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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
ON THE MODERN NATION-STATE 
Karatekelioglu, Petek
Master’s Thesis, Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor; Associate Prof Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Ba9
September 2000
This thesis analyzes, the transformations that occur in the modern nation-state 
in Europe as a result of the process of European integration. In the history of 
Europe, if a first historical conjuncture is the Westphalian Settlement which had 
established the basic grounds upon which the modem nation-state has been 
founded, a second one is the actualization of the European integration process. 
This thesis explores the transformations on the modern nation-state by focusing 
on the principle of sovereignty. The impact of the European Union is analyzed 
both in terms of the integration processes and in terms of the attempts to cope 
with the regional disparities within the Union. A latent attempt is to situate the 
exploration within the context of the process of globalization.
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ÖZET
AVRUPA BİRLİGİ’NİN MODERN ULUS DEVLET ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ
Karatekelioğlu, Petek
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi; Doç. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç
Eylül 2000
Bu çalışma, Avrupa’daki modern ulus devlette, Avrupa birleşme süreci 
sonucunda meydana gelen değişimleri incelemiştir. Avrupa tarihinde bir dönüm 
noktası modern ulus devletin temelini oluşturan Vestfalya Antlaşması ise, bir 
diğer dönüm noktası da Avrupa birleşme surecinin gerçekleştirilmesidir. Bu 
çalışma, ulus devlet üzerindeki değişimleri incelerken, egemenlik kavramını esas 
alacaktır. Avrupa Birliği’nin modern ulus devlet üzerindeki etkisi, hem birleşme 
süreci, hem de bölgesel farklılıkları giderme yolundaki çabalar çerçevesinde 
incelenmiştir. Bir diğer amaç ise, bu değişimleri küreselleşme platformunda ele 
almaya çalışmak olmuştur.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Devlet, Egemenlik
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INTRODUCTION
The opening of the new millenium is marked with fundamental transformations in 
the classical Westphalian system of states. In this so-called “post-Westphalian” 
(Linklater, 1996; Buzan and Little, 1999), “Post-international” (Rosenau, 1990), 
or ‘beyond territorial sovereignty’ (Ruggie, 1993) order, the shape of politics is 
considerably altered. As Held mentions (1999: 9), the notions of “sovereignty, 
state power and territoriality stand today in a more complex relationship than in 
the epoch during which the modern nation-state was being forged”, the prospects 
of “a new sovereignty regime” make up new debates in comparative politics. The 
essence of revealing the coming of a ‘post-Westphalian’ order does not 
necessarily imply the closing down of the state file or the end of the nation-state. 
Indeed, the basic assumption is that the modern nation-state, the basic premises of 
which are drawn from the ‘Wetphalian settlement’ (1648), is undergoing a serious 
process of reconstruction or its general framework is restructured.^ As underlined, 
a latent attempt of this thesis is to explore the transformations that are going on in 
the modem nation-state system in Europe as the result of the process of European 
integration, which is part and parcel of the post-Westphalian order. The European
' This argument is basically drawn from the ‘transformationalist thesis’, which is an outlook to the 
process o f globalization. Its underlying assumption is that “globalization is central driving force 
behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that are reshaping modem societies and 
world order”. However, “the transformationalists make no claims about the future trajectory o f  
globalization; nor do they seek to evaluate the present in relation to some single fixed ideal type 
‘globalized world’ whether a global market or a global civilization. Rather, transformationdist 
accounts emphasize globalization as a long term historical process which is inscribed with 
contradictions and which is significantly shaped by conjunctural factors”. See Held, David and et 
al. 1999. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, pp. 7-10.
integration for about half a century can be regarded as an integral part of the 
dynamics of the modern nation-states involved in this process. As it is the main 
proposition of this thesis, the process of integration, which is going on under the 
umbrella of the EU, is pushing for a serious reformulation of the modern nation­
state by undermining its sovereignty. In addition to this, the capacity and 
autonomy, relating to the independent policy making potential of the modern 
state, are weakened. There is a double-pressure on the nation-state; the first and 
the foremost pressure, which covers the most of the thesis, is the supranational 
forces of the EU that are pushing for further unification, respectively, on both 
domains of Tow politics’ and ‘high politics’.^  On the other hand, there is a 
fragmentary move on the part of the localities within the EU member states as the 
result of their increase in political strength, which is also an outcome of the 
European integration\unification movement.^
In the first chapter of the study, the purpose will be to explore the historical 
evolution of and the basic premises upon which the modem nation-state in 
Western Europe rests, in order to develop a proper comprehension of the 
reformulation or restmcturation processes which it is experiencing. In this respect, 
the general purpose of the first chapter is to explore the Westphalian State in
 ^ ‘High politics’ issue involves “policies concerned with the existence and preservation of the state 
(such as territorial issues, defense policy and balance of power manoeuvrings). ‘Low politics’ 
issues “are more concerned with the wealth and welfare o f the populations (such as policies on 
trade, monetary stability, environmental protection, and airline safety). See Nugent, Neil. 1999. 
The Governments and Politics o f the European Union, pp.7-8.
 ^ As it will be specified in the first chapter, the processes o f globalization constitutes the wider 
framework within which the process o f European integration is taking place. Consequently, the 
regional integration in Europe is also effected by the integrative and fragmentary forces o f  
globalization. See, Axtmaim, Roland (ed.) 1998. Globalization and Europe:Theoretical and 
Empirical Investigations.
historical perspective.'* The basic emphasis will be on the sovereignty principle of 
the modern nation-state, as it was conceptualized by the Westphalian Settlement 
(1648), and evolved throughout the eighteen, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
A second attempt will be to underline briefly what is implied by the strength of 
the state. This will be made by introducing the relative autonomy and capacity 
through the interplay of which the strength of the state is measured (Migdal, 1987; 
Skocpol, 1987; Nordlinger, 1987). Finally, the challenges that the late 20* century 
has brought about to the modern understanding of the nation-state will generally 
be open to discussion. The focus will basically be on the integrative and the 
fragmentary forces of the globalization process. This is attempted to provide a 
general framework for the analysis of the European integration process. The first 
chapter of the thesis consists of a very general discussion of the underlying pillars 
upon which the modern nation-state rests as well as the contemporary challenges 
that it faces. In the subsequent chapters of the thesis the study of the modem 
nation-state will be deepened hand in hand with the exploration of the impact of 
the European integration on the member states of the European Union.
In this respect, the second chapter of the thesis will cover the evolution of the 
European integration process up until the introduction of the Treaty on the 
European Union. This period is mainly marked by the economic integration and 
the completion of the Single European Market, which are of great significance for 
the purpose of the thesis. The focus will be on the processes whereby the members
The ‘Westphalian State’ is used to refer to the modem nation-state. The study takes the 
Westphalian Settlement as the historical conjuncture when the conception o f modem nation-state 
emerged and evolved throughout the following centinies.
states share their sovereign rights with the ECVEU. Another aim is to demonstrate 
the extent to which the relative autonomy and capacities of the member states in 
their policy formulations has been undermined. The chapter will also cover some 
significant empirical cases to demonstrate the proposition of this thesis, the 
rulings of the European Court of Justice and the Reports to the Community are 
some examples (i.e. Van Gend en Loss case, Cassis de Dijon case, Tindemans 
Report, White Paper).
The third chapter consists of the study of the institutional framework of the EU. 
The underlying purpose is to develop an understanding of the functioning of the 
dialects between the supranational and the integovemmental axis around which 
the European integration revolves. The supranational pillar is where the member 
states have given up most of their sovereign rights to the Community, and the 
intergovernmental pillar is where the member states still hold most of their 
sovereign rights. However, on the one hand it will be demonstrated that the 
conclusions adopted in the intergovernmental pillars generally lead to further 
supranationalism. On the· other hand even if the states remain sovereign, their 
independent policy formulation capacities are considerably undermined. Another 
latent objective, although not specifically reserved to this chapter, is to underline 
the role of ‘constitutionalism’ for the process of integration be sustained.  ^ In the 
final chapter the prospects for the European Economic, Monetary and Political 
Unification will be explored. This chapter essentially consists of an account of the
In this context, ‘constitutionalism’ refers generally to the Community Law, yet at the same time 
it refers the process whereby common codes o f conduct are formalized, institutionalized to become 
part of the EC\EU identity. See Weiler, J.H.H. 1997. The Reformation o f European 
Constitutionalism.
Steps achieved in relation to political unification in Europe.^ The underlying aim is 
to develop an understanding of the extent and scope of the reformulation that 
European integration\unification has stimulated on the nation-states, which are 
involved in the process. The idea of a European Citizen, the Economic and 
Monetary Unification symbolized by the single European Currency (Euro), the 
European Common Foreign Security and Defense (Identity) Policies are explored 
as instances of stretching forth to the supranational. Another important part of this 
chapter is the study of the increased political strength of the localities, which bring 
about fragmentation. How and why intertwined are the process of integration and 
fragmentation will be attempted to be explored. And, the connection between 
globalization and Europeanization will become clearer.
The focus o f the fourth chapter will essentially be on integration in ‘high policy’ issues.
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CHAPTER 1
THE WESTPHALIAN STATE
Held (1984: 29) has pointed out to the centrality of the state in human life by 
mentioning that
The state...appears to be everywhere, regulating the conditions of our lives 
from birth registration to death certification. Yet, the nature of the state is 
hard to grasp. This may seem peculiar for something so pervasive in public 
and private life, but it is precisely this pervasiveness which makes it 
difficult to understand. There is nothing more central to political and social 
theory than the nature of the state and nothing more contested.
It is true that when a student of political science goes back throughout an
historical exploration of the state she\he will find out a wide range of literature on
the political entities experienced by human collectivities, and corresponding
theories about the best possible polity that ought to conduct and organize the
mundane affairs of these societies. To put it somewhat differently, the main
concern of the political thinkers throughout history was to find out the best
possible system of rule that would efficiently regulate the internal activities of a
given community and its interaction with other communities at a given time and
space.^ This inherent inquiry is due to the fact that changes and differences are in
 ^ To begin with the political thinkers, the most prominent of which are Plato and Aristotle, in 
Ancient Greek times, to be followed by the medieval times, and throughout the modem epoch, the 
basic concern of political thought was the search for a proper system of m le to organize the social, 
economic and political interactions o f the societies. For an extensive study of the history o f  
political thought, see Weiser, James L. 1983. Political Philosophy: A History o f the Search o f  
Order. McLennan, Gregor, David Held and Stuart Hall (eds.) 1984. The Idea o f the Modern State, 
and Held, David (ed.) 1991. Political Theory Today.
conjunction with human life. In this context, retrospection of history demonstrates 
that the definition of the best possible system of rule experiences corresponding 
transformations.
The contemporary international system is composed of a wide range of nation­
states, as the modern political entity regulating the internal and external activities 
of their societies, and interacting with one another. Yet, at the edge of the 21^ 
century, the integrative and fragmentary pressures posed by the forces of 
globalization, by the emergence of supranational organizations, and by the 
increased political strength and the fragmentary forces of localities are 
challenging the basic premises upon which the modem nation-states are founded. 
These developments lead to the question of whether the political division of the 
world into various nominally independent nation-states is prompt to change or 
not. (Watson, 1992; Watson, 1997). Indeed, the present epoch promise to be one 
of considerable transformations with respect to the international system of states. 
Even if at varying degrees, all the nation-states are effected by these integrative 
and the fragmentary pressures within the system. However, the exploration of the 
transformation experienced by all the nation-states across the globe will be too an 
extensive work exceeding the scope of this present study. Consequently, the 
thesis will concentrate mainly on the transformations in Western European states 
in general, and within the framework of the ongoing process of the European
* The current state of international relations is conceptualized by Rosenau as “postintemational 
politics”. According to this new conceptualization, the emergence of new political actors in the 
international arena is stimulating considerable reformulation in the traditional imderstandings o f  
the external and mtemal affairs of the societies. In his work, he provides an extensive analysis o f  
the contemporary challenges that the modem international societies are facing. See Rosenau, 
James N. 1990. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory o f Change and Continuity.
integration\unification. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that the time and 
space where the concept of the modern nation-state, as a territorially sovereign 
polity, emerged is in Western Europe, and is symbolized by the 1648 Westphalian 
Settlement that is the outcome of “the intersection o f ‘international’ and ‘national’ 
conditions and processes” (Held, 1999: 36). The legacy of the European system of 
states, as developed throughout seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth 
centuries, still persists today in its general tenets. Its basic institutions and norms 
are still more or less applied in the contemporary organizations of societies 
(Watson, 1992). Consequently, to explore the reformulation of the state in 
Western Europe, promise to be an important point of departure in order to grasp, 
at least in part, the changes that are occurring in the international system.
Before going into a general exploration of the sources of these transformations 
both experienced and theorized in Western Europe, the following section will 
focus on the emergence and evolution of the modern nation-state in Western 
Europe. The study is introductory to the underlying principles of the modem 
nation-state the elaboration of which will be deepened in the subsequent chapters 
while analyzing its interactions with the integrative and the fragmentary forces of 
the EC\EU.
1.1 The Evolution of the Modern Nation-State in Western Europe
The concept of modern nation-state and the rationale of the modem international 
system originates in Western Europe. It is the output of the interactions among 
cultural, social, economic and political dynamics, which the Western Europe
experienced throughout its history. The history reveals that all the nation-states 
that are today considered as being part of the integration process of the EU have 
had a contribution on the making-up of this modem nation-state. The classical 
civilization of Greece, the feudal stmcture of the medieval Latin Christendom, the 
Italian Renaissance, the Reformation and the connter-Reformation, the overseas 
expansions launched by the Spanish and Portugal kingdoms, the ‘Glorious 
Revolution’ in England, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and the 
two World Wars in Europe, all these experiences combined together to pave the 
way for the theoretical and practical grounds upon which the Western culture and 
the modern nation-state are founded.^ To provide a coherent picture of the modem 
nation-state in Western Europe, these historical inputs active in the formation and 
evolution of the modern nation-state will be touched upon. However, while 
depicting the historical evolution of the concept, the basic emphasis will be on the 
main pillars of this state in question as they are proposed in this thesis.
As already mentioned, the study focuses on two major pillars upon which the 
modern nation-state is traditionally supposed to stand. These are the principle of 
sovereignty, and the notion of strength as it is measured through its autonomy and 
capacities. However, before going into an exploration of these two basic tools to 
define the state, a very general description on the nature and scope of the modem 
nation-state is necessary to project a light on the subsequent sections. The state 
has a function to act as an arbiter of interests in two different spheres of social 
interactions, the internal and the external. To repeat the observation of Held
® A very extensive study of the European history is provided in Palmer, R.R. and Joel Colton. 
1971. A History o f the Modern World.
(1999: 36), “the interstate system crystallized” at the conjunction of the internal 
and external “conditions and processes”.
1.1.1 The State as an Introvert and Extrovert Existence
A very general exploration of the concept of the modern state reveals two major 
dimensions determining its nature and scope. The first one is the internal 
dimension, which consists of the regulation and the inter-mediation of the 
domestic activities of a society within a given territorial boundary. The second 
one is the external dimension, which involves the regulation and the inter­
mediation of the activities of this territorially confined society with the rest of the 
world. Poggi (1978), in the introductory chapter of his work The Development o f 
the Modem State gives a general explanation of these two dimensions of the 
nature and scope of the state. First, he defines ‘politics’ as the institutionalized 
form of ruling a certain social system. Then he identifies the state as the privileged 
institution in “politics” or the “political”, and observes that “the state...reserves to 
itself the business of rule over a territorially bounded society; it monopolizes in 
law and as far as possible in fact, all the faculties pertaining to that business”. 
Accordingly, he refers to the political theories of David Easton and Carl Schmitt, 
which he contrasts and reconciles in order to provide a general framework of this 
“business of rule” that the state is involved in. Within this framework, Easton’ s 
conception of “politics” is the circle of creating, generating, distributing and 
redistributing scarce and valuable resources within a given society. The ‘values’ 
are created, in a ‘territorially bounded society’, both by the processes of social 
interaction and by the processes of re-allocation of these created values by the
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state. Accordingly, these valuable resources may be on the one hand abstract, 
such as cultural constructs, having symbolic values attached to them by the 
society. These are redistributed by the state or by ‘politics’, so as to meet the 
moral needs of a given society. On the other hand, they can be concrete, such as 
the production of goods and services, having material values attached to them. 
These are redistributed by the state, so as to realize the material needs and the 
welfare of a given society.^' Yet, according to Easton, the processes of 
redistribution of the resources is not a random one, it involves “commands” that 
are issued by the state as the result of its mediating role between the individuals or 
various groups within a society, given that these resources are “scarce”. 
Accordingly, to ensure order and obedience within this framework of allocation 
the state has the legitimate right to issue laws and to use force as a last recourse. 
According to Easton, through this process of allocation and re-allocation of these 
“valuable things” the continuation of a society is realized, as well as its adaptation 
to the changing moral and material needs corresponding to the changing 
requirements of specific times. Consequently, this process also involves the 
creation and re-generation of common values and interests within a given society, 
which makes it distinct from the others existing ones. This is the sustained
David Easton is an early twentieth century political scientist and his conceptualization o f politics 
as the allocation of the material and moral resources reflects the political tradition o f “post- 
Norman England” among the ancestors of which are Thomas More, Thomas Hobbes, and John 
Locke. As Poggi observes, “in a country protected by the sea from the direct and continuous threat 
of aggressive neighbors, political thought and praxis naturally turn inward”, and “public 
controversy, the safeguarding of rights and the framing and enforcing of laws appear as the very 
essence o f political business”. In this tradition the powers and functions intemhl to the state to 
reproduce the society has been the major focus, consequently the internal dimension o f the 
‘sovereignty’ o f the state over its territory was the major concern. See Poggi, Gianfranco. 1978. 
The Development o f the Modern State, pp. 9-10.
" In modem societies, this is basically realized though the interplay o f public revenues and 
expenditures via taxation. Tax collection is a cmcial financial resource for the state to manage 
social welfare provisions.
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creation of a ‘common identity’ conception between the citizens of the state in 
question, a notion of what makes “Us”. However, the concept of political as the 
distinction between “Us” and “Others” is dealt by Carl Schmitt.*^ According to 
Schmitt, collectivities have both symbolic and geographic possessions. They are 
cultural existences within given territories, in which their identities are 
constituted. Yet, the underlying assumption is that each collectivity is faced with 
the threats coming from the inimical “others”. Therefore, the ultimate function of 
the “political”, in Schmitt conceptualization, is to set and maintain the boundary 
“distinction” between the societies and to protect the common identity, security 
and existence of a certain society against the threats coming from outside the 
geographical possessions of the state. Consequently, this view of politics involves 
that each state be permanently prepared by strong foreign security and defense 
strategies to be able to face the constant threats coming from the “others”.
According to Poggi, these two views of politics, one concerned with the domestic 
dimension and the other concerned with the international one, are complementary. 
Accordingly, they provide a general framework upon which the nature and scope 
of the modern nation-state is based. Therefore, it can be drawn out from this 
picture that the business of the state is basically to rule, regulate and mediate the 
external and the internal affairs of a ‘territorially bounded society’, so as to secure
As Poggi observes, Schmitt “restates a Continental conception, one first and most sharply 
articulated by Machiavelli in the sixteenth century as the operational codes of the emergent 
sovereign states of Western and Central Europe”. In this context, the political experiences was 
primarily based on the "continuous threat, potential or actual, that each country poses to its 
neighbor’s boundaries and the ensuing continuous stmggle for an equilibrium acceptable to all 
countries involved. Under these conditions political thought and praxis necessarily tun outward, 
according the highest priority to diplomacy and war”. See Poggi, Gianfranco. 1978. The 
Development o f the Modern State.
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the continuity of it by means of existential and normative decisions. By doing 
so, when necessary it has the legitimate and exclusive access to the means of 
coercion to promote domestic order and security against internal and external 
threats, which endanger the resources, interests and identity of the society (Poggi; 
1978).
1
In this chapter that is introductory to the basic tenets of the modern nation-state in 
Western Europe so that to show how it is prompt to be reformulated by the 2E* 
century, after this introduction concerning the general nature and scope of the 
modern state, as it is conceived by the early 20**' century political thinkers quite 
before the European integration process, the principle of sovereignty and the 
conceptual tools to measure the strength of the state can be elaborated on this 
light. The fact is that, both the conception sovereignty and strength are related to 
this introvert and extrovert existence of the state. Indeed, the principle of the 
‘territorial sovereignty’ of the states rests fundamentally on these two qualities of
the state 14
1.1.2 The Principle of Sovereignty
The principle of sovereignty is used as a major pillar to identify the nature and the 
scope of the modern nation-state. It emerged as an attempt to legitimize the power 
of the state to be located within a single center and its independence from any
Existential and normative decisions implies, the processes o f social, economic and political 
interactions whereby the reproduction of common values is realized and the regulation of these 
interactions by the means of law so as to provide the continuation o f a given society.
‘Tlie principle of ‘territorial sovereignty’ will be furthered in the subsequent chapters of the 
thesis in relation to the impact of the European integration\unification processes on the state.
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supranational modes of governance (Newman, 1996: 5)/^ Indeed, it implies that 
the state has ultimate jurisdiction over the population and the resources within a 
delimited territory. In this respect, “a sovereign state is a political organization 
that has the capacity to make laws” and enforce them if necessary through its 
monopoly over the disposal of the means of coercion, to control policies, and to 
manage the “national economy that is the basis of its revenue” (Newman, 1996; 
11). Additionally, it also assumes that the state is independent from and 
normatively equal to such other states in the international system. The evolution 
of the principle of sovereignty, corresponds to the historical evolution of the 
modern nation-state. Accordingly, the roots of the modern nation-state are traced 
at the heart of the Italian Renaissance. In the 15*^  and 16*'’ centuries, Italy was 
fragmented into various city-states named ''stato” (Watson, 1992:156-157). These 
were self-governing city-states ruled by princes who were backed by wealthy and 
powerful traders, bankers and artisans families.'® In this context new techniques of 
governance developed, mainly driven from the economic competition between 
these co-existing statos. This involved the attempt to crystallize power within the 
territories of the city-state, and to consolidate as far as possible this power through 
the economic and military capacities against the threats coming from other such
This specifically refers to the context in which the notion o f sovereignty emerged as the “need 
for power to be located in the state and to undermine the claims of others to dispute” this supreme 
jurisdiction o f the state “on the basis of such justifications as ancient privileges or Christian 
universalim.” See Newman, Michael. 1996. Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union, pp. 
5-6.
Another study relating to the city-states as the historical predecessors o f the modem state is 
provided in Burke. He assumes that the exploration of the social, economic and political dynamics 
of the city-states have constituted the basis of the modem states. From Athens, Florence to 
Hamburg and Lubeck, he analyzes the common denominators of these cities and of the economic, 
social and political lives o f townspeople the existence of which has endorsed the emergence o f the 
modem state. See Burke, Peter. 1994. “City-States”. In Hall, John A, ed.. The State Critical 
Concepts (Vol. 1), pp. 530-543.
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polities. Nicollo Machiavelli, the major political thinker of that age, today “often 
regarded as the first theorist of the modern state”, in his works The Prince and The 
Discourses reflected the major political trends of his time (Held; 1987; 43). In his 
writings he tried to find an equilibrium between the powers of the state and the 
citizens. In this period, the revival of the ancient Greek learning permitted such a 
conception of the collectivity that lived in the Italian city-states. According to 
Machiavelli, as opposed to the Christian doctrine, there was no God given or 
natural principle for organizing social life but it was the purpose of politics to 
handle it. Politics was the struggle to power through which the societies operated. 
However, he thought that the human nature was selfish, therefore his main 
question was how to transform this human being into a political being that will set 
the interest of the community above his personal will. Machiavelli, through his 
adoption of the 'polybian cycle of constitutions’ argued that Rome was an ideal 
type of government because it contained the dynamics of monarchy, aristocracy 
and democracy. He was to some extent against tyranny because he assumed that 
in order to secure the collectivity from the pressures coming from other 
communities there was a need for internal cohesion and harmony to be established 
through some kind of consent by the people. However, considering the actual 
competition and warfare between the Italian city-states he conceptualized a 
‘strong state’ as one that was able to secure its community from the threats 
coming from outside (Watson, 1992: 158).“The necessity of an organized political 
force, supreme in its own territory and actively pursuing a policy of
17 The ‘polybian cycle o f constitutions’ is a continuum model of ruling from monarchy to 
-uistocracy to be followed by democracy and to return back to monarchy.
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aggrandizement” (Held, 1987:47). Indeed, Machiavelli who was also arguing for 
the realization of the liberties of the citizens, considering the realities of the inter­
city-states relations set himself closer to the monarchy end of the choices for an 
appropriate system of rule. Meanwhile, another aspect of the Italian Renaissance 
was “Humanism”, which was characterized by its substantial emphasis on the 
potential capabilities for self-achievement of the human being. The humanist 
ideals are important in the sense that they provided a ground for the diffusion of 
liberal sprit of inquiry undermining the doctrines of the Catholic Church.
The basic tenets of the Italian Renaissance spread to other parts of the European 
continent. In this period. Medieval Europe was fragmented into various localities 
ruled by multiple and overlapping centers of power divided between the local 
nobility, the clergy and the townspeople, which were unified under the authority 
of the Christian Church, this was the period of the feudal model of governance 
(Marks, 1997: 91). However, the Renaissance ideals combined with the divisive 
forces of the Reformation movements and the rise in economic power of the 
townspeople brought about new conceptions of rule. In this respect, first, the 
Calvinists declaration Vindiciae contra Tyrannos (1579) was assumed to provide 
a collectivity the legitimate right to resist an oppressive ruler and to legitimize the 
right to choose the religious community into which one will to belong (Watson, 
1992: 170). Consequently, these reformist movements challenged deeply the 
universalistic authority of the Christian Church. Second, the townspeople mainly 
engaged in economic activities such as trade, commerce and banking were in 
support of a more centralized authority within which they could secure their
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economic activities. Although, the towns had acquired relative autonomy from 
other competing centers of feudal power and had developed a system of ‘self- 
governance’^^ , this newly emerging bourgeoisie were supporting the creation of a 
more unified, territorially delimited state which could impose a uniform system of 
law, order and administration so that to secure and to conduct effectively their 
economic interests and their culture against other feudal actors (Poggi, 1978: 57- 
58; Lipset and Rokkan, 1990: 95-96). In response to these major developments, 
the position of the higher territorial rulers (kings) was reinforced with regard the 
other overlapping feudal locus of ‘sovereignty’. Consequently, the gradual 
concentration of power into the hands of these kings as the absolute rulers in their 
territories was to be legitimized. Therefore a new conception of statecraft 
gradually emerged in Western Europe,
The movements of trade, commerce and capital undermined dense local 
structures of feudalism, creating more unified, state wide national economies. 
The Territorial boundaries increasingly coincided with the limits within which 
the state could effectively impose a uniform system of law, order and 
administration. Trough ‘mercantilism’, the dominant economic doctrine under 
Absolutism, the state and crown assumed direct role in commercial 
enterprises. These states therefore increasingly acquired a ‘national’ 
character...(Hall, 1984: 7)
This was the opening of the Absolutist era, the internal dynamics of which paved 
the way for the modern conception of territorial sovereignty. Another related
This was based on a system of representation by estates. The townspeople, the clergy and the 
nobility came together to decide on issues relating particularly to the proper management o f the 
land and o f the economic activities, which had a translocal character. This was in fact an 
intermediary to confront or to cooperate with the raler at the top of the feudal hierarchy (the 
kings). In this context emerged the medieval ‘Parlement’, which “decided everything, alone, as a 
sovereign. It constituted a collective governor strong in traditions, in the favor of true prince 
immortality”. In the period, still the rule and the loyalties were fragmented, yet it was transitory to 
Absolutism. See Poggi, Gianfranco. 1978. The Development o f the Modern State, pp. 36-59, and 
Hall, Stuart. 1984. “The State in question”. In McLeiman, Gregor, David Held and Stuart Hall ,ed.. 
The Idea o f  the Modern State, pp. 4-9.
17
development was the external interactions between these emerging territorial 
units.
Followed by a series of major wars in Europe fought over the territorial claims of 
the rulers, the major one is the Thirty Years War, the settlement of Westphalia 
(1648) is the cornerstone of the modern state and the international system. It 
brought about the collapse of the authority of the Church, and the closing of the 
decentralized political power of the feudal Europe. It legitimized the 
“commonwealth of sovereign states”, which were assumed to have supreme 
power in the ruling of their internal affairs and independent from external sources 
of jurisdictions (Watson, 1992:186). Accordingly, the sovereign rulers drawn the 
territorial boundaries of their states and within their territories they were neither 
bound by the supposedly universal laws of the Catholic Church or that of another 
territorial ruler outside or inside their state, the authority of the rulers was 
monopolized and centralized. However, this conception of sovereignty remains 
different from the contemporary notion because it was primarily perceived as the 
faculty of the personal ruler. Consequently, only a premature conception that 
‘sovereignty belonged to the people’ over whom the power was exercised 
emerged (Newman, 1996; 6-7). Another ambiguity, concerning the practicability 
of such an understanding of sovereignty, was that the sovereign states were 
assumed to have juridical equality but they were inevitably in a state of 
hierarchical equality in terms of their power relationships. This is in fact an issue 
that conserves its actuality in our global society, hypothetically, even if the 
assumed equality of the members belonging to a specific nation-state is realized in
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practice there comes the problem of achieving real equality between the different 
societies existing across the international system. Nevertheless, the concept of 
political equality of the states, as brought about by Westphalia, is central to the 
definition of the modern nation state.
In this respect, the Settlement of Westphalia, in 1648, was aimed at setting clear 
cut geographical boundaries with regard to the area over which each and every 
rulers were entitled to rule so that to put an end to the previous wars. In other 
words, each ruler acquired the right of jurisdiction over a territorially bounded 
state within which they were recognized as the only source of authority to manage 
the internal and the external relations of the community and to control the 
resources which were confined to this territory. This was the first path towards the 
emergence of the modern nation-state and the consequent formation of interstate 
system. Indeed, the framework of the Westphalian model, as underlined below, 
legitimized the modern state system,
(1) The world consists of, and is divided into, sovereign territorial states 
which recognize no superior authority. (2) The processes of law making, 
the settlement of disputes and law enforcement is largely in the hands of 
individual states. (3) International law is oriented to the establishment of 
minimal rules of coexistence; the creation of enduring relationships among 
states and people is an aim, but only to the extent that it allows state 
objectives to be met. (4) Responsibility of cross-border wrongfial acts is a 
‘private matter’ concerning only those affected. (5) All states are regarded 
as equal before law; the legal rules do not take account of asymmetries of 
power. (6) Differences among states are often settled by force; the 
principle of effective power holds sway. Virtually no legal fetters exist to 
curb the resort to force; international legal standards afford minimal 
protection. (7) The minimization of impediments to state freedom is the 
‘collective priority’. (Held and et. al, 1999: 37-38)
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Therefore, the right of each state to act independently and autonomously with
respect to such other state was legitimized and enforced by the mutual agreement
of each state making up this newly emerging interstate system. In this
conceptualization, as Held mentions (1999:38), “States were conceived as
‘separate and discrete political orders’ with no common authority to shape or
curtail their activities”. Therefore, as Morris claims (1998:224),
A “sovereign” is the unique ruler of a realm, whose sphere of authority 
encompasses the whole realm, without overlapping that of another ruler.
This “sovereign” initially the monarch, later the state, then “the people” -  
rules without superiors”. With the development of sovereign states, the 
central elements of the modern state system are present. “International 
relations” are the relations between independent states.
Indeed, as demonstrated, this principle has two dimensions; the state acquires both 
supreme governance in its territory and independence of action from other states 
in the system. In this context, it is important to clarify that in terms of the conduct 
of its domestic affairs, the effective use of the granted autonomy of a state 
depends on its capacity to set the rules independently from the social forces and 
other agencies within and outside its realm (Held, 1999:37). This is related to the 
strength of the state in terms of its capacities to meet the moral and material 
expectations of the community over which it has the legitimate right to rule and its 
relative autonomy to set the rules to meet its objectives. In this respect, both the 
issues of sovereignty and strength of a state will become much more complicated 
throughout the evolution of the international society of states. These will be 
touched upon in the forthcoming exploration of the evolution of the European 
Union as a newly emerging regional form of governance. Yet, it is important to
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clarify two important legal issues to be explored latter in terms of the 
jurisprudence of the European Communities. As Held mentions (1999:38), this 
emerging Wesphalian model also implied the ‘immunity from jurisdiction’ and 
‘immunity of state agencies’, the former means that “no state can be sued in the 
courts of another state for the acts performed in its sovereign capacity”, and the 
latter “should an individual break the law of another state while acting as an agent 
for his country of origin and be brought before that state’s court, he is not held 
“guilty”...”. Thus, the states were independent to pursue their interests and no 
‘ supranational courts’ were permitted to rule on their behavior.
The era of Absolutist rule proved to be very crucial for the development of the 
conceptions of statehood and nationhood associated with the feelings of belonging 
to a specific nation and the consequent loyalty to the state within the territories of 
which that specific nation was situated. The very fact of being enclosed into a 
territorially bounded state, where the affairs of the community were directed from 
one single center of rule aiming at implementing a uniform sets of rule and shape 
the society into having common values this seems to be inevitable. The state had a 
standing army, a single market, a centralized bureaucracy, and a centralized 
system of education, single set of taxation and codified rule. All these elements 
combined together provided a centralized administration through, which the state 
could consolidate its power internally and adopt strong foreign policies against 
other sovereigns. It is in this context that the ideals of Enlightenment, in the 
eighteen century, also characterized as the age of reason and balance, flourished 
(Watson, 1992; 200-201). The main point that concerns this study is the
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contribution of Enlightenment to the development of the distinction between the 
will of the state and the will of the absolute ruler. In this period, the bourgeoisie, 
especially in France, improved its economic conditions and was in the quest of a 
form of government where it could be enabled to exercise political authority. The 
intellectual debates in the search of a more enlightened system of rule which 
would respect the principle of the ‘rule of law’ emerged in this context. Yet, still 
the notions of ‘state sovereignty’ and ‘legal sovereignty’ were not directly 
connected to the democratic ideals of ‘popular sovereignty’, which was to be 
developed more comprehensively in the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and in 
the ideals of the French Revolution (Newman, 1996; 6). In these conceptions, the 
state and the people came to be identified with one another in the 
conceptualization of ‘popular state sovereignty’. This was a first step in the 
evolution of the notion of ‘national sovereignty’. Another source of influence that 
led to the establishment of the principle of ‘sovereign nations’, was the English 
model of ‘Constitutional Monarchy’ where the people were assumed to be the 
partners of the King in terms of the decisions made in the state. This was an early 
form of the liberal-democratic tradition whereby the idea to establish “democratic 
institutions through which the citizens may express their political demands and 
preferences” where the power could be divided between the executive, legislative 
and the judicial organs “to decentralize the responsibilities within the state, while 
maintaining the national sovereignty” (Newman, 1996: 8-9). As a result of the 
combination of all these factors, the break of the French Revolution in 1789 
symbolizes the transfer of sovereignty from the absolute ruler to the nation living 
within the territories of the modem state. The French revolutionaries with the
22
^''Declaration Des Droits De L'Homme Et Du Citoyen" asserted that the
conception of sovereignty was legitimate only to the extent that the state was a
mechanism of self-rule of the citizens. The consequent developments with regard
to the sovereignty principle of the modern nation state in western Europe, are
concerned with the efforts to consolidate the ideas and ideals set forth by the
French Revolution. In this context, the notions of nationalism and democracy
were intertwined. The modern conception of the nation-state involves a double
construct; the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’. Accordingly, ‘nations’ can be defined as
“cross-class collectivities which share a sense of identity and collective political
fate on the basis of a real, imagined and constructed cultural, linguistic and
historical commonalities” and ‘nationalism’ as “both the emotive allegiance of
individuals to that identity and community, and the political project of acquiring a
state in which that nation is dominant” (Held, 1999: 48). In retrospect, the
processes of state-building, which basically was launched by the Westphalia
Settlement, more or less enforced the reduction in socioeconomic and cultural
differences between the peoples living within the geographical boundaries of a
given state, but in the meantime increased their consciousness of being different
from such other collectivities of people situated beyond the territories of their
state. Although the processes of ‘state building’ and ‘nation-building’ varied
across Europe, the general trend was an attempt to stimulate a centralized
sovereign regime of rule within a territorially delimited geographical space, and
reciprocally, in this period, the waves of ‘nationalism’ endorsed this centralized
power of the state. As Marks (1997; 89) mentions.
The overall direction of power redistribution and the locus of power 
creation in the process of state building from the thirteenth to twentieth 
centuries was towards the center. The monopolization of legitimate
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authority, the creation of a secular hierarchical system of justice the 
deepening and widening of taxation all pressed decision-making towards 
the national level. This development was greatly intensified with the rise of 
nationalism across Europe and the identification of centralized education, 
provision of welfare, and control of various sectors of the economy with 
the interest of the nation as expressed by the state.
Accordingly, in the European context, the formation of state identity and national 
identity were intertwined and they were the outcomes of specific historical 
circumstances. Consequently, it is important to remind that sovereignty, which 
initially was exercised by the monarch, gradually came to be exercised by the 
‘state’ and by the ‘people’ (Morris, 1999: 224) . In this context, on the one hand 
the people are assumed to have an emotional loyalty to their nation compounded 
with a feeling of belonging to the common identity of that nation. On the other 
hand, they are legally bound to the identity of their state through the status of 
citizenship, which empowers them with the right to participate in the political 
decision-making processes in their nation-state. In other words, the bridge 
between the individuals making up a political community and their respective 
nation-state is built through their citizenship and national identities. In this 
context, as Held mentions (1999: 46), “the modern nation-state has acquired a 
particular form -its main variant has crystallized as liberal or representative 
democracy". Accordingly, the ‘people’ or the ‘nation’ is supposed to exercise 
sovereignty through the institutions of liberal democracy. Moreover, this 
constitutes also the mechanisms trough which the political community formulates 
its ‘common good and values’ and the subsequent ‘common interests’. 
Consequently, this also provides a platform to construct or re-construct the 
collective identity of the community. In other words, this involves a process of
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identification with the ‘fate’ of one another within the collectivity through which 
the construction of common interests are intertwined with the construction of a 
common identity (Weldes, 1996; Wendt, 1994:386). Additionally, an effective 
democracy transcends the basic cleavages existing in a given society; while it can 
result in the share of the political power by the ‘many’, it should not exclude the 
representation of the ‘few’ (Rueschmeyer and Stephens, 1992:44). It is crucial that 
all the constituent parts of a collectivity participate in the construction of its legal 
framework. Participation to the decision-making processes is important because it 
involves social and political interaction for the definition and re-definition of 
collective values and interests, and the consequent construction of collective 
identity. Therefore, the extent of participation in the ‘constitution’ will be 
reflective of the extent of feeling of belonging to that specific community. As 
Held mentions (1999:48,49),
In the contemporary world the key principles and practices of liberal 
democracy remain associated almost exclusively with the principles and 
institutions of the sovereign nation-state. Further, modern democratic 
theory and democratic politics assumes a symmetry and congruence 
between citizen-voters and national decision-makers. Through the ballot 
box, citizens-voters are, in principle, able to hold decision-makers to 
account; and, as a result of electoral consent, decision-makers are able to 
make and pursue law and policy legitimately for their constituents, 
ultimately the people in a fixed territorially based community...the modern 
system of democratic nation-states can be characterized by...the 
entrenchment of accountability and democratic legitimacy inside state 
boundaries and the pursuit of national interests (an maximum political 
advantage) outside such boundaries; democracy and citizenship rights for 
those regarded as ‘insiders’ and the frequent negation of these rights for 
those beyond their borders.
Therefore, the political community trough the mechanisms of liberal democracy 
builds a legal framework, which sets the rules and regulations to organize the
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social, economic and political life within a territorially bounded state and traces 
the limits of its collective identity.
The nation had acquired the legitimate right to rule or at least to determine their 
rulers. This was determined as the basic rights of the citizens, and such a system 
of self-government through representation was defined as democracy. Therefore 
democracy emerged as a system of rule in which the ‘nation’ became the citizen 
of the state and acquired the legitimate right to lay down the rules. Accordingly, 
democracy assumed that the nation ought to be sovereign and that the most natural 
form of the state was one composed of a ‘single people’ with a ‘single national 
character’ in possession of an ‘independent state’ (Watson, 1992:245). Therefore, 
“the artful combination of space, people and resources in territorialized 
containtements and the policing, monitoring and disciplining of the population 
within these spaces became the manifestation of state sovereignty” (Axtmann, 
1998: 6). However, the contemporary forces of the globalization process are 
challenging more than ever this assumed and accepted as legitimate notion of 
sovereignty of this modern nation-state, “these distinctions themselves no longer 
appear so clear-cut as political globalization itself has encouraged the growth of 
global politics” (Held, 1999: 49). A point to which the study will return back 
while discussing the relationship between the globalization process and the 
modern nation-state.
At the end of the nineteenth century the European institutions were spread all 
around the globe. During this period “the Europeans brought the whole world for
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the first time into a single net of economic and strategic relations” (Watson, 
1992:265). The major contributor to this development was the high degrees of 
scientific and technologic innovations on the European continent backed by the 
sustained economic growth and followed by the Industrial Revolution. As it was 
clarified, a major reason for this was the availability of the modern nation-state as 
a system of governance for the economic interests of the middle-classes in 
Europe. That is to say that, it was favorable for the accumulation of capital and 
industrialization of the country. The economic power that the Europeans acquired 
also translated itself into the military power. By the end of the 19* century, the 
overseas colonies that the Europeans possessed, other Asian empires with which 
they were in contact, and the Russian and Ottoman polities were under the 
influence, and even more under the hegemony of the western European states that 
tried to reform their states on the European model. Therefore, we can assume that 
this was the first step in the globalization of the European modern nation-state as a 
system of rule, and an era of Europeanization of the world (Axtmann, 1998; 7; 
Watson, 1992; 265 ).
1.1.3 The Strength of the State as Measured through the Interplay of its 
Autonomy and Capacities
In this section of the study, and before going into an analysis of the contemporary 
challenges to the modern nation-state, some significant remarks about the nature 
and scope of the modern nation-state remains to be made. This is related to the 
strength- as measured by the autonomy and capacities of a given state (Migdal, 
1987; Nordlinger, 1987). The relative independence of the state from the internal
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and the external forces is an integral part of the state autonomy. And, the capacity 
of the state is the extent to which it can meet the demands and expectation of its 
population through the effective and efficient use of the resources at its disposal. 
The legitimacy of a given state is highly dependent upon these factors, they are 
important sources of social support. In other words, a ‘strong state’ is assumed to 
rate high in the effective and efficient management of the resources.
In the post-world war period the emergence of the international institutions, 
basically the UN in its Charter (1945), legitimized furthermore the principle of 
sovereignty of the nation-state. However, an additional factor was the revival of 
the notion of Human Rights in all its universality and the duty of the state was 
mainly conceived as the provision of these rights to its citizens. Additionally, the 
Western European states after experiencing the horrors of the total wars were 
mainly concerned with the achievement of a ‘Working Peace System’. The main 
concern in this period was to promote a peaceful environment for the European 
society of states and to reconstruct the economies of Europe. Consequently, at this 
period the state was conceived mainly as being in the service of its citizens to 
remedy the illnesses caused by the wars. Partly, because the ruling elite backed by 
the industrial capitalist class felt themselves responsible for the break of those 
major wars. Since, the total wars broke mainly because of the struggle over 
economic and territorial gains between those European nation-states and at that 
period still the access to the means of communications -  very important to 
mobilize a nation for specific aims and goals- resided mainly in the hands of the 
rulers and the dominant classes. Yet, mainly because it was in the interests of the
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ruling elite to reconstruct Europe, and to promote social welfare in the face of the 
rising threat of communism coming from the Soviet Union. Therefore, in the 
period between 1950s and mid-1980s the specific emphasis was on the duties of 
the state with respect to its citizens (Poggi, 1999). The emergence of the 
Keynesian welfare-state, in which the state was supposed to promote public 
services -such as health, education and unemployment wages- so as to realize a 
more just allocation of resources within the society, goes back to this period (Hall, 
1984: 9-14). Following this period, many scholars wrote about the conception of 
the strength of a given state. Skocpol (1987), Migdal (1987), Nordlinger (1987), 
Huntington (1987) and are among those who brought the question of autonomy 
and capacities of a given state back into the scene. Accordingly, the strength of a 
given state is defined mainly by the interplay of two variables that are autonomy 
and capacity. Consequently, a state is autonomous to the extent that it can 
formulate its own preferences into policies, without being dependent on any 
external or internal forces, i.e. without acting as the instrument of specific 
interests. Therefore, the extent to which the state is capable of such autonomous 
policy formulation is one of the determinants of its strength. In theory, the state is 
supposed to have such strength. When it comes to the question of capacities it is 
the extent to which a state is able to solve the problems it encounters and to meet 
the moral and material needs of its society and obtain its support in return. Thus, 
the conception of a strong state, beginning from the second half of the 20*** century 
began to be related to the extent of its being autonomous, capable and supported 
by the society at large. However, as it will be demonstrated the contemporaiy
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Integrative and fragmentary forces within the global system have been 
undermining the strength of the state.
1.2 The Contemporary Challenges to the Modern Nation-State
The Second World War and the collapse of the European system of states paved 
the way for a gradual reconstruction of the international system. The major events 
of the post-war period can be outlined as follows; the trend towards political and 
economic integration in Western Europe, the cold war between the two 
superpowers: USA and SU, the decolonization processes in the Third-World, the 
rise of the ‘new-right’ policies to replace the policies of the welfare-state, the 
disintegration of the SU, the emergence of organizations aiming at regional 
cooperation mainly on economic and security issues, the unprecedented booms in 
science and technologies, and the emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations 
and a variety of alternative agencies through which civil society or individuals are 
operating to influence the global politics. All these developments when explored 
in greater details are the historical events that have connected the population of 
the world to each other. The contemporary notion of globalization, are largely 
associated with these historical conjunctures, yet when it comes to define the 
processes of globalization a wide range of theoretical and empirical debates are 
going on about the shape of the emerging global politics. However, a general 
understanding of globalization can be drawn out.
19 Two recent works on ‘globalization’ are important in terms of their contribution to develop an 
indepth understanding of the processes o f globalization. See Held, David and et al. (eds.) 1999. 
Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture, and Axtmann, Roland (ed.) 1998. 
Globalization and Europe: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations.
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Globalization appears to be a process where opposite trends are clashing with 
each other. To put it somewhat differently, globalization involves a set of clashing 
concepts co-existing side by side, however they are not as exclusive that they may 
appear. Heterogeneity vs. homogeneity, differences vs. sameness. North vs. 
South, traditional vs. modern all seem to hybridize to shape the globe (Pieterse, 
1994). In this context an additional dichotomy is that the forces of the 
globalization appears to operate in two major ways; the increasing global 
interdependence, the integration and the centralization tendencies that the process 
itself is creating, are unfolding together with corespondent fragmentation, 
decentralization, and regionalization (Axtmann, 1998; Sassen, 1996; Watson,
1997). Another aspect of the globalization process, is that it also involves the 
"posts" concepts; postmodern, postindustrial, postcapitalist, postsocialist, 
postinternational is among such new concepts (Rosenau, 1990:6). This is because, 
as the thesis proposes, these intertwined processes of globalization stimulate 
considerable transformations on the Westphalian state, as explained in the first 
section the basic internal and external politics are conducted.
The era of globalization, to begin with the fall of the communist bloc, is 
understood as an “era of dense and ever increasing inter- and trans-national 
political, economic and cultural interdependence” (Axtmann, 1998). Therefore, 
the localities around the globe are in an increasing network of economic, political, 
social and cultural interaction with each other. People, places, capital, goods and 
services are globally interconnected. Even more, the problems that societies are 
facing are also globalizing; the danger of the nuclear weapons, the need for the
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protection of the environment, the practicability of the human rights, and health 
risks, drug traffics, immigration issues. The international system is face with the 
emergence of an informed and publicly concerned global society, against all its 
diversity (Rosenau, 1990). At the forefront of all this newly emerging patterns of 
interactions, lie economic transformations and technological innovations in 
transport and information services. As a result of these processes, there is a 
reconfiguration of space and time related distances. Therefore the “associated 
notions of “here” and “there”, “far” and “near”, “outside” and “inside”, “home” 
and “away”, “them” and “us”” are becoming problematic, thus the identification 
of boundaries are becoming difficult. In this respect, the place of a given location 
is becoming less important than whether this location is connected to the global 
society or not (Axtmann, 1998:5). However, while the states and the societies are 
linked together by the economic and technological mechanisms of the 
globalization process, a counter trend is observed. This is the rise of the local 
existences that are cross cutting their states of origin to relate themselves to the 
global networks for economic, cultural or social purposes; such as achieving high 
levels of economic growth, assertion of their distinct cultural traits, or to mobilize 
support for the protection of the global environment (Cvetkovich and Kellner, 
1997) . Another aspect to be emphasized in respect to globalization, and one of 
the most problematic one seems to be the uneven economic development that is 
becoming more and more visible. This is creating considerable tensions especially 
in terms of the North/South axis. Additionally, the reactions of the disadvantaged 
interests within the North axis itself, as the recent demonstrations in Seattle 
(2000) against the WTO proves it, are also becoming problematic. According to
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Held (1998), Watson (1997) and Axtmann (1997), these problems are exceeding 
the scope and nature of the modern nation states and a kind of “global 
governance” should be structured, for instance within the UN, so that the global 
society solve these problems collectively. However, viewed from another 
perspective, according to Resnick (1998), the visions for the establishment of a 
global democratic governance are rather founded on idealistic assumptions given 
the socioeconomic disparities and the diversity of interest that would be involved 
in the constitution of such a system of governance.
In fact from the very combination of the conception of the modern nation-state 
and the contemporary notion of globalization we can conclude that the 
globalization process is pushing for a reformulation of the modern nation-state. It 
is a process undermining the sovereignty and the strength of the modern-nation 
state. According to Watson (1992), legitimacy has a lubricating role in the 
functioning of both domestic relations and international relations. However, he 
argues that in the contemporary state of the global relations, an alternative form of 
legitimacy is required. To put it somewhat differently, the legacy of the past that 
is the acceptance of the modern nation-state as the legitimate sovereign unit 
should be reconsidered so as to discuss the legitimacy of the alternative structures 
involved in the decision-making process of an ever globalizing world. Such 
alternatives are the supranational organizations, international organizations, 
NGOs, multinational global companies, local political actors, individuals and 
other such emerging politically active units in the global politics (Held, 1998; 
Rosenau, 1990). Therefore, Watson argues that some major problems of the
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current era are that the legitimacy of the past is lagging far behind the actual 
practices of rule. Consequently, this proposition can be considered as among the 
challenges that the forces of globalization direct to the legitimate sovereignty of 
the modern nation-state. Because, there now emerges ‘postinternational’ actors 
that are challenging the traditional conceptualization of the sovereignty principle 
of the modern nation-state (Rosenau, 1990).
As it was explained in the preceding sections, at the very foundation of the 
modern state resides the “artful combination of space, people and resources in 
territorialized containtements” and the state sovereignty involves the business of 
rule over this given territory (Axtmann, 1998:6). The sovereignty also involves 
the non-interference in the internal affairs of the state from external forces. 
However, the emergence of the supranational institutions, the foreign investments 
across national boundaries and the networks of communications are challenging 
the practicality and the premises of sovereignty and territoriality of the nation­
state (Ruggie, 1993; Rosenau, 1999). Another impact is the increasing importance 
the global community is attaching to the exercise of the human rights in the world, 
this is an issue that is transcending the sovereignty of the nation-state (Dower,
1998). Additionally, the claim of being composed from a single nation and the 
aims to uniformity in society seems to be no more realistic, given the fact of an 
ever increasing movement of migration added to the reality that the societies from 
the fact of being connected to “others” are no more uniform (Rex, 1998). 
Technological innovations have already created a space for the freedom of action 
of the immigrant communities, they are enabled to organize themselves into
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powerful collective political actors both in their homelands, host nation, and in the 
global society (Axtmann, 1998:59). This process is realized through the use of 
internet and transportation services and the mass media. A final challenge to the 
modern nation-state is the increase in importance of the local existences as 
autonomous political units, most of which are now pressuring the state, in order to 
acquire more autonomy (Rosenau, 1999). Therefore taken together, both the 
fragmentary forces and the forces of integration of the globalization process are 
challenging the principle of the sovereignty of the modern nation-state. Another 
related challenge of the current wave of globalization is that it is undermining the 
strength of the modern state. As already mentioned, in the face of global problems 
there is a requirement for the active participation of more than one global actor in 
their solution. Therefore the states’ capacities, to provide the moral and the 
material needs to their citizens without co-operating with a wide range of 
postinternational political actors, is undermined (Rosenau, 1990; Axtmann, 1997).
According to the framework of Watson (1992) on the working mechanisms of the 
international system, “propensity to hegemony” is always accompanied with 
“propensity to independence”.T herefore throughout history and according to the 
corresponding systems of rule the international society was constantly 
experiencing this dichotomy. Therefore, in terms of the international society, the 
fact that the integrative forces are faced with corresponding fragmentary forces in 
the system is not a recent in the international system. However, the novelty lies in 
the speed with which these forces are operating, and the fundamental restructuring
20
In liis work, Watson is mainly studying the “European society or system of states”. See Watson, 
Adam. 1992. The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative and Historical Analysis.
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of the conception of the modern nation-state they are pushing for. In the European 
context, the emergence of the EC\EU as a supranational organization is embedded 
in the process of globalization, and the EU has considerable impact on the 
member states. The integrative forces of the supranational mechanism are 
complemented by the fragmentary forces of the localities to exercise a double 
pressure on the modern state. In the following chapter the aim will be to deepen 
the study of the state and its reformulation processes by focusing on the relations 
between the EC\EU and the member states. It is important to note that the internal 
structures of these states varies and their responses will be different, they are 
effected by the processes of European integration\unification at different degrees 
and at various levels. Yet, even if at varying degrees and levels they are all subject 
to the transformations that the integration process bring about.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EMERGENCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A 
POST-WESTPHALIAN ACTOR
2.1 “Visions of a United Europe”^^ : As Historical Consequences of the 
Westphalian State?
The visions of a united Europe can be traced back to the very distant past of the 
continental European history. A contemplation throughout the history of the 
European continent unveils the shadow of numerous wars fought over the 
‘Enlightened’ lands. From the Peloponnesian War throughout the “struggles 
between monarchs, princes, and barons over the domain of rightfial authority...; 
religious strife and the challenge to the universal claims of Catholicism”, and to 
be followed with the Italian city-states fighting over economic resources, Europe 
experienced many wars (Held, 1999:35; Watson, 1992),^  ^ There was always a 
tendency to unify European realms under one hegemony or another (Watson, 
1992:252). In this context, the settlement of Westphalia (1648), was aimed at 
setting clear cut geographical boundaries with respect to the realms over which 
each and every rulers was entitled to rule in order to conclude the era of wars
This heading is quoted from Neilsen, Brent, F. and Alexander C-G Stubb, (eds.) 1994. The 
European Union.
This is a war fought in Ancient Greece between the city-states o f Athens and Sparta (431-404 
B.C)
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fought over territorial claims.Consequently, each ruler acquired the right of 
jurisdiction over a territorially bounded state within which they were recognized 
as the sole source of authority to rule the internal and the external relations of the 
community and to control the resources that were confined to this territory. 
Accordingly, this Westphalian order set up the principles of territorial 
sovereignty. Therefore, the right of each state to independent action with respect 
to such other state was legitimized and enforced by the introduction of the 
Westphalian settlement, among these states making up the newly emerging 
interstate system in Europe. This was a major historical conjuncture for the 
emergence of the modern nation-state and the consequent formation of 
international system. '^*
To follow the logical sequence, the division of Europe into territorially confined 
nation-states did not translate itself into a European society of peacefully 
coexisting states. Indeed, by the process of territorial state building, the social, 
economic and cultural differences within states were reduced and the differences 
among these political entities, living in ‘territorially confined spaces’ increased 
(Held, 1999:36; Poggi, 1978; Watson, 1992). The communities living under the 
same jurisdictional domain, in most of the cases and specifically against such 
other communities, identified themselves with their fellows living in the same 
spatial organization and supposedly sharing a common faith. As described in the
23 The framework of the Westphalian settlement is already explained in details in chapter 1.
This is important in terms of the time and place were the basic premises upon which the modem  
nation-state is founded. In terms of comparative politics, it is in the same European landscape that 
the EU emerges as a new system of governance.
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preceding chapter, a growing sense of collective identity among the people living 
in territorially confined spaces was further highlighted with the gradual flux of the 
ideas and ideals of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. This was part of 
the processes of consolidation of the modern nation-state, in which the principle 
of the rule of law, the waves of nationalism and the claims for democratization 
were intertwined. It followed that ‘sovereignty of the people’ implied that the only 
legitimate state was based on and expressing the will of a particular kind of 
collective entity, namely the ‘nation’ through the mechanisms of emerging 
democratic institutions (Watson, 1992:240).
As a matter of fact, at the edge of the 20^ *' century, the forces of nationalism and 
democracy had a fragmentary impact on the international system of states, and 
mainly because the idea of “sovereign exercise of the popular will” implied for the 
‘sovereign states’ acquiring legitimately more independence and freedom from 
external restraints (Watson, 1992:245). In other words, national governments, 
through democratic institutions, were held accountable to their citizens only. The 
liberal democratic citizenship rights were only accorded to the ‘insiders’ of a 
particular political community and denied to its ‘outsiders’ (Held, 1999:49). 
Consequently, the intertwined processes of ‘state-building’ and ‘nation-building’ 
by the mid-17* century resulted in underlining the differences of identities 
between the nation-states in Europe.^^ The outcome was the intensification of the
As mentioned by Keyman, “the state constitute not only the “sovereign place within which the 
highest internal laws and policies are enacted and from which strategies toward external states and 
nonstate people proceed,” but also, “the site of the most fundamental divisions between inside and 
outside, us and them, domestic and foreign, the sphere o f citizen entitlements and that o f strategic 
responses”. See Keyman, Fuat 1997. Globalization, State, Identity/Differences: Toward A Critical 
Social Theory o f International Relations.
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competition between the faiths, identities and interests of different national 
political communities on the European continent, which increasingly identified 
each other either as ‘friend’ or as ‘foe’. Taking place on the European continent, 
the consolidation processes of modern (liberal democratic) nation-states were 
paralleled by the imperial conquest of overseas colonies by the competing 
European ‘powers’. At the edge of the 20 century, competition over the 
territories and resources of these colonies became a major source of conflict 
among the European nations (Watson, 1992). Additionally, the advent of the 
Industrial Revolution and the consequent improvements in the warfare technology 
intensified the struggle for power in Europe. In this period, the economic policies 
of European states were characterized by high degrees of protectionism against 
each other (Karluk, 1998). The states were competing to maximize the power and 
the welfare of their respective nations. The only function of state action was 
national interest consideration . Consequently, as it was in the age of Machiavelli, 
this time every means were legitimate as long as ‘national sovereignty’ principle 
applied. The escalation of the tension reached its peak with the respective late- 
unification of Germany and I ta ly .T h is  was due to the fact that the ‘Balance of 
Power’, agreed upon after the Napoleonic by the Vienna settlement (1814-15), 
was broken down by the emergence of two powerful nation-states in the European 
state system (Watson, 1992). All these historical developments combined with the 
forces of nationalism paved the way for the World War One and World War 
Two. These wars were classified as ‘Total Wars’ because the intensity and 
extensiveness of their nature and scope were devastating for the European
This refers to the national unification and their establishment as nation-states in the European 
international system, Germany in 1881, Italy in 1871.
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political, economic, social and cultural landscape (Poggi, 1990: 112). There was 
an emergent need to reconstruct socio-economic and political landscape of 
Europe. It is then from the ruins of the ‘Total Wars’ that the idea of a Union 
Europenne concretized.
Two major lessons, relating to the establishment of a ‘working peace system’, 
were drawn from the history of warfare in Europe.^^ To begin with, there was 
always a double tendency in Europe, either toward ‘hegemony’ or toward 
‘multiple independence’, which in both cases resulted in major wars on the 
Continent.^*To provide an illustration, the universalistic claims of the Catholic 
Church were followed by religious particularism, the commitment to independent 
action from the part of the nation-state was followed by the ‘total wars’. Thus, 
both cases resulted in the escalation of the tensions between the actors making up 
these systems. In retrospect, though providing a foundation, visions to establish a 
peaceful unity among the nations making up the European continent remained as 
failed attempt on the parts of the intellectuals and statesman in Europe. On the one 
hand, Kant, Voltaire, Hugo and many other intellectuals were writing on their 
visions of a ‘Grande Republique’ to be established on the European lands. On the 
other hand, international arrangements were agreed upon between the statesmen 
aiming at establishing a ‘balance of power’ on the Continent. The ‘Concert of
The notion of ‘working peace system’ in Europe is basically drawn from the work of David 
Mitrany (1966). It refers to the basic aim of his ‘functionalist theory’, which is an attempt to 
construct a framework to stimulate “a transformation o f the way people think about international 
relations” and essentially for “the prevention of war”. See Nelsen F. Brent and Alexander C-G 
Stubb, (eds.) 199^ .^The European Union, pp.77-97.
The framework proposed by Watson to analyze the European system of states is explained in 
chapter 1.
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Europe’, the ‘League of Nations’ (1919), among many others, were failed 
attempts to promote peace and stability in Europe (Watson, 1992: 240; Nugent, 
1999: 5). The major reason was that they were either too flexible or too rigid to be 
able to adapt to systemic changes, and it followed that 'raison de system’ and 
'raison d ’etat’ were always in conflict (Watson, 1992), To prevent the wars in 
Europe required the formula of a ‘working peace system’ (Mitrany, 1966).
The second lesson concerned the inherent power struggle, which was taking place 
between Germany and France over the domination of the European territories. 
This issue required a sustained resolution in order to eliminate one of the major 
sources of polarization in Europe. One of the main reasons for the conflict was the 
territorial claim over the region Alsace-Lorraine where coal and steel were the 
main resources. In this period, coal and steel were the backbones of industrial 
development. In addition to this, the inter-war period had informed that Germany 
was to be contained and kept in the post-war restructuration projects that were 
envisaged for Europe (Kennan, 1969: 477). After the defeat in the World War One 
and the subsequent Versailles Treaty (1918), popular resentment in Germany 
reached its peak. According to the Versailles Treaty, Germany had to demobilize 
its national army and to pay a great amount of war indemnity to the victorious 
powers. Additionally, Alsace-Lorraine was back under French jurisdiction and 
some other German territories were lost. Consequently, the German nation was 
left to its own devices with a nearly collapsed national economy and national 
defense capabilities. Versailles was perceived as a 'Diktat’ unfairly imposed on
29 This is very important in order to understand the historical experience upon which the project of  
European unification is launched.
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the German nation. This in turn paved the way for the appeal of ‘National 
Socialism’ and the subsequent emergence of the ‘Totalitarian Third Reich’ 
regime, the militant objective of which was to revenge the consequences of the 
World War One and bring the European lands under its dominion (Watson, 
1992:285, Kennan, 1969: 439-440). The consequence of the rise of fascism, as the 
far extreme mode of nationalism, was the total destruction of the European 
system.
In the aftermath of the first world war, Cont Kalergi, has launched the ‘pan- 
European’ project yet, it was only after the Second World War that the idea 
acquired much more meaning to the Europeans (Salmon and Nicoll, 1997: 6- 
20).The historical experiences of the ‘Total Wars’ are of major importance in 
terms of the actualization of the European integration movement. It was now 
clearer that recourse to military means was not the relevant method to deal with 
‘differences’ (Nugent, 1999: 6). As a result of experiencing these major wars at 
the opening of the 20‘*’ century, in Europe both the public and the statesmen 
wanted to see the reconstruction of a peaceful Europe. As Watson mentions 
(1992:282), “They wanted to move away from the perils of uncontrolled multiple 
independences towards a tighter system, and especially to ‘outlaw war’”. 
Therefore, one of the major targets held responsible for war in Europe was the 
fragmentary forces of the independent nation-states in the European society of 
states. There had to be a workable solution for the demise of the ‘anarchical 
system of sovereign states’. And, a way to integrate both the winners and the 
losers of the war in to the new solution -especially to provide Germany a
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“comfortable place” in the forthcoming European framework. As Kennan 
mentioned (1969; 477-478),
To leave Germany to continue to realize her national ideals and aspirations 
within the sovereign national framework would inevitably lead to a 
repetition of the general sequence of development that had followed 
Versailles settlement; only some sort of European federation could provide 
for Germany a place in the European community that would be 
comfortable and safe for everyone concerned.
Other political and socioeconomic developments, in the early post-war period 
were decisive in terms of the solution agreed upon for the reconstruction of 
Europe, First, the global power of Europe had collapsed by the end of the Total 
Wars. Second, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a Communist bloc, and its 
acquisition of the East Germany, Central and Eastern European countries, and 
finally Czechoslovakia, paved the way for a bipolar system where the United 
States was placed at the other end of the spectrum. In this context, both for the 
United States and for Western Europe there was a pressing need to reconstruct the 
social, economic, political and cultural landscape of Europe, and to reassert its 
place in the international system (Dinan, 1994:16). In this respect, the states in 
Western Europe were resolved that they had to construct an ‘ever-closer’ system 
of cooperation among their nations to achieve the reconstruction process in the 
post-war era.
2.2 The Architecture of the European Unification Project
The period from 1949 to 1952 was basically devoted to the architecture of the 
post-war European order, for the reconstruction of the European economic, social, 
political, and cultural landscape. The post-war period is marked by the foundation
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of numerous international organizations, and most of them were aimed at 
establishing effective cooperation networks among the nation-states. Today, most 
of the international organizations founded after the Second World War are still 
actively working: the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Council of Europe and the European 
Court of Human Rights. All these organizations are designed to be international in 
nature, they are founded through agreements among the member states. Although 
the members are expected to conform to the norms set by these organizations, 
each member state preserve its sovereign rights. As already mentioned, the origins 
of the EU dates back to the same period when all of these international 
organization were founded. Yet, as it will be elaborated in the subsequent parts of 
this thesis, as early as the concretion of the unification project by the 
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, the unique nature of 
this newly emerging organization was made clear. As observed by Nugent (1999: 
23), the contracting parties,
were the first to show a willingness to go beyond the cooperative 
intergovernmental ventures...not without reservations, each took the view 
that the benefits of integration, as opposed to just cooperation, would 
outweigh what appeared to be the major disadvantage -some loss of 
sovereignty
As a builder of post-war order Churchill (1946) appealed to establish a “United 
States of Europe”, in which the fates of the sovereign nation-states would be 
closely knit to each other so as to construct a ‘family of nations’, and the project 
for establishing ‘unity’ in the European continent speeded up (Salmon and Nicoll, 
1997: 26). In this context, a framework for establishing a ‘supranational
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organization’ in Europe emerged. It was designed to be different from the
traditional ‘international organizations’. It would have the authority to engage in
activities which cut across national boundaries and it would include agencies
“with power to make decisions at a level above that of national governments”
(Dinan, 1994:2). Indeed, the project prescribed that the member states would no
longer be the exclusive locus of power within their own borders. As mentioned in
Held (1999: 74-75), based on a later European Court of Justice notice,
by creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own 
institutions, its own personality...and, more particularly, real powers 
stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the 
States to the Community, the member States have limited their sovereign 
rights
Additionally, the framework, at least in its earlier stages, was also to be different 
from a ‘federal state’ because it was rather designed to be a network of states 
pooling their sovereign rights by a ‘stage by stage’ process.^” This implied that the 
constituent states were not yet ready for a radical political unification, considering 
the diverse nations involved in the process. Accordingly, the members 
constituting the organization would transfer amounts of their sovereign rights to 
its institutions, and consequently share their jurisdictional domains with it. As 
such, the emerging unity in Europe was intended to be both different from the 
classical international organizations and the classical federal state, it was designed 
to be supranational in nature and scope. The organization had to be neither too 
rigid nor too flexible. It was intended to act over and above the nation-states, and
As it will become clearer in the following parts of the thesis, this implies that the member states 
are not supposed to reahze political unification all at once. Indeed, ‘stage by stage’ process refers 
to the ‘spillover’, this implies that the unification will start from a sector to spread into other 
sectors. A Federal state, as in the US model, requires a central government, thus a Federal state can 
be a last step of political integration.
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to represent the interests of the community making up the organization. Yet, it 
should also have the capability to incorporate the individualistic national interests 
of the member states and to adapt to the systemic changes. Almost outlined as 
such the framework was perceived as the gateway for sustained cooperation 
among the European nation-states, and was adopted as a suitable design for the 
reconstnaction of Europe in the post-war era.
Jean Monnet (1943) was the main architect of the EU project, as the head of the 
French economic planning office, he declared that peace would not be the rule in 
Europe “if States reestablished themselves on the basis of national sovereignty 
with all that this implies by way of prestige politics and economic protectionism”. 
Instead, he suggested that “the States of Europe must form a federation or a 
‘European entity’, which will make them a single economic entity” and leave the 
adoption of “defensive positions” (Salmon and Nicoll, 1997; 21; Dinan, 1994: 
11). The European unification “movement” was then launched, and behind was a 
considerable post-war public support (Dinan, 1994: 11-12). The functionalist 
theory proposed by Mitrany (1943) constituted the basic theoretical framework 
upon which the process of European integration was founded. Indeed, Monnet’ s 
strategy to unify the European nation-states was mainly based on the functionalist 
assumption o f ‘spillover’. This envisaged a stage by stage processes of integration 
to result in a coherent whole process of unification. As the Schuman Plan (or 
Declaration) (1950) suggested, “Conditions will gradually evolve”, “European 
governments would start with two industries essential to the making of war, coal 
and steel, then add other economic and political sectors until all major decisions
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were taken at a European level” (Salmon and Nicoll, 1997: 45; Nelsen and Stubb, 
1994:11). It was upon the proposal of Monnet that the French Foreign Minister 
Robert Schuman prepared a plan for the unification of coal and steel industries 
under a common authority, namely the ‘High Authority’. According to the 
Schuman Declaration (1950), it was the first step in the convergence of interests 
and the subsequent “establishment of a common economic system”, which would 
in turn lead to “a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to 
one another by sanguinary divisions”. Indeed, the foundation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community implied that “the two key sectors of industrial 
production and war-making potential would be removed from national control and 
placed under a single, supranational authority” (Dinan, 1994: 23). And, as Monnet 
mentioned (1978: 293), pointing out to France and Germany, “to exercise joint 
sovereignty over part of their joint resources...a solid link would be forged 
between them, the way would be wide open for further collective action, and a 
great example would be given to the other nations of Europe”. As it was made 
clear, the cooperation was to be de facto as well as de jure. Consequently, based 
on the basic premises of integration set in the Schuman Plan, the establishment of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was agreed upon, in 1951, by 
the approval of the German Foreign Minister Konrad Adenauer, and the 
participation of Benelux (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) and Italy.
The Paris Treaty, which established the ECSC, was signed in 18 April 1951 and 
put into force on 25 July 1952. The specific goals to be achieved by the ECSC 
were set in the Treaty as follows; to establish a common market for coal and steel
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industries, to stimulate economic development through cooperation, and to 
improve employment and life standards of the member states. As it was set in the 
project, the institutions to conduct the affairs of the Community were 
supranational in nature. Consequently, the Community members had given up 
(transferred) their sovereign rights relating to the coal and steel industries to the 
institutional mechanisms, basically to the High Authority, of the ECSC. The 
dynamics of the institutional framework of EU will be explored in the following 
section. Yet, for the ECSC, its institutional framework consisted of the High 
Authority, the Council of (National) Ministers, the Common Assembly and the 
Court of Justice, which were the embryos institutional structure to the 
forthcoming European Communities. It can be suggested that the Treaty of Paris 
stands on a very important historical conjuncture in relation to the Westphalian 
settlement because for the first time since 1648, the states were voluntarily 
agreeing to sacrifice amount of their sovereignty for the establishment of another 
authority, which would have jurisdictional rights, supranational powers, over their 
territories. Complementary to the ‘discourses’ that were going on in relation to the 
integration process, one observation can be that this was a first contractual step in 
the emergence of the ‘post-Westphalian’ order in Western Europe, the ECSC 
emerged as a supranational organization.^*
‘Post-Westphalian’ here is derived from the conceptualization of Hedley Bull, which observes 
referring to the European Community, “If they were to bring about a situation in which the 
authorities existed both at the national and at the European level, but no one such authority 
claimed supremacy over others in terms of superior jurisdiction or its claims on the loyalties of 
individual persons, the sovereign state would have been transcended. Similarly, one may imagine 
that if nationalist separatist groups were content to reject the sovereignty o f  the states to which 
they were at present the subject, but at the same time refrained from advancing any claims to 
sovereign statehood themselves, some genuine innovation in the stmcture o f the world political 
system might take place. See, Linklater, Andrew. 1996. “Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post- 
Westphalian State”.
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In the period to follow, attempts to establish a European Defense Community on 
May 1952 and a European Political Community on March 1953 failed mainly 
because of the reluctance of the French national parliament to ratify the Treaties 
concerning the foundation these Communities (Nugent, 1999; 41). It is necessary 
to clarify that the problem, concerning the ratification these Treaties, lied on the 
reluctance from the part of the member states to give up their national sovereign 
rights and autonomy on issues relating to the domain of ‘high politics’, such as 
security or foreign policy. It was too early to open the way for political unification 
via integration. Consequently, the intergovernmental processes of cooperation on 
these issues continued. Indeed, as it will be pictured throughout the thesis, the 
movement of European integration is marked with the ‘dialectics’ of the 
Supranational and Intergovernmental axis. On the one hand, the tendency is in the 
words of Haas^^,
Progressive regional centralization of decision-making ...the process 
whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded 
to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new 
center, whose institutions posses or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing 
national states (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1994: 246)
Thus, this implies that the member states are compromising to articulate and
decide on their interests at a higher level than the national one, to be known as
Community (Union) or supranational interests. It can not be categorized as a
classical international organization. Yet, on the other hand, this does not imply
that the European Union possess a unitary sovereignty regime, since it is
Ernst Haas is one of the proponent of the ‘neoiuntionahst theory’ the basic premises are founded 
upon the ‘functionalist thesis’, yet the main differing point is the neofuntionalist support for the 
establishment of proper supranational institution so that to stimulate further (spillover) integration.
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something more than the aggregation of the sovereignty of the member states but 
less than the transfer of sovereignty on all the issues relating to the nature and 
scope of the modern nation-state. Therefore, the decisions made at the EU level 
are also the outcomes of the intergovernmental negotiation and decision making 
processes. In other words, the EU level decisions are also closely related to the 
negotiations among the national governments that are reflecting their national 
interests. Not to mention that these individualistic interests are open to conflict 
with one another. As observed by Newman (1996), the ‘ambiguity of sovereignty’ 
in a considerable extent is the result of the member states concern in safeguarding 
their policy-making competence on certain areas “regarded as integral to state 
power”. As elaborated in the subsequent sections of the thesis, major aspects of 
the ‘Social Policy’, Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (CJHA), and CFSP 
provide perfect illustrations as to how the member states are negotiating to 
preserve their policy-making competence (autonomy and capacity) in these 
domains where they seek to act as ‘strong states’. In this context, the bargains are 
made over the amount of sovereignty to be given up to the institutional 
. mechanisms of the EU.^  ^ Intergovernmental negotiations implies the participation 
of the member states on an equal platform to discuss the future of the integration, 
the European Council functions as the integovernmental pillar of the EU. In the
The argument is derived from Newm an, the various interests for preservation of several policy­
making competence are conducted under ‘ loss of sovereignty’ argument, i.e. “Norwegian ‘no’ 
voters were generally defending a high level of welfare expenditure, whereas the British 
‘Emosceptics’ (reserved against the ‘European Social Policy’ model) came from the Thatcherite 
wing of the Conservative Party, and wanted to restrict all forms of government expenditure and 
control in favor of neo-liberal economics”. See Newman, Michael. 1996. Democracy, Sovereignty 
and the European Union, pp. 1-4.
On an equal platform refers to the intergovernmental decision-making procedure. The principle 
of unanimity voting is the prevalent featme of the intergovernmental axis. This is also explained in 
chapter 3 while discussing the intergovernmental functions of the Council o f Ministers and the 
European Council.
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following sections of this thesis, the dialectical relations between the 
supranational and the intergovernmental will further be analyzed.
In this context, in the early 1950s, the establishment of the European Defense and 
Political Communities were failed attempts because they involved political 
unification or the transfer of loyalties from national to supranational level, which 
appeared challenging in this early period of integration. In terms of political 
integration, intergovernmentalism dominated over the Community interests. 
Consequently, the Western European Union (WEU), an international arrangement, 
originating from the Brussels Agreement on March 1948, which was also referred 
to as agreement of cooperation on socioeconomic, cultural and common defense 
issues, continued to function as the mechanism of cooperation on security and 
foreign policy matters in Europe (Karluk, 1998:6). But, with the establishment of 
NATO in 1949, WEU’ s fianctions lost their importance as the European security 
was undertaken by NATO. It was only, after the establishment of the Maastricht 
Treaty that the WEU, as the European pillar of NATO, acquired much more 
importance as an integral part of the CFSP pillar of the EU.^  ^However, the real 
achievements, in the period to follow until the Treaty on European Union, were in 
the domain of economic unification.
Following the relative success of the ECSC, the European governments decided to 
further the process of integration. In this context, the Foreign Ministers of the six 
member states of the ECSC participated to the Messina Conference held on June
CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) is one of the most important aspect of integration 
relating to political unification. It is explored in greater details in the chapter 4 o f this thesis.
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1955. In this ‘intergovernmental conference’ they agreed in the first place for the 
process of economic integration had to be furthered in order to promote “the 
gradual merging of national economies, the gradual creation of a common market, 
and the gradual harmonization of their social policies” (Nugent, 1999: 42). The 
failure of EPCVEDC demonstrated that it was too early to step explicitly in the 
political integration. The governments resolved, in addition to the gradual 
unification of national economies, “they consider that the further progress must be 
towards the setting up of a united Europe by the development of common 
institutions” (Salmon and Nicoll, 1997: 59). Accordingly, as a latent perspective, 
move toward economic unification was seen, by the supranational axis, as 
positively correlated with a move towards political unification since the interests 
of the member states would smoothly be converged. This involved a process of 
learning to cooperate in and socialization into the emerging institutional 
framework. The resolution at Messina and the subsequent Rome Treaties were a 
manifestation of the ‘spillover’ and a basic attempt to avoid the faith of 
EDC\EPC. Thereafter, a committee was selected to outline a plan for the 
realization of economic integration to be followed by economic unification. The 
committee under the chairmanship of Paul Henri Spaak prepared the Spaak 
Report, which outlined the basic tenets of a closer economic cooperation, and 
basic steps and goals to be reached for the accomplishment of the economic 
integration. The Foreign Ministers of the six member states accepted the proposals 
set in the Report (1956). Accordingly, in 27 March 1957, the Rome Treaties were 
signed. The first Treaty founded the European Atomic Energy Community
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(EURATOM) and the second one the European Economic Community (EEC). 
The first basically aimed at the joint regulations for the effective use of the atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes, and the basic goal of the latter was to establish an 
‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’, a ‘Common Market’. In other 
words, the general plan outlined (EEC) consisted of the realization of custom 
unions and common external tariffs (to third parties); common agricultural policy; 
common policies on issues relating to competition, transportation, environment, 
technology and fisheries; the free movement of goods, persons, services, and 
capital, the harmonization of economic and social policies; the establishment of a 
European Investment Bank (Dinan, 1994:34).
Accordingly, the following section will cover the sequences of events that have 
led to the completion of the ‘Single European Market’ and to the establishment 
of the EU. The interactions between the intergovernmental and supranational axis 
and the outcome of these interactions will be explored in their historical 
sequences. The basic emphasis will be accorded to study some empirical cases. 
First, certain rulings of the ‘European Court of Justice’ that resulted in the 
establishment of the supremacy of EC jurisdiction over the territories of the 
member states will be explored.^® Second, empirical cases relating to the 
realization of the Customs Union, the completion of the Single European Market 
will be studied, i.e. Tindemans Report, Dooge Report, White Paper. Not to 
mention the intertwined nature of the two in order to demonstrate how and why
The European Court of Justice acts as the judiciary organ of the EU. In fact it is the institution of 
the supranational first pillar (European Communities) o f the EU. After the introduction of TEU, all 
die activities relating to the European integration were ‘entwined’. Although the complexity o f  
economic and political networks, every activities of the EU are interrelated and interdependent. In 
tile following chapter the institutional framework of the EU will be explored in details.
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the European state is no longer in a position to formulate independent laws, and 
specifically in the issues entering the EC domain.
2.3 The Completion of the Single European Market and the Dialectics 
between the Supranational and the Intergovernmental from Rome to 
Maastricht
If we say that sovereignty means the ability to legislate independently of 
any other state, if it means that our domestic laws will prevail over all 
other external laws, then the United Kingdom long ego gave up some of its 
sovereignty...Even before the United Kingdom joined the Community it 
was well established that Community Law was supreme when in conflict 
with national domestic law and that Member States had abrogated a part of 
their sovereignty to the Community (James, 1998: 42)
The process of integration consist of networks of coordination of and adoption of
common Goi^t) actions and policies. The operationalization of the Treaties of
Rome, as the outcomes of the Messinna intergovernmental conference, furthered
the establishment of the supranational institutional structure of the European
integration process. Accordingly, the individual member states were given their
sovereign rights to these institutional mechanisms on the issues relating to the
accomplishment of economic integration. The Treaty of Paris and the Treaties of
Rome had established three European Communities with quite separate
institutional structures. Yet, with the Treaty of Merger, signed in 1965 and put
into force by 1967, the institutions of the three Communities were merged
(Karluk, 1998:5). Consequently, without loosing their legal entitlement, set by
their constituting Treaties, the ECSC, EURATOM and EEC acquired the status of
European Communities (EC). Thereafter, the major institutions of the European
Communities were the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the Court of Justice
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and the Parliament. These institutions acts as legislative, executive and judiciary 
organs of the European Communities. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is a 
major locus of supranationality. As Weiler (1998) mentions, in retrospective the 
ECJ is a stimulus for “the evolution of the constitutional and institutional 
architecture of the EC”. In most of its history, the ECJ acted to prevent any 
infringement to the proper functioning of integration.
Indeed, the process of (economic) integration is a very delicate issue. It is not 
supposed to work to the comparative disadvantage of the regions involved in the 
process but to create an equivalent economic system among them. The completion 
of the ‘common market’ involves the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital (Gormley, 1998; 575). The emphasis is on the ‘trade creation-effect’ 
between the members and consecutive increase of their welfare. Auxiliary is the 
creation of common consumption habits and cultures.^^ A primary stage for the 
creation of a common internal market is the Customs Union. This involves the 
elimination of physical barriers (i.e. custom duties, import quotas) to trade 
between members and the establishment of a common external tariffs to trade 
with non-members (Dinnage and Murphy, 1996: 423). The custom duties and 
quotas are price and supply regulations imposed by the national authorities on 
‘out-of-state goods’ (imports). The aim is the protection of the domestic industry 
from foreign competition. Likewise, every state has an external tariff policy. Until
‘Trade-creation efiFect’ refers to the reduction or elimination of any ‘trade barriers’ (“Any 
interference with the free exchange of goods and services among different political jurisdictions. 
Custom duties and import quotas are common trade barriers, but international exchange control 
and sanitary and health regulations may be used for the same pmpose”). Additionally, “indirect 
taxation comprising sales and excise taxes” can also result in “discrimination against out-of-state 
goods. See Sloan, Harold S. and Arnold J. Zucher. 1970. Dictionary o f Economics. Barnes and 
Nobles Books:.New York, London, Evanston, San Francisco.
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the establishment of the Customs Union, the m.ember states were independent in 
their national economic policy-making capacities. Yet, the Customs Union limited 
the member states foreign economic policy-making competence. The process of 
‘negative integration’ that was in the form of trade liberalization within the EC, 
was to be sustained by ‘positive integration’ or the (approximation of laws') 
harmonization of the policies of the member states and the adoption of common 
policies at the EC level. The areas of common policies are domains to be managed 
“exclusively by the Community” (Dinnage and Murphy, 1996: 5). Yet, in this 
case certain aspect of common policies may run against the interests of certain 
groups within member states or against certain national interests. This can, in turn, 
lead to complications in terms of approximation of laws or implementation of 
common policies. The governments, for the seek of political support or for the 
protection of national economy may be reluctant to implement or follow the 
common policies. However, in the cases where member states do not follow the 
principles of economic integration, it would be to the detriment to the 
establishment of a ‘common market’. In this respect, the CJEC rulings reasserted 
the supremacy of the EC law over the national law (Craig and Burca, 1999).
To begin with, it is important to remind two important legal issues in relation to 
the rulings of the Court of Justice. The Westphalian model implies the ‘immunity 
from jurisdiction’ and ‘immunity of state agencies’, the former means that “no 
state can be sued in the courts of another state for the acts performed in its
The European Court of Justice was known as the Court of Justice of the Eiu'opean Communities 
(CJEC) up until the operationalization o f the TEU. The decisions of the ECJ are part and parcel of
tlie sources of the EC law.
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Sovereign capacity”, and the latter “should an individual break the law of another 
state while acting as an agent for his countiy of origin and be brought before that 
state’s court, he is not held “guilty”...” (Held, 1999: 38). Thus, the states are free 
to pursue their interests and no ‘extra-territorial’ courts are permitted to rule on 
their behavior.
Van Gend en Loss v. Nederlandse Administratie Der Belästigen 26/62 [1963] 
was a first ruling where the Court of Justice (CJ) declared “Member States have 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited field” (James, 1998: 42). The 
case was brought to the CJ by Van Geld en Loss, a Dutch firm “importing an 
adhesive from Germany and paying customs duties of 3 percent of its value” 
(Rudden and Phelan, 1997: 12-31). At the period, physical barriers were in effect 
but the transitional period to the Customs Union had already started and the 
member states were eliminating the customs duties and quotas. Yet, the Dutch 
government increased the duty to 8% and argued that this increase “had come 
about as a result of a reclassification of the product in another heading of the 
tariff’ (Dinnage and Murphy, 1996: 86-88).The firm brought the case to the 
Amsterdam Customs Court, which on he grounds that the product was imported 
from another member state asked the CJ “whether the Treaty article has a direct 
effect on the legal positions of individual and firms” (Rudden and Phelan, 1997: 
12). The creation of a ‘common market’, which is the basic goal of the Rome 
Treaty, has direct and indirect socio-economic and political implications for the 
citizens of the Community. From the producers, commercial entrepreneurs, to the 
consumers, every segments of the society are effected. Therefore, a uniformity in
58
the interpretation, approximation and implementation of the EC legislation is 
primordial to provide equivalent conditions to the members. Consequently, the 
subjects of the legal order of the Community “comprise not only the member 
states but also their nationals” and the “Community law, apart from legislation by 
the member States, not only imposes obligations on individuals but also confers 
on them legal rights” (Dinnage and Murphy, 1996: 87). Therefore, Van Gend an 
Loss plaint against the Ducth government was concluded by the preliminary 
ruling of the Court of Justice affirming that the “EC Law has supremacy over the 
national laws of the member states”. Not to mention that the infringement to the 
EC legislation by the member states may also be to the benefits of its nationals, 
yet this does not overrule the ‘direct-effect’ and the ‘supremacy’ of the EC 
jurisdiction over the member states territories on the common policy domain. In 
the following years similar cases -  i.e. Costa v. ENEL, Amministrazione Della 
Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA- involving various kinds of 
infringement with the common policy objectives were brought to the CJ, which 
reasserted repetitively its position concerning the safeguard of the proper 
functioning of integration.^^ A kind of ‘constitutional’ balance was then 
established.
Costa V. Enel 6/64 [1964] case·, “...the validity o f a Community Measure or its effect within a 
member state can not be effected by allegations that it runs counter to...the principles of a national 
constitutional measure” Administrazionne Della Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA  
106/77 [1978], “..any National Court must...apply Community law in its entirely...and must 
accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or 
subsequent to the Community rule”. See Rüden, Bernard, and Diarmud Rossa Phelan. 1997. Basic 
Community Cases. Dinnage, James D. and John Murphy. 1996. The Constitutional Law o f the 
European Union.
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In this context, two other CJ actions are worth to be briefly discussed . Both of 
them are made in the post-Customs Union period, and are insightful for the 
subsequent exploration of the completion of the Single European Market. The first 
one is Cassis de Dijon Case 120/78 (Rudden and Phelan, 1997: 115-127). This 
involved the case of a firm that wanted to import to Germany a French liqueur. 
Cassis de Dijon, the alcohol rate of which was 20% by volume. Yet, the German 
authorities resolved that the amount of liqueur was too small to be sold in 
Germany. Consequently, the firm brought its case to the Court. The German 
action was not the infringement of the EC law through imposing direct quotas or 
tax but it was arguing that the alcohol rate was unfit to German standards. This 
was an indirect discrimination against a French product. This was a very hard case 
since it demonstrated a clash between the German national standards and the 
French ones. And, the Community has not yet developed regulations relating to 
‘common standards’. Finally, the Court decided that the case falls under 
“measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports” 
(Article 30 of the EEC Treaty). This implied “even where national measures are 
inspired by considerations of fair trading... the restrictions must be proportionate to 
the aim to be achieved: thus on the facts, information label would suffice to warn 
the potential buyer...” (Rudden and Phelan, 1997: 120). Consequently, Cassis de 
Dijon case had a strong influence on the prospects of the ‘common market’ 
relating to the elimination of technical barriers on the freedom of movements. 
Therefore, the main conclusion drawn from Cassis de Dijon was, rather than the 
approximation of standards, the member states are to “recognize and accept each 
other’s standards, as long as those standards satisfied certain health and safety
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conditions” (Dinan, 1994: 338). Today, the same rules apply, yet by a 1989 
legislation, for the purpose of the protection of the consumers the firms are 
obligated to certify (CE) that their products confirms to be sold in the European 
Market (Karluk, 1998: 43-47). This is the result of the “New Approach to 
Technical Harmonization and Standards”, whereby the products on the markets 
should meet health and safety norms. Currently, the norms are extended and 
applying to a wide range of sectors, and European standards organizations are 
actively working to control and enforce these requirements. This then relates to 
the recent ‘BSE’ crises in which the British beef was banned from the European 
market up until 1999 due to mad-cow diseases (Westslake, 1997). Now that the 
ban is void, the French government has still not lifted the ban for the sake of the 
protection of the French citizens. The case is brought to the Court.
As it can be deduced from the illustrative cases above, the process of integration 
results in undermining the sovereignty of the state and its independent policy 
formulation capacity. On the one hand, the ruling of the ECJ are limiting the 
sovereign rights of the member states over their territory. On the other hand, the 
member state’s relative autonomy for policy-making and enforcing is seriously 
undermined. Not to mention that the capacities of the states in meeting the 
demands and the expectations of their people is undermined.
The period between 1958 and 1965, the Commission acted as a Federal-like 
government. The procedures of supranational legislation and executive worked
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almost without any obstacles. In 1 July 1968, the Customs Union was in full 
effect, the period to follow consisted of a second transitional stage in the 
construction of a ‘common market’. As it was clarified, a wide range of measures 
had to be taken in order to prevent the negative effects of integration. This 
consists of eliminating almost every possible discrimination against internal trade 
in order to overcome probable sectoral or regional socio-economic disparities.“*' 
For this purpose elimination of technical barriers to trade (i.e. the adoption of 
common technical and health standards), the adoption of common commercial 
policies, common competition policies, common agricultural policies, and many 
other common economic policies are required. Additionally, as described in the 
Treaty of Rome (1958), the establishment of a ‘common market’ relies on the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital. In this respect the dynamics of 
integration requires the adoption of common social policies, common monetary 
(fiscal) policies and other related common policies, or the approximation of these 
policy areas, not to mention the elimination of custom controls (frontiers). This 
implies large scale erosion of state sovereignty. Indeed, by this kaleidoscope 
of economic integration, it is clear that the final stage is intended to lead to 
economic unification, which is the ‘economic and monetary union’. Although as 
part and parcel of integration in ‘high politics’ it is subject to study in chapter 4,
The Commission acts as the supranational government of the EC, it basically the executive 
organ. There is no analogous institution in national governmental systems. In chapter three its 
peculiar character is explored in details.
The process o f economic integration consists of four the stages: (1) the creation of a free trade 
zone, (2) customs union, (3) common market, (4) economic and monetary union. The member 
states have adopted as their objective the completion of integration\unification within the timetable 
set for each stages. See Dinnage, James D., and John Murphy. 1996. The Constitutional Law o f the 
European i/n/on, pp. 11-20.
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for the recent purpose it is sufficient to say that this involves the convergence of 
the national economies of the member states.
To follow the logical sequence, the clock-work like mechanisms of the dialect 
between the supranational the intergovernmental were soon to emerge. The 
Commission’s supranational rule, the completion of the Customs Union, and the 
launch for the ‘common market’, were perceived by some members as to much 
challenging to their sovereign existence. In 1965 a crisis between the Commission 
and the Council of Ministers emerged because the French government rejected the 
proposal of the Commission.'*^ This proposal consisted of provisions relating to 
“the financing of the new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the introduction of 
EC ‘own resources’, and the widening of the budgetary powers of the European 
Commission” and the EP (Teasdale, 1993; 568). Another source of the crises was 
the reluctance of the French government about the introduction of ‘majority 
voting’ on a wide range of issues.'*  ^ The two sources of objection were both 
perceived incremental for France. First, a Community acquiring independence to 
control its own resources (or budget) meant a Community independent in its 
capacities of redistribution. Second, agriculture has a very important share in the 
French economy, therefore capacity to formulate independent policies relating to 
the agricultural sector is integral to state power in France. Third, increase in the
The Council of Ministers is the legislative organ of the EC. Up until the 1985, it acted as one of  
tlie locus of intergovemmentality. The voting procedure in the Council is very important in 
determining whether the institutional pendulum shifts toward the supranational of the 
intergovernmental. This is elaborated in chapter 3.
“The so-called ‘third stage’ of the transitional phase of the Community’s development came into 
effect in January 1966, majority voting should automatically be introduced for the first time on a 
significant range of issues in the Council of Ministers”. See Teasdale, L. Anthony. 1993. “The Life 
and Death of the Luxemburg Compromise”, Journal o f Common Market Studies, pp. 567-568.
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legislation subject to ‘majority voting’ in the Council meant that further decisions 
would be taken at the supranational level. The French government under the 
President de Gaulle, was resolved “to shield sovereignty from the encroachments 
of supranationality” (Dinan, 1994: 39). It should be specified that the French 
position was not to break up the Community but to continue the process of 
integration with respect to the principle that each nation-state controlled their own 
destinies (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994: 25-41). In cases where national interests 
conflicted with the Community interests a space for the latter had to remain. 
Therefore Luxembourg Compromise was agreed upon in January 1966, by the 
intensification of the tensions, as the result of the French chaise vide (empty chair) 
politics.'*'* Accordingly, the issue of majority voting in the Council of Ministers 
remained unsettled; instead unanimity vote was brought about. The essence of the 
Compromise was that when “a decision requiring majority voting in the Council 
could be postponed until unanimous agreement had been reached” (Teasdale, 
1993: 567). Thus, it symbolized “a transformation from a ‘Community’ spirit to a 
more selfish and pragmatic ‘cost-benefit’ attitude of the member states” and in the 
period to follow until the Single European Act the intergovernmental axis 
remained stronger (Dinan, 1994:59). Consequently, until mid-1980s the process of 
European integration slowed down, the balance between supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism was broken down in the favor of the latter. Yet, the 
completion of the Custom Union on July 1968, which rendered the national 
economies of the member states ever interdependent, the improvement reached in 
Hague Summit (1969) on issues relating to Common Agricultural Policy,
France did not participated in the meetings of the Community.
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European Political Cooperation, European Monetary Unification and the 
processes of Community enlargement were still steps forward in the process of 
integration (Dinan, 1994:71-75).'*^
By the 1970s the oil crisis hit the world economy, the member states had troubles 
in their individual capacities to adjust their socioeconomic policies to meet the 
crisis. A latent reason for this was that the impact of integration had already 
rendered the member states even more interdependent with one another, the 
original purpose to ‘out-law’ war between the nations of Europe was now 
deviating toward the sustained growth of the welfare of the European nations 
(Nugent, 1999: 17). The EC failed to develop a unitary European foreign and 
economic policy to deal with the petroleum crisis (Dinan, 1994:84). However, 
they needed integrated Community policies for collective action even more 
strongly. Additionally, the negative effects of economic integration were also 
hindering the economic sectors of the member states because the processes of 
harmonization of policies was slowed down as the result of the 1965 intra- 
Community crisis. These gave rise to an intensification of the intergovernmental 
meetings for negotiations of the EC problems. This, period then saw the 
institutionalization of the once ad hoc intergovernmental conferences (IGC). The 
underlying purpose was to revitalize the process of European integration through
EMU or the European Monetary Union and EPC or the European Political Cooperation will be 
discussed in the last chapter, but for the recent purpose it suffice to say that cooperation toward 
closer political integration were already issues attempted to handled at the European level. When it 
comes to the process of enlargement, it has a direct relations with institutional reforms, because the 
integration of a new participant in the Community has a direct impact on the decision-making at 
the European level. This issue is clarified in chapter 3. The member states participation to the 
Community depends on tlie size of their populatioa Additionally, the introduction of new 
members means and additional vote to be reconciled at the level o f the Council.
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networks of intergovernmental communications so as to cope with the blockages 
in the institutional decisions making processes stimulated by the Luxembourg 
Compromise, Thus, in 1974, with the Paris declaration the European Council 
was established as an integral part of the European integration process. It was an 
intergovernmental institution in nature and scope; however, as Dinan (1994:230) 
mentions, “the European Council’s emergence in the 1970s coincided whith a 
gradual strengthening, rather than weakening, of supranationalism in the 
Community”. The increase in the powers of the EP; the increasing use of majority 
voting in the Council of Ministers; and the forthcoming re-launch of the visions of 
establishing a European economic, monetary, social, cultural and political union 
respectively by the Single European Act (1987), Maastricht Treaty (1993), 
Copenhagen Summit (1993), Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Helsinki Summit 
(1999), the Feira Summit (2000) -were all steps forward in the unification of the 
member states, and this was the outcome of the regular meetings of the European 
Council.
In this context, the post-Maastricht era is mainly the subject of study of the third 
and the fourth chapters, in which the institutional dynamics and the dynamics of 
the political unification are explored. For our recent purpose, the focus will be on 
the period up until the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty or the Treaty on 
European Union. The period is worth studying because most of the fundamentals 
of the economic and political unification are constructed in this period. The major 
success was especially in the issues relating to the completion of the Single 
European Market, institutional reforms and subsequent enlargements, and finally
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the establishment of the EU as a three-pillar structure. In the previous section of 
this chapter, the underlying dynamics of the processes of integration are set forth. 
The period to follow will briefly be covered, constructing on the previous 
explorations.
As a remedy to ‘Europessimism’, in the Paris Summit (1974), the European
Council asked the Prime Minister of Belgium, Leo Tindemans, “to produce a
report on how a political union might realistically be achieved” (Salmon and
Nicoll, 1997; 142-150; Vandamme, 1989: 149-173).'*  ^ The Tindemans Report
prepared and submitted to the European Council (1975-76) underlined the basic
principles upon which should be built a European Union.
(1) European Union implies that we present a united front to the outside 
world. We must tend to act in common in all the main fields of our external 
relations whether in foreign policy, security, economic relations or 
development and aid. (2) European Union recognizes the interdependence 
of the economic prosperity of our States and accepts the consequences of 
this...(3) European Union requires the solidarity of our peoples to be 
effective and adequate. Regional policy will correct inequalities in 
development and counteract the centralizing effects of industrial 
societies...(4) European Union makes itself felt in people’s daily lives. It 
helps to protect their rights and to improve their life style...(5) In order to 
achieve these tasks European Union is given institutions with necessary 
powers to determine a common, coherent and all-elusive political view, the 
efficiency needed for action, the legitimacy needed for democratic control.
The principle of equality of all our States continues to be respected within 
the Union by each State’s right to participate in the decision-making. (6) 
Like the Community whose objectives it pursue and whose attainments it 
protects, European Union will be built gradually. So as to restart the 
construction of Europe straight away and increase its credibility its initial 
basis in the commitments of the States to carry out in different fields 
specific actions selected according to their importance and chances of 
success.
46 It is used to describe the period where the process o f integration fall into an abyss. This 
negatively effected the member states and run contrary to the proponents of supranationalism. See 
Dinan, Desmond. 1994. Ever Closer Union, page 69-98.
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The European Council welcomed the report. This was an important step on the 
road to Maastricht. However, the process of (economic) integration was yet far 
behind the original program and the climate of the Luxembourg compromise still 
persisted. The report’s utility was only to provide a framework for the Treaty on 
European Union to follow two decades later. For the current purpose, the pursuit 
of economic integration, some institutional reforms were on top of the agenda. In 
the meantime by the early 80s the internal and external challenges to the 
Community were felt strongly by, the Europeans (Pryce, 1989; 175). The 
processes of economic integration that had been launched rigorously had slowed 
down in the middle of its allure and this disturbed the balance of the economies of 
the members. An additional impact was the full membership of Greece and the 
accession negotiations with Spain and Portugal, which were relatively the weak 
economies. These challenges combined de-colonization, the competition in the 
international economy that strongly acquired a global shape, and undermined the 
competitiveness of the Community. In addition to this, the tension with the United 
State relating to the cold-war defense and security strategies was requiring 
collective action of the Western European states. This time another proposal came 
under the European Council, this was the Genscher-Colombo Act which 
translated itself into the Solemn Declaration on European Union (1981-1983). 
It was a proposal brought about by the German and the Italian Foreign Ministers. 
The plan outlined strongly the foundation of a European Union, its underlying 
assumptions were similar to Tindemans Report. Yet, note that the latter was 
drafted upon the request of the Council while the former was the initiative of the 
German Foreign Minister and reflected the German position to unify Europe. The
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support was mainly from Italy. A final move in the transition from the 
Community to a ‘Union’ was made from the part of the European Parliament in 
1984, by a parliamentary group, The Crocodile Group, under the leadership of 
Alterio Spinelli. This consisted of a ‘Draft Treaty establishing the European 
Union’ sent to national parliaments of the member states (Salmon and Nicoll, 
1997: 176). It again urged to take collective action on as much as issue relating to 
integration, with specific emphasis to establish a stronger union among the 
European people. The major emphasis was on the emergency to increase the 
powers of the EP, and to bring about democratic legitimacy to the institutions of 
the EC. This remained also only as an attempt and was not actualized as a Treaty 
by the member states. Yet, for the years to follow it is an illustrative example for 
the role of the EP in stimulating institutional reforms and for the notion of 
establishing a ‘Union’ where the decisions are to be made as closer as possible to 
the people (Corbett, 1993: 7). Indeed, all the Report, the Declaration and the Draft 
inform a common position reached in the European Council. This consist of the 
necessity to move forward in the process of integration: toward the completion of 
the common market with the support of deepening of the scope of the EC 
institutions (shifting toward the supranational pendulum) and through the 
extension of cooperation in common foreign and common security policies. 
Additionally, most of the Treaty on the European Union consists from a revised 
version of these proposals.
As the mid-80s came, the prospects for future integration were more or less clear. 
The first path was definitively to focus on the completion of the common market.
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and then to move from the Community to a Union. In 1985, Jacques Delors 
became the President of the Commission and Lord Cockfield the Vice-President. 
They were decisive in the completion in the completion of the common market. In 
most of the EU literature, Delors is introduced, after Jean Monnet as a second 
architect of the EU project. In his speech in Bruges, Delors (1989) argued for the 
establishment of a European Federal State based on the principle of 
“subsidiarity”.T w o  consecutive documents were prepared in that period. The 
first is the Dooge Report to the European Council (1984-85) (Keatinge and 
Murphy, 1989: 217-237; Salmon and Nicoll, 1997: 189-199). The majority in the 
European Council, resolved that it was the time for a second Spaak Report and to 
prepare the grounds for an intergovernmental conference to negotiate a draft 
Treaty on the European Union. Consequently, the Dooge Committee was 
established as a first step. The priority objective was set in the Report as 
institutional reformation, to reassert efficiency and to bring about democracy in 
the institutional framework were the underlying purpose. The completion of the 
objectives set in the Treaty of Rome, the realization of the Economic and 
Monetary Unification, to bring ahead the notion of European citizenship, to 
improve the European political cooperation and to set a proper formula for
The principle of subsidiarity is briefly discussed in the final chapter. It is basically introduced by 
the TEU (1993). Tlie idea was launched by Delors (1989), “Never entrust to a bigger unit anything 
that is best done by a smaller one”...subsidiarity, he argued ...made the federalism the savior of 
pluralism, diversity, patriotism, and national identity in Europe. Indeed, the rejection of 
federalism, he warned, would mean the return of ugly nationalism”. Thus, the argument was that 
each decisions should be taken at the proper political unit. It “appeared as the guiding principle to 
delienating the competences of Brussels versus other administrative authorities, such as national 
states and regions”. Its basic implication was that there should be a “separation of the 
responsibilities between the European Commission, the member state and sub-national 
governments or other local authorities. Yet, the subsidiarity and its imphcations are largely 
debated. See, Nelsen, Brent F. and Alexander C-G. Stubb. 1994. The European Union, pp.51, and 
Van Kersenbergen, Kees and Bertjan Verbeek. 1994. “The Politics of Subsidiarity in the European 
Union”, Journal o f Common Market Studies.
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cooperation in foreign and security policies were functions of a proper 
institutional framework. Consequently, the Report was informing the framework 
of the forthcoming Maastricht Treaty.
The second is the White Paper (1985) submitted by the Commission to the 
European Council (Dinnage and Murphy, 1996: 16-19). It informs the
governments of the member states on the measures to be adopted for the 
establishment of the Single European Market, and within the set timetable. In line 
with the stages of economic integration already discussed in this chapter, this 
consists of the elimination of the removal of all the physical, technical, fiscal 
barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital and people of the 
Community, and all other measures, such as institutional reforms, relating to the 
creation of the Single Market.
Both the Dooge Report and the White Paper were negotiated in the Milan Summit 
(June 1985) of the European Council. The member states agreed on fundamental 
principles of the both documents, and specifically on White Paper. Yet, still some 
of the member states were reluctant in certain issues and the unanimity voting still 
applied, and specifically for such decisions involving a considerable amount of 
sovereignty to be given up to the Community institutions. Not to mention that the 
independent policy-making capacities of the member states would be seriously 
undermined. Consequently, the governments decided to organize another 
intergovernmental conference to be held in Luxembourg (September 1986), 
within this period the governments continued negotiations in order to reach a
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common position (Corbett, 1989; 238-272). Thereafter, the outcom.e of all these 
processes from Dooge to Luxembourg, was the introduction of the Single 
European Act (SEA) in 1987. The provisions in the SEA consisted of the 
revisions and amendments of the Paris and Rome Treaties, the major issues were 
the common market and the institutional reforms. In the Article (13/8A) the 
objective is set as, “The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of 
progressively establishing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 
December 1992...”, and a specific emphasis was given to the notion that “The 
internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movements of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured...” (Salmon and 
Nicoll, 1997: 206). Additionally, specific importance was accorded to the 
actualization and institutionalization of the European Political Cooperation. By 
the end of the 80s, Cecchini Report (1988) was announcing the positive 
contributions that the construction of the common market was bringing about the 
growth of the European economies to the increase in welfare through the creation 
of jobs and decrease in inflation. Moreover, the Report analyzed the prospects of 
future improvements through the realization of the economic unification (Karluk, 
1998: 35).
In the eve of 1989 the Berlin Wall was no more there, in the words of Delors 
(1989) it symbolized a conjuncture for the “acceleration of History”. The 
unification of Germany and the future of the Central and Eastern European socio­
economic, political and cultural landscape were crucial to be considered in 
relation to the European Community. In addition to these, the second era of
72
globalization was beginning to make itself felt, there was an all-encompassing 
restructuration in the shape of the world politics (Rosenau, 1990). As 
consequences of the global competition in post-industrial societies, the integrative 
and the fragmentary forces of the globalization became gradually apparent in the 
internal and external political relations of the societies (Ross, 1998). It was more 
or less clear that the post-cold war era would result in considerable changes in the 
socioeconomic and political dynamics in the global system. In this context, the 
European Community perceived that it should be able to adapt to the probable 
systemic changes. Yet, the forthcoming evolution of EC through preparing the 
basic premises upon which the EU should be built is not only and adaptation to 
the systemic changes, but it is also an attempt to reassert the European position in 
the post-cold war era as an actor shaping the global order, and the direction of the 
process of globalization (Ross, 1998).
The emergence of the EU as a post-Westphalian actor is in part to denote the role 
of the European Community in creating the institutional arrangement for a 
possible revision of the concept of ‘sovereignty’ in its full content. As for the 
events leading to Maastricht, by the early 90s, the Single Market Program has 
reached almost its peak. In this respect, Delors, with the full support of the French 
President F. Mitterand and the German Prime Minister H. Kohl, prepared a 
committee report known as Delors Report on the European Economic and 
Monetary Unification (1989). The Economic and Monetary Unification will be 
discussed in chapter 4, but for the recent study, this was an important step leading 
to the ratification the Maastricht Treaty. In the years to follow the subject matter
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of the Intergovernmental Conferences was the signing and the ratification of the 
Treaty of Maastricht on Economic, Monetary and Political Union (TEU). The 
Treaty was signed in 1992, yet it had to be ratified by the national parliaments or 
by popular referendums in the member states. One point needs clarification here. 
Throughout the evolution of the process of integration, the European public 
became increasingly involved in the process. In its origins, the process was rather 
going on through negotiation at the level of political elite. Yet, the impact of 
integration soon made itself felt at all the levels of European societies, the public 
became gradually aware and informed on the consequences of integration (Slater, 
1982). As it was obvious the ratification of TEU involved “further loss of 
sovereignty”, and the popular concern about the relatively undemocratic 
institutional mechanisms of the EC combined with certain consideration of 
national interests lead to the late approval and operationalization of the Maastricth 
Treaty. As its content will be addressed in the following chapters, the TEU was in 
full effect only by November 1993, after subsequent series of multi-level 
negotiations. Denmark opted out from the CFSP pillar of the EU, and UK was 
reserved on the Social Charter, on the independent budget of the EC and ion 
issues relating to EMU.
The completion of the Single European Market (January, 1993) and the 
introduction of the Treaty on European Economic, Monetary and Political 
Union are the grounds on which the European integration movement is evolving 
today on a ‘stage by stage’ process of unification, yet not without any 
complexities. The TEU established a three-pillar institutional framework, which
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consist of Economic Communities, Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. Additionally, it introduced important 
provisions relating to European Citizenship. In the following chapters the focus 
will be on the post-Maastricht era, in which the Treaty of Amsterdam and certain 
important IGC relating to achieve the goals set for the construction of the 
European Union will be explored. The new institutional framework of the EU, the 
current state of integration reached relating to the notion of ‘subsidiarity’, 
European Citizenship, EMU, CJHA and the CFSP are worth studying in order to 
reach a deeper understanding of the current transformations and challenges that 
the modern nation-state (member states) are experiencing.
While these Treaties were put into force from 1958 to 1993, they meant extending 
the share of sovereignty of the Community/Union over the territories of the 
member states, on a ‘stage by stage’ basis. In other words, the member states were 
given up (transferring) amounts of their jurisdictional authority to the institutions 
of the Communities (Arat, 1996:44). In this respect, one underlying assumption is 
the complementary nature of the interaction between “negative” and “positive 
integration” or “informal” and “formal integration” (Bressand and Nicolaidis, 
1990: 44). The first involves the processes of integration such as the elimination 
of obstacles to free trade, while the second involves the processes of integration 
relating to the coordination (harmonization), adoption and implementation of 
common policies or rules and regulations. This is important to comprehend the 
cumulatively complementary nature of the relationship between the economic and 
political integration (Belassa, 1961). As set in Rome Treaty (TEC), the mode of
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economic integration via the establishment of a ‘common market’ mean the 
gradual convergence of the national economies and markets of the member states, 
and the process, to be sustained, requires the adoption and implementations of 
common policies. Another underlying assumption is that, the vision to 
convergence the national economies of the member state is seriously undermining 
the basic premises upon which the modern nation-state rests. Traditionally, the 
state is considered as the main economic actor in its territorial space (Pierson, 
1996: 94). Indeed, micro and macro economic policies relating to production- 
consumption, import-export, inflation, employment, ownership, taxation and 
redistribution of resources and many other aspects of economic activities falls 
under the responsibility of the state. Therefore, by the informal and formal 
processes of integration the sovereignty of the member states over their national 
economy is seriously undermined. Another related challenge is that the relative 
autonomy and capacities of the member states are undermined. On the one hand, 
in terms of their policy-making capacities, the principle of relative independence 
from external forces is undermined once the process of policy harmonization 
starts."*^  On the other hand, the capacity of the individual member states to meet 
the moral and material need of their respective population is undermined. This can 
be read in two major ways. On the one hand, as the result of the process of 
integration significant amount of national resources are simultaneously polled
‘"*The principle of relative independence from external forces was elaborated in the first chapter. 
In this section, 'external forces’ refers to the supranational forces o f integration.
76
together, i.e. coal and steel production, research and development, energy, are 
some examples. Therefore, the exploitation of these resources is no longer in the 
hand of a single state to meet its problem-solving capacity, the resources are open 
to be controlled by an ‘extra-territorial’ authority. As briefly explored in the first 
chapter this is complemented by the forces of globalization, in an ever 
interdependent world “policy issues increasingly require international agreements 
and collaboration and are therefore no longer open to the problem-solving 
capacity of individual nation-states”. (Axtmann, 1997: 43).''^ On the other hand, 
increasing aspects of socio-economic or political decisions are issued by the 
supranational organization. The outcome of these decisions can either be to the 
satisfaction of the “demands and expectations” of the citizens of the individual 
member states or to their disappointment (Axtmann, 1997: 44). As it will be 
further demonstrated in the subsequent sections, the member states in most of the 
cases are bound by these common policies. Indeed, all these observations 
mentined above will become clearer when they are considered together with the 
empirical instances where the adoption and implementation of common policies 
had been achieved. On the way toward the completion of the Single European 
Market, which is in itself an empirical case, the Common Agricultural Policy, 
Common Competition Policy, harmonization of Tax Policies and many other 
areas where the processes of unification, integration, coordination or cooperation
In his article Axtmann refers to the impact of globalization on the “political legitimacy in the 
sovereign, democratic nation-state” which he observes “has typically been linked to the state’s 
capacity to deal effectively with the demands and expectations o f its citizens and with the citizens’ 
democratic rights to exercise control over the raling elites through elections and other forms of 
political participation as well as trough the use of law”. See Axtman Roland. 1997. “Collective 
Identity and the Democratic Nation-State in the Age o f Globalization”. In Cvetkovich, Ann and 
Douglas Kellner ,eds., Articulating the Global and the Local: Globalization and Cultural Studies, 
pp. 43.
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has considerably been achieved, and thereafter the process ‘spillover’ into other 
major domains of high politics. There remains other considerations to be made in 
relation to the challenges posed by the forces of integration to the modern nation­
state, they are explored in the following chapters. And, the dialect between the 
supranational and the intergovernmental axis of the European integration process 
is a major demonstration of these considerations relating to the reformulation 
(reconstruction) of the modern nation-state. In the following chapter, the attempt 
will be to explore the institutionalized dynamics of the intergovernmental and the 
supranational.
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CHAPTER 3
TO BRIDGE THE SUPRANATIONAL AND THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL: THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
3.1. Why Does the Institutional Framework of the EU Matters?
In this chapter, the purpose is to demonstrate that the EU is a new form of 
territorial governance, which has a geographical boundary, and constituting its 
legal system and supranational jurisdiction. The European Union is a 
supranational organization in nature and scope. It is a legal entity having its own 
institutional structure and decision-making mechanisms that is supposed to 
function over and above that of the nation-state (Newman, 1996; 31). This legal 
system, which emerged throughout the process of integration in Europe, is 
juxtaposed with the legal systems of the nation-states, which are part of this 
process of integration. The area of jurisdiction of the EU, its authority and 
governance, encompasses the territories of the member states (Held, 1999). In 
other words, the member states share their sovereign rights with the European 
Union.Consequently, the formation of the institutional structure of the EU and 
its becoming a legal system stimulates progressively a transformation in the 
Westphalian system of states. This is to point out to the fact that, while the
The conceptions of ‘transfer of sovereignty’, ‘pooling of sovereignty’, ‘yielding of authority’, 
‘sharing powers’ are also used in the literature and all refer to an erosion o f sovereignty or 
transformation in the very nature of the Westphahan state.
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institutions of the EU acquire jurisdiction over the territories of the member states 
the sovereignty and autonomy of the state in question erode. This poses a 
challenge to the very nature of the modern nation-state described in the first 
chapter. Yet, the transfer of sovereignty is a stage by stage process, and the law 
making capacity of the institutions of the EU extends over various areas 
progressively. As an illustration, the process of integration had started with the 
establishment of ECSC through which the control of the coal and steel resources 
in the member states had been given to the High Authority, which was the 
supranational institution. Consecutively, the Commission replaced the High 
Authority, and its areas of control extended to encompass almost all matters 
relating to economy. Today, the jurisdiction of the institutions of the EU ranges 
from economic, social, cultural, environmental issues to political ones, which 
means from trade, welfare, education, and pollution policies to common foreign 
and security and justice and home affairs policies.
As already mentioned the EU seriously undermines the principle of sovereignty 
developed by the Westphalian model. It is the basic reason for why there arises 
competing perspectives in the process of institutionalization of the European 
integration process, which revolves around the intergovernmental and 
supranational axis. Indeed, as it is also mentioned by Keohane and Hoffman 
(1994) with regard to the EC, while exploring the institutional structure of the 
European Union it can be argued that “it is both intergovernmental and 
supranational in nature”. As explored in the first chapter, sovereignty is where the 
notions of (territory), nation, state, democracy and citizens are intersecting
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together with the concepts of national interest, collective identity formation and 
law making. The tensions between supranational and intergovernmental axis 
arises from the very possible clashes between the individual national interests of 
the member states and the common interests of the Union. Certainly, these issues 
are debated under the heading of ‘amount of sovereignty’ to be given up to the 
Union and the conditions under which it should be sacrificed. As Newman 
(1996:1) comments on the debates following the Maastricht Treaty, “On the one 
side were those who insisted that Maastricht Treaty was a step too far and that 
democracy and sovereignty must be defended against too far encroachment of 
‘Brussels’; on the other were those who claimed that sovereignty was 
anachronistic and that the way forward was to recognize the importance of the 
Union, while simultaneously democratizing it”. Altogether combined, it would be 
correct to argue that the EU has arisen as a supranational entity (polity) 
performing its own interests which may clash with the interests of a nation-state, 
and in many cases dominate over individual national interests.
In order to have a better understanding of what makes the EU supranational or 
intergovernmental and to grasp its difference from both the international 
organizations and the modern nation-states there is a need to explore the 
institutional framework of the EU. This exploration is additionally important in 
order to conceptualize how the EU undermines the sovereignty and strength of the 
member nation-state; while it restricts the autonomy and capacities of the member 
states. In sum, its institutional framework is necessary to analyze in order to grasp
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what makes the EU to be classified as one of the playwright of “post international 
politics” or as the symbol of the post-Westphalian order.
The process of institutionalization of the European integration movement is 
substantial for the process of integration be durable. According to Arat (1996:35- 
38), the formation of a legal system is crucial for the integration process be 
sustained. This legal system which binds the member states distinguishes the EU 
from other international organizations, and gives it a supranational character. In 
other words, the achievement of a European society of states without internal 
frontiers requires the formation of a European legal system to set the norms, codes 
of conduct and to promote coordination, harmonization, standardization of 
policies repetitively as if a new nation-state was forming. A legal system -  
relatively the most developed contemporary is that of the nation-state (Arat, 
1996:39; Held, 1998, Kohler, 1998) - requires four elements to work properly.^' 
As Arat (1996: 38-39) describes, first, a legal order requires agencies having the 
capacity to set rules and implement them, the most important of such organs those 
having legislative and executive capacities. In the case of the EU those are the 
institutions that are established by the treaties, these constitute the fundamental 
legal sources of the EU. The second element of a legal order are the legal rules.
Held and Kohler, assesses it in terms o f the democratic institutions through which the decisions 
are made. See, Archibugi, Daniele, David Held and Martin Kohler (eds.) 1998. Re-Imagining 
Political Community, pp. 11-27 and 231-251.
Arat in his article distinguishes between the EC and the EU and mentions that it is proper to use 
the concept of EC Law rather than the EU Law. In this thesis EU will be used to refer to the three- 
pillar institutional framework, but Arat clarification on EC Law will be taken as granted. 
Accordingly, the sources of Law o f the EC, are the founding Treaties, and the decisions issued by 
the legislative organs of the EC. See Arat, Tuğrul. 1996. “Avrupa Toplulukları Hukuku” (The Law 
of the European Communities). In T.C.M.B. Avrupa Birliği El Kitabı, pp. 29-52.
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which are the lubricants of the institutional framev/ork of the society, and the 
institutions are both important inputs and outcomes of the legal rules and Law is 
established through a system of legal rules (Arat, 1996:39). The third element are 
the courts, which are responsible for safeguarding the proper application of the 
legal rules. Forth, there are executive branches that are responsible for the 
execution or the enforcement of the laws. These last two elements of any modern 
legal order are essential for it to be effectively sustained and implemented. All the 
institutions mentioned should be Constitutionally be empowered in order to 
exercise their legislative, executive or judicial powers. Moreover, to render a legal 
system work effectively, the four constituent element of a legal order should have 
reached a high degree of institutionalization. As Arat mentions (1996:40), as the 
nature and scope of the social interactions intensify and diversify, the legal system 
which basically regulates the social relations widens and deepens in content. In 
other words, new rules are being made consecutively in order to meet the 
emerging material and moral expectations of the people, in different time and 
places. In this context, and referring to the first chapter of this thesis, the capacity 
of the system -in this case the state apparatus- to issue autonomously the proper 
rules to meet the changing expectations and demands, in order to get the support 
of its citizens, is a measure for the strength of this system. In the case of the 
relationship between the EU and its member states, the realm of authority of the 
institutional framework of the EU encompasses the territories of the member 
states. This means that regarding the areas they have given up the right to 
decision-making to the institutional framework of the EU, they have also eroded 
their capacity of autonomous decision making, as illustrated by the Court of
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Justice cases analyzed in previous chapters. In other words, they are dependent 
and bound by the decisions made at the EU level.
Yet, has the institutional framework of the EU developed as that of the nation­
state? The process of enlarging of the Union embarked in 1997 has brought about 
the need for institutional reform. In the EU, ‘widening’, i.e. enlargement of the 
Union, goes hand in hand with deepening, i.e. institutional reforms. Recently, in 
May 2000, German foreign minister Joschka Fischer declared the need to stretch 
the integration process and “to move towards stronger central government if it 
was to provide a workable framework for the doubling of EU membership with its 
own Constitution” (Herald Tribune, 18 May 2000; Financial Times, 18 May 
2000). Then, these federalist visions were supported by the French President 
Jacques Chirac (Financial Times, June 18 2000).This contemporary debate on the 
idea of a “Federal Europe” points out to the fact that the institutional framework 
of the EU is still in a process of evolving. In the coming Nice Summit a major 
item on the EU agenda is institutional reforms, prior to enlargement of the 
U nion.Additionally, this debate is a demonstration of the resilience of the two 
axis: the supranational and the intergovernmental. Would the intergovernmental 
bargains in Nice result in steps towards more supranationality, meaning further 
erosion of sovereignty of the member nation-states?
Nice Summit will be held on December 2000 under French presidency, the issues on the agenda 
of the Nice Summit are considered in the Feira Summit held on 19,20 Time 2000.
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The Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the 
Court of Justice are established as the major institutions of the European 
Communities. A parallel development within the movement of European 
integration was the institutionalization of the Intergovernmental Conferences 
(IGC), which until 1975 were held on ad hoc basis. This meant the 
institutionalization of the “European Community summitry”, the decision was 
taken at the Paris Summit, December 1974, under the French Presidency and 
assumed “thrice-yearly Community summits, henceforth known as European 
Councils” (Dinan, 1994:89). Arising from the pressing need to overcome the 
crisis of 1970s, the regularization of the Summit meetings meant to endorse 
communication between the heads of the Member States in order to strengthen 
compromise and cooperation. The European Council is an intergovernmental 
institution within the Community, yet as it will be explored further in this chapter, 
it worked to strengthen the supranational character of the European integration 
(Dinan, 1994:230). As an illustration, another important decision made at the 
Paris Summit brought “regular Community-wide direct election to the European 
Parliament”. This was a supranational step forward in order to balance the 
intergovernmental axis thought to be strengthened by the European Council 
(Dinan, 1994:89). Despite the hardships before their ratification, the SEA, the 
Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam are all outcomes of the summit
3.2. The Institutional Structure of the European Union
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meetings of the European Council.^'' Yet, they have all brought about 
supranational reformations in the institutional structure of the Community.
However, in retrospection, it was the Maastricht Treaty which made the most
fundamental restructuring in the institutional framework of the European
Community. First, labeled as the Treaty on the European Union, it transformed
the European Community into the European Union. As mentioned in Newman
(1996:1) and in Best (1994: 18), the first article of the Treaty mentions “the
definition of what the European Union is intended to be”:
By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a 
European Union, hereinafter called ‘the Union’. This Treaty marks a new 
stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens.
The Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented 
by the policies and forms of cooperation established by this Treaty. Its task 
shall be to organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, 
relations between the Member States and between their peoples.
Second, it established the Union as a three-pillar structure. Consequently,
European Communities, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Justice and Home
Affairs were set as the three pillars constituting the institutional framework of the
EU. The Treaty was a step forward in the process of integration while it
maintained both the supranational and intergovernmental axis. In the period
between 1970 and 1985, “new forms of joint action” had already increased and
emerged within the Community. In addition to the institutional reforms, the
This refers to such instances when, during the negotiations, Denmark and UK exceptionalism, 
French skcepticism on sharing their sovereign rights on policy issues which they considerof high 
national interest, complicated the ratification of these treaties. See, Laursen, Finn and Sophie 
Vanhoonacker (eds.) 1994. Ratification o f the Maastricht Treaty: Issues, Debates and Future 
Implications.
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“competerxes and objectives” of the European Communities increased to include 
regional policies, energy, environment, research and technology and the 
cooperation in monetary policies. Meanwhile, the cooperation in some other ‘high 
politics’ domain, i.e. European Political Cooperation, were within the Community 
framework but mainly under the “political guidance of the European Council” 
(Best, 1994: 19). This means that even if at an intergovernmental cooperation 
basis the issues negotiated at the European level by the Member States increased, 
which led to further restrictions of autonomy in the policy spheres in question. 
The SEA had introduced most of these forms of cooperation into the framework 
of the Treaties. Yet, the Treaty of Maastricht has gone steps forward and 
introduced “everything that the Member States do together under the umbrella of 
the European Union; and supposedly” installed “a single institutional framework” 
(Best, 1994: 19). To follow the description of Best (1994: 19-21), the European 
Communities retained their importance “as the ‘hard-core’ of the integration 
process”, and Maastricht has increased the objectives and areas of competence of 
the EC, single currency is one such example. Moreover, it has brought 
institutional reforms, most important of which is the increased powers of the 
European Parliament, which is important in terms of supranationality and 
democracy. In sum, the ‘single institutional framework’ established by the 
Maastricht Treaty was composed of the traditional European Communities as the 
first pillar “joined to the Union roof, by two blocks of intergovernmental 
cooperation: Common Foreign and Security Policy as a ‘second pillar’, and 
Cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs as a ‘third pillar’” (Best, 
1994: 20).
87
The most important feature of the EU is that it explicitly demonstrated an 
important move from the economic to the political integration -from ‘low politics 
to high politics’. In other words, the Treaty of Maastricht was the first explicit 
step toward forming a political union in Europe. The completion of the Single 
Market, the European Economic and Monetary Unification project and the idea of 
European citizenship. And, the increase in the areas of competence of the EC and 
the formal inclusion of the CFSP and JHA within the umbrella of the EU means 
further transfer of sovereignty to the European level of decision making, which is 
not happily accepted by all the members of the EU.
In order to develop a better understanding of how the European Union works, it is 
time now to explore all the institutions of the Union separately. However, before 
the exploration ahead, it should be emphasized that a Union of three-pillar 
structure does neither mean a clear cut separation of the decision-making 
apparatus of the pillars, nor that all the institutions are common to the three- 
pillars (Best, 1994; 20). In other words, economic, political, social, environmental 
etc. policies are all made within the framework of the EU some by ‘Community 
method’ (EC decision-making framework), some others by intergovernmental 
processes. This is related to the amount of sovereignty given up to the institutional 
framework of the EU, and to the nature and scope of the issue subjected to 
legislation. There are policy areas where it is the space of EU decision-making, 
some others are done by the member states through EU negotiations, others only 
left to the member states (Everling, 1997).
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“The European Commission and the Berlaymont, its headquarters building in 
Brussels, are popularly synonymous with the Community itself’ (Dinan, 1994: 
200). It is primarily supposed to safeguard the interests of the Community and of 
the European integration movement in general. As such, within the institutional 
framework of the European Union it is a supranational institution of the European 
Communities. The issues are decided upon with simple majority voting. It legally 
represents the European Union. It is established by the Treaty of Rome as the 
main “actor in all aspects of policy-making, implementation, and ‘policing’” 
(Newman, 1996: 32). First of all, the executive function of the Commission is 
supplemented by its major status in the formulation and implementation of 
common policies (Karluk, 1998: 109). Although it is mainly an executive organ, 
it has considerable role in the legislation process. Basically, it is the only 
institution that can initiate law. A proposal from the Commission is a requirement 
for the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament to pass legislation. It 
has the exclusive right to submit proposals to the Council of Ministers. As such, it 
is designed to be the locomotive of the process of integration. Moreover, the 
Commission can also “issue directives, regulations and decisions annually” 
(Dinan, 1994: 221). Consequently, it can be deduced that the Commission is 
placed at the center of the policy-making and implementing process of the EU.
3.3 The Supranational Axis
3.3.1 The European Commission
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As already mentioned, the Commission is supposed to represent the interests of 
the Community. Consequently, it represents also the converged interests of the 
member states, which is related with the collective identity formation process. 
Related to this role, the Commission is the organ with the authority to represent 
the European Union in its international relations. This means another 
transformation in the traditional understanding of sovereignty. In other words, 
through the Commission, the EU is externally recognized as sovereign. Thus, to 
be present at the international deliberations and agreements are within the 
responsibilities of the European Commission. The Commission has “delegations 
and offices throughout the world”, which are to conduct the external relations 
between the Community and the international organizations or the third countries, 
non-member states (Dinan, 1994: 224). Early on it was specified that the EU is an 
alternative locus of sovereignty, which it exercises over the territories of the 
member states.
The European Community has a common (foreign) trade policy. Consequently, 
the member states do not have individual trade policies, this space is reserved to 
the EU, they are bound by the regulations of the Community. In this respect, the 
Commission has the most important role in conducting the common (foreign) 
trade policy and the international trade relations of the Community (Arsava, 1996: 
54). It has the right to go through negotiations to prepare and to sign the 
agreements on behalf of the Member States. Moreover, the Commission has also 
an important role in the process of the enlargement of the European Union since it 
is the organ that negotiates the association agreements. However, it should be
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specified that “the Commission is associated but not centrally involved” in 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, over which the Community lacks 
competence (Dinan, 1994: 224). Therefore, trade and technical issues and 
enlargement, which are today important components of foreign and security 
policies are conducted side by side with the Council and the member states closely 
follow the overall activities of the Commission. Yet, as already mentioned the 
Commission has the initiative and executive power. This means that it lies both at 
the source of the decisions made at the Community level, and that it acts like a 
government that implements the laws and to which the member states give up 
their sovereign rights on gradually increasing issues -specifically on issues 
concerning the internal market. In sum, it can be argued that the Commission, as a 
supranational apparatus, possess considerable authority in terms of conducting the 
external relations of the European Union.
Another important role of the Commission is its status in the ‘policing of the 
Community Law’. This concerns its relationship with the judiciary organ of the 
EU. It is supposed to safeguard the proper functioning of the institutional 
framework of the EU. This means that it is assigned to observe whether the legal 
rules were made by the constituent Treaties and the organs are followed duly. In 
this respect, in instances of infringements to the Community Law, it is authorized 
to bring the cases to the European Court of Justice. As mentioned by Dinan (1994: 
225), “...the Commission may bring a member state before the Court of Justice for 
alleged non-fulfillment of treaty obligations...But member states generally respect 
the treaties; otherwise the Community would collapse”. The “single market
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program” has led to the increase in the powers of the Commission “to enforce the 
Community Law” in the area of the internal market and especially in the issues 
concerning the ‘competition policy’ (Dinan, 1994: 226). Consequently, the 
authority of execution of the competition policy within the territories of the 
member states belongs to the Commission of the EU. In other words, the 
Commission has the right to supervise the compliance to the competition law of 
the business enterprises within the territories of the member states (Arsava, 1996: 
55). This is another concrete example of the erosion of sovereignty of the nation­
state since the Commission has the right to retribution in the form of heavy fine 
the enterprises within the territories of a member state. Additionally, in case of 
non-compliance with the competition policy, the case might also be brought to the 
Court of First Instance. This is an instance of EU exercising its authority in the 
realm of the national sovereignty, which is at odds with the Westphalian system of 
states already described in the first chapter. Traditionally, in the spheres of 
national autonomy it is the national authorities empowered with the Constitution 
which can exercise authority (Arsava, 1996: 55). Consequently, the autonomy of 
the state is also undermined, it can not autonomously decide on certain issues, i.e. 
firm mergers.
However, it should be clarified that the Commission of the EU, in terms of its 
executive powers is mainly dependent on the institutions of the member states. As 
an illustration, “without assistance from the member states’ agricultural 
departments, the Commission could not possibly make the CAP work”, and this is 
also true for “customs service”, and other services that the Community is
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supposed to enforce (Dinan, 1994: 222). Yet, although dependent upon the 
established institutions of the member states, the space of jurisdiction of the 
Commission is juxtaposed with that of the nation-state, and this constitute a 
reformulation of the conception of ‘territorial sovereignty’ of the modern nation­
state. This is because the autonomy of the state is undermined, the state is bound 
to consider the EU legislation in these matters. The state can neither make nor 
implement decisions independent from the general framework of EU, in the areas 
where the Commission is empowered, within the supranational spaces.
Another important responsibility of the Commission is the management of the 
budget of the EU. It oversees the revenues and the expenditures of the 
Community. As mentioned by Dinan (1994: 223), it “submits a preliminary draft 
budget to the two arms of the Community’s budgetary authority: the Council and 
the Parliament” this “is the first step necessary to translate into material terms the 
Community’s political, economic and social objectives”. The management and the 
“preliminary draft budgets” of structural funds such as the European Regional 
Funds, funds to finance the CAP, funds for assistance to the non-members such as 
the CEE, are delivered by the Commission. The last debate on the control of the 
budget of the two intergovernmental pillars by the Commission is an illustration 
of supranational intergovernmental axis (Monarg, 1997). The suspicion from the 
member state to move a step forwards to give up their sovereign rights on ‘high 
politics’ issues.
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Finally, in retrospection, the Commission of the European Union acts, as Delors 
described, as a “a strategic authority” established to “guarantee the continuity of 
the integration project despite political or geopolitical hazards”...acting as 
“custodian of European interests...and as a repository of past achievements,”...the 
Commission has a unique obligation to point “the way to the goal ahead”...the 
Commission itself cannot achieve much but it can generate ideas” (Dinan, 1994: 
227). As in the case of the ‘single market program’, as illustrated in the second 
chapter, the Commission is supposed to set strategies in the way toward economic 
and political integration. The “legislative programming” process, which is realized 
by the cooperation between the Commission, Parliament and the Council as 
introduced by the SEA, is one such illustration to make the decision-making 
procedure operate more effectively and to set the future of the integration (Dinan, 
1994: 219).
The last observation to be made about the Commission concerns its organizational 
structure. First, the Commission has General Directorates through which its 
activities are conducted, they correspond to the activities and responsibilities of 
the Commission -economic and monetary affairs, relation with the EP, transport 
and energy, internal market are example to General Directorates. The distribution 
of portfolios are supposed to be made according to the Community interests. 
Second, there are various Committees, which are “advisory, management or 
regulatory”, which are responsible to “counsel on rule making”, to “help 
implement” common policies such as CAP, or to realize policy harmonization 
such as the Common Custom Tariff (Dinan, 1994: 221). They work like a bridge
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between the Commission and the member states -competition committee, external 
relation committee, research and development committee are such examples. 
Finally, the President of the Commission is appointed by the common decision of 
the governments of the member states, and by the approval of the European 
Parliament. The President and the Commissioners form a cabinets to work on 
effective forward integration. The other members of the Commission, 20 members 
from all the member states, are supposed to work independent from their nation, 
which means the Commission is supposed to be ‘collegiate’ without being 
involved in the power politics -supposed to be equals- considerations of the 
nationality of the commissioners, the Commissioners are nominated by the 
common accord of the member states’ governments and the President. Thereafter, 
the vote of confidence from the European Parliament is important for the 
Commission to start working. Additionally, the Parliament can dissolve the 
Commission for reasons of non-confidence. Consequently, the Commission is 
rendered accountable to the European Parliament The competence of the EP 
concerning the Commission are part of attempts to “create an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible 
to the citizens” as cited in the Maastricht Treaty (1993). In other words, the space 
of competence of the European Parliament, which is a supranational Parliament, 
and the members of which are directly elected by the EU nationals, is tried to be 
widened in order to resolve the ‘democratic deficit’ debates going on throughout 
the EU. Additionally, the fact that the time of office of the Commission was 
equalized to that of the European Parliament, elected for five years, is an example 
of establishing closer cooperation between the supranational institutions with
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regard to the intergovernmental axis, so as to contribute to the embryonic federal 
system (Dinan, 209). This is also to establish solidarity with regard to the Council 
of Ministers, the main decision making body of the EU (Arsava, 1996: 53). The 
Commission is also supposed to report its activities annually to EP.
3.3.2 The European Parliament (EP)
The European Commission is worth studying in length because it represents the 
‘supranational’ and there is no analogous institution within the framework of the 
nation-state. The Parliament and the European Commission, as the competence of 
the former increases, are in close cooperation (Arsava, 1996: 53). It is important 
in terms of the inter-institutional balance of power. The European Parliament is 
another supranational institution within the EU, in that it is supposed to act on 
behalf of the European people, and to act over and above the interests of the 
individual nation-states. As such, it is supposed to represent the citizens of the EU 
(TEU, 1993). It is similar to the parliament, the legislative organ of the nation­
state. However, it is not the equivalent of national parliament because relatively it 
considerably lacks legislative powers (Dinan, 1994: 257). Therefore, it remains at 
the center of the debates on the ‘democratic deficit’ in the institutional framework 
of the EU. This debate is reinforced by the fact that the members of the EP, since 
1979, are directly elected by the citizens of the member states.^  ^Consequently, the 
introduction of direct elections to the EP was both a step forward in the promotion 
of democratic accountability to the supranational institution and a further support 
for the argument that the area of competence of the EP should be enlarged. The
Before the introduction of direct elections they were send to EP by the national parliaments of 
the member states. It was introduced by the Paris Summit 1974.
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counterpart of EP in the nation-state, constituted by national elections, is assumed 
as the cradle of democratic accountability and legitimacy, and is assumed as the 
representation of the sovereignty of the nation. Consequently, it can be supposed 
that the EP should have been the lubricant of democracy and the representation of 
the sovereignty of the people of the Union. Yet, its lack of competence in the 
decision-making procedure of the institutional framework of the EU renders the 
EP a relatively powerless institution. However, the members of the EP are 
constantly working to increase their institutional weight (Dinan, 1994: 257).
It will not be wrong to argue that, gradually, the EP is reasserting its political 
position in the EU. This is very important for the principal purpose of this thesis 
because it means a considerable transformation of the traditional Westphalian 
system, thus a direct challenge to the nation-state by undermining the principle of 
national sovereignty. As it will be further explored within the context of European 
citizenship, in the chapter four, the emergence of an alternative locus of loyalty 
which will represent an alternative expression of sovereignty, that of the people of 
the EU, would constitute a direct challenge to the basic premises of the modern 
nation-state. As noted by Arsava (1996: 62), the gradual increase in the space of 
common policies is accompanied with the narrowing down of the space of 
national sovereignty and autonomy of the member nation-states in the areas of 
individual policy formulation. Consequently, to solve the problem of ‘democratic 
deficit’ within the EU becomes an important issue. In other words, the citizens of 
the member states are directly electing their national parliament, which transfers 
or gives up amounts of its authority and sovereignty to the EU. Yet, within the
97
institutional balance of the EU, it is the Commission and the Council of Ministers 
which have relatively more power with respect to rule-making. Consequently, 
even though the members of the EP are elected directly, their relative weight in 
the decision-making procedures of the EU remains small. Increase in the powers 
and area of jurisdiction of the EP would mean direct transfer of loyalty from 
national to the European level (this involves integration in high politics), and 
would considerably contribute to the federalists support for the establishment of a 
Federation from the EU, and with respect to democratic principles. But, this is yet 
far from being achieved.
To begin by the 1980s, specifically with the introduction of SEA, to be followed 
with Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, EP has been accorded considerable 
institutional competence. Consequently, the powers of the EP in the process of 
legislation and in the supervision of the activities of the EU increased. Yet, before 
furthering this exploration on EP’s institutional development, the areas over 
which EP has jurisdiction need some clarification. This is also required because 
the degree of EP’s competence is dependent on the area over which it should take 
action. The increase in the space of authority of the EP is a cumulative process. In 
other words, EP, primarily as the institution of the EC, was mainly empowered on 
the issues relating to certain aspects of the ‘internal market’. Yet, along the 
process of integration, the areas over which EP is involved are, as it will be 
touched upon, increasing. In this context, its degree of competence is also issue 
specific, in certain policy areas it functions only as a consultative organ -  
‘amendment of the treaties’, ‘approximation of laws’. But, in some others it is
98
more directly involved in the legislative process such as ‘internal market’, ‘public 
health’, ‘association agreements’.
When it comes to explore in further details the functions of the EP within the 
institutional framework of the EU, firstly, since its establishment the EP was 
intended to function only as a consultative organ. This meant that the proposals of 
the Commission could not be approved before the Parliament submits its avis on 
the forthcoming legislation (Dinan, 1994; 274). Against de facto weaknesses of 
the Parliament in making its amendments accepted within the institutional 
mechanism of the EU, the SEA, the Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaties 
reinforced the prerequisite of consultation and extended the areas of policy for 
which consultation was the requirement. As illustration, ‘citizenship rights’, 
“certain aspect of monetary policy”, “main aspects and basic choices on CFSP and 
США” can be mentioned (Dinan, 1994:275). As Karluk (1998; 125) noted, 
contemporarily, the Parliament submits to the Commission and the Council its 
opinions on almost all important issues. According to the Article 149 of the Treaty 
of Rome (EEC Treaty), where the procedure of consultation is described, there is 
no time limitation for the Parliament to submit its opinion on a given legislation 
proposal. Then, the Council of Ministers, depending on the subject of the 
legislation, adopts either by ‘qualified majority voting’ or by unanimity by the 
proposal initiated after the process of consultation.^^ It can be deduced that this is 
very important for the simple fact that the Parliament can block a legislation by 
delaying to submit its avis. In this case, even if the legislation is agreed upon in
56 As it is clarified in the section exploring the Council o f Ministers, some legislation are subject to 
qualified majority voting (qmv), some others to unanimity voting.
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the Council, it can be declared void by a ruling of the Court of Justice because of 
its unconstitutional na t ur e . As  it will be explored later on, the Court of Justice 
has a basic role in the resolution of the inter-institutional problems, and acts as the 
guarantor of the proper functioning of the institutional system of the EU. The 
Tsoglucose case’ illustrates the importance of the EP.
Secondly, the SEA (1987) introduced the ‘cooperation procedure’. According to 
this procedure, after the initiation of the Commission’s proposal, and the 
submission of the opinion of the Parliament, the Council adopts a ‘common 
position’, the decision which is sent back to the Parliament for consideration. If 
the Parliament rejects (absolute majority voting is required) the common position, 
the Council has the power to overrule (unanimity voting is required) the decision 
of EP. If the Parliament proposes amendments (absolute majority voting is 
required), the position of the Commission is important. In case when the 
institutional power balance favors the Parliament, the Council either overrules 
(unanimous voting is required), accepts (by qualified majority voting (qmv)) the 
amendments, or does not take action and the proposal lapses. The introduction of 
‘cooperation’ into legislative process was initially intended to cover the issues 
relating to the single market program, but were then extended gradually in the 
post-Maastricht and post-Amsterdam eras to cover other aspects of policies such 
as education, certain issues concerning ‘justice and home affairs’. Thirdly, the 
‘co-decision procedure’ is introduced by Maastricht Treaty (1993) and reinforced 
further in post-Amsterdam Treaty era. It applies to certain aspect of legislation on
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‘internal market’, ‘free movement of persons’. Its difference from the 
‘cooperation procedure’ is that, concerning certain kinds of legislation, if the 
conflict between the Council and the Parliament persists, a conciliation committee 
formed from members of Parliament and Council try to reach a consensus within 
the time required on the legislation draft. If a consensus is reached, the Parliament 
(absolute majority) and the Council (qualified majority) have to approve the final 
draft of the legislation. This is important for the very simple fact that in case of 
failure of approval, the legislation cannot be issued. Another possibility is that the 
committee in question cannot reach any conciliation within the time required. In 
that case, the Council can adopt its initial ‘common position’, sometimes by 
including the amendments of the Parliament. In the Treaty of Maastricht, for such 
a legislation, ‘qmv’ was sufficient, but the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the 
necessity of unanimous vote for such an act of the Council of Ministers. 
Consequently, the HP’s legislative power was reinforced. Additionally, in the 
post-Maastricht period, the Parliament, by absolute majority voting, can render the 
decision of the Council of Ministers invalid. Finally, the Parliament also acquired 
considerable institutional powers in terms of supervising the Commission and the 
Council of Ministers. EP’s supervisory powers over the Commission were already 
explored in the section explaining the European Commission. It remains to study 
how the Maastricht Treaty rendered the Council of Ministers somehow 
accountable to the Parliament. EP, since 1993, has the right to give an 
interpellation to the Council of Ministers. Thus, EP has the right to require from 
the Council to reports on its activities.
As specified, the sources of EU law are the regulations within the Treaties, directives issued at 
tlie end of the legislation processes, the decisions or rulings of the Court of Justice.
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A final and very important power, which is accorded to EP concerns the 
budgetary matters of the EU. It shares with the Council of Ministers the 
responsibilities concerning the European Community’s budget. The EC, since 
1970s, possess its own financial resources. This is important because this gives 
EC relative independence from the member states in the implementation of the 
Community Law. Yet, it should be emphasized that the space of budget control 
includes small areas as compared to traditional national budgets. The areas 
concerning the internal market, the common agricultural policies, regional and 
structural funds to promote “economic and social cohesion” in the Community 
falls within the authority of the EC, whereas public finance and security matters 
are dependent on the contribution of the member states. The Parliament is mainly 
involved in non-obligatory spendings, the obligatory ones are mainly decided by 
the Council. It is the Commission which implements the budget decisions, the 
Parliament together with the Court of Auditors supervises the implementation and 
has the right to discharge the budget. Although the weakness of EP vis-a-vis the 
national parliaments lies in this weakness of authority on the budget, which 
mainly concerns the redistribution of the resources, the budgetary powers of the 
EP is increasing. The capacity to meet the expectation (health, social security, 
defense, education: public finance the management of which is the function of the 
modern nation-state) (Dinan, 1994; 273) of the people is in a considerable extent 
related to the redistribution of the resources. Thus, control over the budget is very 
important, as well as whether this control is supranational or intergovernmental in
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nature. Today debates on the issue are going on such as how to finance the CFSP, 
the США pillars or Social Policies of the Union.
The composition of the European Parliament, just like the composition of the 
Commission, is determined by the relative size and population of the member 
states. The President of EP is an elected official and besides presiding in the 
‘plenary sessions’ of the assembly, he represents the Parliament and participates 
to the summit meetings of the European Council. This is important because the 
chair of the presidency constitutes a bridge between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism. Eventually, the Parliament is mainly composed from political 
groups: the Socialist Group, the European People’s Party, Liberal Democratic and 
Reformist Group, the Greens Group in the EP are some illustrations to these 
parliamentary groups (Nugent, 1999: 223; Karluk, 1998: 120; Dinan,1994: 266). 
The main point is that, the groups are not constituted on national grounds. In other 
words, the groups are not primarily formed on the basis of nationality of the 
members of the EP, on the contrary, it is expected that the groups transcend the 
national lines. The national political parties are the main reference for EP’s 
political groups, which are made up from “coalitions of national political 
parties...based on ideological affinity, sectoral interests, and convenience” (Dinan, 
1994:263). For instance, the European People’s Party is composed of Christian 
Democrats and Socialist Catholics. Therefore, the main point is that the ‘groups’ 
in the EP are a representation of the national political parties across the member 
states. A striking illustration is the emergence of the Technical Group of the 
European Right as a reflection of the rise of the extreme right-wing parties on the
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EU members’ national political settings. This group is formed by a coalition 
among the French National Front, the German Republican Party and some others. 
Even though marginalized by the rest of the groups in the EP and part of an 
uncomfortable coalition, they managed to agree for instance on the negative 
aspects of the immigration (Dinan, 1994: 265). Another case is that the 
organization of EP allows for the formation of “intergroups” because there is no 
central government to be supported. This means that some members of the EP 
from different parliamentary groups, can form sub-groups on the basis of their 
common interests. The ‘Crocodile Club’, illustrated in the second chapter, and 
which is formed of ‘federalists’ is a major example. The last important 
components of the parliament to be mentioned are the committees. These 
committees play very important function in the conduct of the activities of EP. As 
the names suggest, ‘Foreign Affairs and Security’, ‘Legal Affairs and Citizens 
Rights’, ‘Institutional Affairs’, ‘Economic and Monetary Affairs’, ‘Budgets’, 
‘Women’s Rights’, ‘Culture, Education, Youth, and the Media’, ‘Regional Policy 
and Regional Planning’ are some examples to the Committees responsible to work 
on the policy areas into which the EU is involved (Nugent, 1999; 236).
As it will be further explored in the last chapter under the heading ‘The Citizens 
of the European Union’, although EP in terms of both its organizational structure 
and its relatively weak position in the legislative framework of the EU, is 
reasserting its power cumulatively. First, as suggested by Dinan (1994: 268), the 
parliamentary groups in the EP “provides an infrastructure” for the evolution of 
the cooperation between the political parties from the different member states. In
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other words, they are perhaps in the long-run the basis for the formation of 
“transnational political parties” at the EU level to represent the citizens of Europe. 
Secondly, as Arsava (1996: 64) suggests, even if not the most competent organ of 
the Union, the EP has relatively strong relations with the citizens. The principle of 
‘transparency’ is followed. Additionally, with the increase of its legislative and 
supervisory powers, the interests groups are in closer contact with the EP. Fourth, 
the EP works on building closer relations among the people of the Union. As an 
illustration, the proposal which suggested to add a ‘European culture dimension’ 
into the educational agenda of the member states is such an example. Finally, as 
already mentioned, the resolution of the ‘democratic deficit’ is an issue on the on 
the permanent agenda of the EU, which can only be done through increasing the 
powers of the EP. But, paradoxically, such an increase would slow down the pace 
of European integration.
A final consideration to be made relates to another institution of the EC, it is the 
Economic and Social Committee (ESC), which is composed of transnational 
interests groups i.e. commercial and industrial interests, labor unions. It functions 
as a consultative organ to the EP and the Commission. It has an indirect 
contribution to the decision making processes.
3.3.3 The European Court of Justice (ECJ)
The essential performance that the European Court of Justice demonstrates in the 
European integration movement was already emphasized in chapter 2, where 
empirical cases depicting moves toward further supranational and corresponding
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regression in the sphere of sovereignty of the member states were considered. In 
this section, the functions, organization and responsibilities of the ECJ within the 
institutional network of the EU will be explored. Then, in chapter 4, the relations 
of the ‘supranational courts’ with the citizens of the EU will briefly be touched
upon. 58
To begin with, the European Court of Justice is supranational. As a principal 
concept underlined in the overall framework of this thesis, this refers to an 
institution supposed to act “above or beyond national jurisdiction”; generally 
established by the consent of the member states but “legally binding” its subjects 
with or without their consents; its “objects” may be individuals; it is in some 
respects similar to a ‘federal court’; “the governments are, in matters specified by 
the various treaties, bound to comply with decisions” (Volcansek, 1997: 3-5). The 
ECJ is composed of “fifteen Judges”, assisted by nine Advocates General”, they 
are appointed by the member states (Gormley, 1998: 249). It functions, within 
the institutional framework of the EU, as the judiciary organ. Its “judicial 
decisions” are sources for the Community Law and to a great extent binding 
(Dinnage and Murphy, 1996: 146). As the classical conception o f ‘court’ suggests, 
in its activities, the ECJ, must carry the qualities of independence and impartiality 
(Volcansek, 1997: 5-7). Moreover, since it is established as a ‘supranational court’ 
it must function beyond the territories of the member states and without any 
regard to the nationality of the parties involved in disputes brought under its
58
59
The Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice
This generally corresponds to one Judge per member state.
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jurisdiction. To put this somehow differently, the jurisdiction of ECJ extends over 
the territories of the member states, yet in the conduct of its activities it is 
expected to be free from the possible interference from the part of any member 
nation-state. Therefore, the realm of sovereignty of the member states intersects 
with the areas of competence of the ECJ, which is itself legitimate to the extent it 
is independent or autonomous form any individual national interests. It is the ECJ 
in its preliminary rulings on many of the ‘Community cases’, argued for the 
supremacy, “direct effect” and autonomy of the Community’s legal system (Witte, 
1999: 178; Dinnage and Murphy, 1996: 84-).^° “For national courts...when an EC 
rule applies in a given case, any conflicting national norm should immediately be 
set aside”; therefore, the national court, which is supposed to be the most 
independent institution of the nation-state, recognizes the rulings of the ECJ and 
the EC Law as a “source of law to be applied to individual cases” (Witte, 1999: 
188). All these qualities, as demonstrated also in chapter 2, renders ECJ one of the 
push factor for the European integration movement. Moreover, as explicit in this 
thesis the constitution of a legal system is the backbone of the socialization 
process (Weiler, 1997). As the legal structure develops the European society 
emerges (Wendt,). In retrospective, the presence of ECJ, as a supranational Court 
is in itself an instance in the transformation of the classical Westphalian system of 
states in Europe because the territorial sovereignty is undermined . The ECJ and 
the national courts share some considerable judicial powers over the territory of 
the member states.
60 ‘Van Gend En Loos’, ‘Cassis De Dijon’, ‘Costa v.ENEL’ are illustrations in chapter four For a 
detailed analysis of basic community cases, see Rudden, Bernard, Diarmud Rossa Phelan. 1997. 
Basic Community Cases.
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In order to resolve the probable conflicts arising between; the member states, the 
institutions, the member states or the persons and the Community, the ECJ plays a 
decisive role. These are “direct action” cases brought to the court. The cases 
concerning mainly the proper interpretation of the EC law, so that it is 
implemented uniformly in all of the member states, are “the preliminary rulings”. 
This happens when a national court “requests” the guidance of the ECJ (it is also 
supposed to be under the “authoritative guidance”) (Dinan, 1994: 299).Thus, the 
resolution of the conflicts arising within the institutional framework of the EU 
falls within the responsibility of the Court. The ECJ is recognized as the only 
authority in cases of conflicts concerning the interpretation and implementation of 
the ‘Community Law’ (Arsava, 1996: 66). As observed by Dinan (1994: 296), 
“the ECJ has seen the original treaties not simply as narrow international 
agreements but, because of the member states’ unique decision to share 
sovereignty, as the basis of a constitutional framework for the Community”. In 
this context, the sources of the laws, which constitute a basis for the proper 
functioning of the European integration system can be studied under two heading; 
“the primary legislation” and the “secondary legislation” (Gromley, 1998; Dinan, 
1994: 296). The former encompasses the legislation setting the principles and the 
rules of the system, these are the treaties in general. The latter includes 
regulations, directives, decisions, rulings issued by the institutions. The most 
important faculty of this legal framework is that it is binding the member states. In 
other words, all the member states which have adopted the ''acquis
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commimaiiiaire''’'^  ^ of the EU are bound with it. This also implies that these 
member states share their sovereign rights with the EU. Moreover, they are no 
longer autonomous in their domestic decision-making procedure in that they are 
bound to consider the decision made within the institutional framework of the EU.
A last consideration to be made is about the ‘enforcement powers’ and the 
limitations of the jurisdiction of the ECJ. First, it should be emphasized that 
enforcement in cases of non-compliance is one of the weaknesses of the legal 
system in question (Arat, 1996: 51). Yet, in these cases, the duty to enforce a right 
to satisfy a judgement is the responsibility of national executive department. It 
was-demonstrated in the preceding chapters that conformity to the ‘Community 
legislation’ is in most of the cases cost-effective. Additionally, in the post- 
Maastricht era, the Court was empowered with certain rights to enforce the 
legislation. ECJ was allowed “to impose a fine on a member state for refusing to 
act upon a Court ruling” (Dinan, 1994; 304). Secondly, in terms of the limitation 
of the areas of jurisdiction of ECJ, it is clear that its jurisprudence mainly 
encompasses the economic process of integration because the ‘Community Law’ 
mainly consist of the ‘constitution’ of the economic integration (negative 
integration). Yet, its authority to interpret the Treaties, and its role as inter- 
institutional arbiter still leaves ECJ with considerable competence. Moreover, the 
‘unwritten law’, which is another important source of the Community law that fall 
under the competence of ECJ, is mainly a combination of the Court’s decisions, of 
the EC law, of the general principles of law, and of the laws in the member states
61 ‘acquis communautaire” refers to the overall legal framework of the EU.
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(Gormley, 1998: 275-278). In other words, the ECJ use while interpreting EC 
laws or deciding on a case. As illustrations, in cases where no written rules apply 
“the principle of sincere cooperation” and “State liability in damages for losses 
suffered by individuals as a result of a failure by the State to fulfil its obligations 
under Community law” are some principles used by the Court in its judgement 
(Gromley, 1998; 277-278). The development and the use of an ‘unwritten law’ 
can be considered as an instance of socialization, construction of common codes 
of conduct and identity within the framework of EU.^  ^ Therefore, in retrospect, 
politically, in its institutional career, the ECJ, has furthered the movement of 
European integration, which has evolved today from a Community to Union 
framework or system. Therefore, it has been also involved indirectly in the 
process of positive integration. However, as the latent component of the 
framework of this thesis suggests, the process of integration brings with 
fragmentation. Sub-national actors can bring national actors to the Court.
As the explorations in this section combined and reconsidered with the illustrative 
cases in the second chapter, the decisions of the ECJ, its ‘direct actions’, and its 
‘primary rulings’ that is its power to interpret the ‘Constitution of the EU’ , have 
had a decisive impact, first, as a stimulus furthering the process of integration in 
Europe (Gormley, 1998; 290), and as a mechanism relatively strengthening the
62 It is implicitly referred to ‘collective identity formation’ through the mechanisms of repetitive 
actions of the legal system, the principles of which are derived from general principles of law, 
member states laws and EC law combined. A process part of the constitution of EU.
63 The ECJ is the institution of the EC, yet in the period following the TEU the concept of EU is 
also widely used. Considering de facto inter-institutional dynamics between the pillars this would 
not be wrong.
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power of the localities because it allows local actors to bring a member state 
before the Court for infringement of the Community Law. Finally, as a basic 
institution taking part in the process of the transformation of the classical 
Westphalian order underlined in this thesis.
3.3.4 The Court of First Instance
As the European integration process evolves, the ECJ is faced with further cases 
to deal with. Additionally, ECJ’s rather ‘Constitutional’ or ‘Federal’ framework 
requires its proceedings to be time effective so that the process of integration 
continues with minimal legal infringements. However, as the amount of the 
individual cases brought to the Court increases, it functions relatively slower. 
Therefore, the CFI, established by the SEA, shares some of the functions of ECJ. 
It is basically, like the ECJ, composed of one Judges from each member states. 
This, as in the case of ECJ is important because, in dealing with the cases brought 
to the court, there is a combination of the aggregation of the national legal 
experiences and of the legal system of the EU. Consequently, as a supranational 
court, the CFI like the ECJ contributes to the development of a common, shared 
legal framework. Yet, the space of the jurisdiction of the CFI is narrower than that 
of the ECJ. The cases requiring ‘preliminary ruling’ are excluded from CFI’s 
domain. Additionally, the CFI is authorized to hear only certain cases such as 
“Actions for annulment, for failure to act, or for compensation for damage 
brought by legal or natural persons” (Gormley, 1998: 268). Debates are going on 
to further the responsibilities of the CFI so that to decrease the burdens of the
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ECJ. As a second supranational court, the CFI is asserting its part in the judicial 
framework of the EU.
A final court is the Court of Auditors, it has no jurisdictional powers, yet it is 
responsible for the management of the EC budget. It also assesses and reports 
whether the budget has been efficiently used for the activities of the EC.
3.4 The Intergovernmental Axis
3.4.1 The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers is the major decision-making apparatus within the 
institutional framework of the EU. The member states are represented at national 
governmental level in the Council. According to the legislation to be considered, 
each of the member states send its ministers concerned with the issue in hand. 
Additionally, the foreign ministers from each of the member states are “regarded 
as the main representatives” of these states at the Council level (Dinnage and 
Murphy, 1996; 27). The Council has a Presidency, which rotates between the 
member states every six months. There is also a Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER), which is composed from “national ambassadors to 
the Community” and assisted by “officials drawn from diplomatic services and 
appropriate national ministries” (Dinan, 1994: 250, Dinnage and Murphy, 1996: 
27). The main function of COREPER is to work on the developments within the 
framework of the EU. For this purpose Committees like those of the Commission 
are established on areas relating to the integration process, which extends from
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agriculture to external affairs. Moreover, they are expected to report on the 
developments at the Union level to their national governments.
In the period preceding the introduction of the Treaty on the European Union, the 
Council of Ministers as the institution of the EC was mainly involved in the 
decision-making process relating to the economic integration. However, the 
establishment of a three-pillar structure by the TEU brought about new functions 
to the Council. In addition to its traditional policy making competence relating to 
the first pillar, the Treaty conferred to the Council “responsibility for the 
intergovernmental cooperation that is to be developed under the umbrella of 
‘European Union’” (Dinnage and Murphy, 1996; 29). It is useful to add that in the 
mean time, the Commission also acquired competence relating to the initiation of 
proposals relating to the intergovernmental cooperation areas.
The Council of Ministers, as observed by Dinan (1994; 230), is the embodiment 
of both supranational and intergovernmental elements. To begin with, as the study 
of the others actors, within the institutional framework of the EU involved in the 
decision-making process has suggested, the Commission and the Parliament are 
important components without which the Council, especially in certain domains
The process of intergovernmental cooperation mainly involves CFP and США. As it was 
already specified in the section relating to the Commission, external economic considerations 
cannot be excluded from considerations relating to common foreign policy. Additionally, the 
issues relating to США such as ‘migration’ can not be opted out from internal economic policy 
consideration such as ‘labor force’. As it will be touched upon in chapter 4 the Amsterdam Treaty 
transferred many ША policy issues to the EC pillar and the new title of JHA came to be known as 
“Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters”. See, Nugent, Neill. 1999. 
The Government and Politics o f the European Union.
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of the integration process, cannot issue legislation. The dialogue and cooperation 
between these institutions is gradually strengthen from Rome to post-Amsterdam 
period (Dinnage and Murphy, 28-29). Second, the decision-making procedures 
within the Council are important determinants of the balance between the 
supranational and intergovernmental. In this respect, the Treaties underline basic 
voting procedures (Nugent, 1999: 166-175). The typical intergovernmental 
decision-making method is by ‘unanimity voting’ (all of the member states must 
agree on the legislation). In the period preceding mid-80s, specifically with the 
‘Luxembourg Compromise’®^, this was the most widely used procedure. Yet, by 
the introduction of the SEA, the TEU and the Amsterdam Treaty there has been a 
considerable increase on the amount of issues legislated by the ‘qualified majority 
voting’ (70% of the total votes) and ‘simple majority voting’ (more than 50% of 
the total votes). The works of the Commission, the Parliament and the summit 
meetings of the European Council have had a considerable contributions to the 
institutionalization of these voting procedures. According to the contemporary 
framework, ‘unanimity voting’ applies mainly to the legislation which falls under 
the CFSP and ‘Police and Judicial Cooperation’ pillars of the EU, yet 
‘constructive abstentionism applies’, this allows a member state the right to not 
participate in the voting procedure. It should also be specified that some decision 
concerning the implementation of the CFSP and a few decisions relating to JHA 
can be taken by qmv. Certain EC domain decisions such as those relating to 
‘financial’ issues are also made using this method. As mentioned, in order to 
amend or reject legislative proposals, basically in cases where the Commission is
This is an agreement between the member states, leaded by the French government under De 
Gaulle (1969), to enforce the principle of unanimity voting. See chapter two for further details.
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reluctant, unanimous vote is requested. When it comes to the cases for qmv, 
almost all the legislation that falls under the domain of the first pillar is decided 
by this procedure. Finally, the ‘simple majority’ procedure applies to certain 
aspects of Common Commercial Policy and for “procedural purposes”.
The process of legislation is a lubricant for the process of integration in Europe. In 
almost all the social systems, as the socio-economic and political dynamics 
change, there is need for new arrangements to meet the moral and material needs 
emerging from the new circumstances for the survival of the social system. 
Consequently, the establishment of a constructive dialogue within the umbrella of 
the EU, and first and foremost between the member states, is one of the major 
prerequisites for fiiithering integration. The proceedings of the Council can in 
some cases function so as to slow down the processes of EU. The reluctance from 
the member states to give up too much sovereignty to the Union is at the center 
stage of within EU tensions. The considerations of national interests and identity 
lies behind the scenes of the protective approaches towards national sovereignty 
and democracy (Newman, 1994: 2). However, as it was already delineated in the 
second chapter, with reference to some specific empirical cases that furthered 
integration, institutionalized through the movement of European integration the 
European Council has been a convenient communicative platform. It can be 
suggested that in most of the cases it succeeded both to reconcile the member 
states and to bridge the supranational and the intergovernmental.
115
4.4.2 The European Council
After the launch of the European integration project, the leaders of the member 
states were used to held informal intergovernmental meetings in order to 
communicate the issues relating to cooperation and integration. In the period of 
‘Euroclerosis’ (1970s), the institutions of the Communities proved to be working 
inefficiently to deal with most of the internal and external challenges that the 
process of integration was facing. Specifically, the increase in the relative weight 
of the intergovernmental axis in the decision-making process induced 
corresponding attempts to give priority to national interests over the Community 
ones. The member states came to be increasingly reluctant to give up sovereignty 
to the institutions of the Community. There was a pressing need to reestablish 
trust between the member states. Consequently, under the cooperation of French 
and German governments, which constitute a main sub-system that determines the 
prospects of integration, it was decided to institutionalize the intergovernmental 
conferences hitherto held (Shoutheete, 1994). To serve this purpose, at the Paris 
Summit on December 1974, the European Council was established. Then, its role 
was reasserted by the SEA. However, it is the Maastricht Treaty that incorporated 
the European Council within the institutional framework of the European Union, 
and gave it a formal status. As set in the Common Provisions of the TEU (Article 
D),
The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus 
for its development and shall define the general political guidelines 
thereof The European Council shall bring together the Heads of State or of 
Government of the Member States and the President of the Commission. 
They shall be assisted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member
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States and by a member a of the Commission. The European Council shall 
meet twice a year, under the chairmanship of the Head of State or of 
Government of the Member State which holds the Presidency of the 
Council. The European Council shall submit to the European Parliament a 
report after each of its meetings and a yearly written report on the progress 
achieved by the Union.
In order to realize these goals, first it should constitute a suitable platform for the 
member states to discuss the issues, to socialize and to develop trust. The member 
states, at least at the Council level, have to develop the outlook that they have 
shared a common past and that their future is bound together. This will lead to 
tendencies toward giving up more sovereignty to the supranational institutions. 
Second, the European Council also communicates with other institutions. The 
President of the Council of Ministers and the European Council are the same 
person, his\her role is mainly to establish a coordination between the member 
states. In fact it can be suggested that the Council of Ministers and the European 
Council are “related but separate entities” (Dinan, 1994: 229). As mentioned, the 
President and members of the Commission participate to the regular meetings of 
the European Council. Finally, the EP has to be regularly informed about the 
activities of the European Council. As such, what happens at the summits is made 
known to the public. As mentioned, the EP is the institution which is the closest to 
the European people. Therefore, there is inter-institutional network of 
communication and cooperation. The European Council can be considered as a 
means to bridge the supranational and the intergovernmental axis within the EU 
so that to prevent major infringements on the European integration process.
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The European Council is not the legal institution of the first pillar, it is outside the 
supervision of the Court of Justice. Yet, it also has the capacity to set the agenda 
relating to the supranational pillar because the EC is under the umbrella of the EU. 
The European Council is the intergovernmental leg of the EU, where the member 
state participate with the principle of national sovereign authority. The realm of 
activities of the European Council basically encompasses the second and the third 
pillars widely known as CFSP and JHA. Additionally, as will be clarified in the 
chapter 4, it also deals with certain aspects of ‘Economic and Monetary Union’. 
Finally, matters related to the process of enlargement are considered. In broader 
terms, the European Council is primarily involved with determining the direction 
of integration issues relating mainly to ‘high politics’ domain, where the member 
states are most cautious in terms of the sharing of their sovereign rights. 
Nevertheless, most decisive steps in deepening the process of integration, such as 
institutional reforms leading to further supranational ism, the SEA, Maastricht and 
Amsterdam Treaties are all established by the contributions of the ‘Presidency 
Conclusions of the European Council’, which set the future agenda of the EU.^  ^
The latest European Council meeting was under the chairmanship of Portugal, in 
Santa Maria Da Feira (19-20 June 2000). In this meeting prospects on the 
functioning of the EU and future integration steps are considered. One of the main 
issues discussed at the present state of the process of integration is the institutional
66 The stimulus for further integration and convergence provided by the European Council are 
further illustrated in chapter 2 and 4. See also Gormley (1998: 186),
118
reforms required before the process of enlargement.^^ It is set in the Presidency
Conclusions of Feira European Council (19-20 June 2000)
Significant headway which has been achieved by the Conference in 
considering Treaty changes which will ensure that the Union continues to 
have properly functioning, efficient and legitimate institutions after 
enlargement. The European Council considers in particular that the 
provisions on closer cooperation introduced into the Treaty of Amsterdam 
should form part of the Conference’s future work, while respecting the 
need for coherence and solidarity in an enlarged Union.
This statement mainly points out to the institutional reforms to be considered at
the European Council summit, which will take place under the chairmanship of
France, in Nice, on December 2000. Two issues lie at the center of the current
considerations on institutional reforms. To begin with, after the recent press
declaration of the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, debates on the
‘constitution’ of a ‘Federal Europe’ reemerged {Herald Tribune, 18 May 2000: 5-
6). According to Fischer, “Europe had to move towards stronger central
government” and suggested “to move toward a European federation” and a
“European Constitution” (or a treaty) “diving powers between national
governments” and the EU, and to have a directly elected President for the
Commission or the EP {Financial Times, 18 May 2000; Herald Tribune 18 May
2000). This general framework proposed by Fischer envisages the completion of
the political union under the European Union. This is a critical proposition
because it raises many questions in terms of giving up sovereignty to the
institutions of the EU on high political issues such those relating to CFSP or
CJHA. Would this lead towards the supranationalization of the intergovernmental
Tills points out to the fifth enlargement process on the agenda, Hungary, Poland, Czech 
Republic are some countries the memberships of which are considered. Yet, the provision of Feira 
summit conclusion states that the end o f the IGC on institutional reform should precede the 
enlargement negotiations. See Santa Maria Da Feira European Council Presidency Report on the 
Enlargement Process (Annex 2).
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pillars? What would this imply in terms of the ‘citizens of the EU’ and the 
‘democratic deficit’? Would this mean a transfer of loyalty from the national level 
to the supranational level and subsequent national political convergence? The 
debates are going on among the member states. On the one hand, France seems to 
be less enthusiastic than its German counterpart, yet President Chirac “endorses 
idea of a constitution for EU” (Financial Times, 28 June 2000). Although the 
Franco-German sub-system is important with respect to deepening the process of 
integration, it is not the sole determinant. UK’s position favors the proper balance 
between the supranational and the integovernmental axis (Herald Tribune, 30 
June 2000). It should be emphasized that other member states are also skeptical to 
the idea of sharing their sovereign rights with a ‘Federal’ central European 
governments (Herald Tribune, 18 May 2000: 5). On the one hand there are 
considerations o f ‘power politics’, which questions the relative power of member 
states in the decision-making processes. On the other hand, there are member 
states which are slower in accomplishing some of the prerequisites of the 
integration processes, such as those of EMU.
The second issue involves the “provisions on closer cooperation” of the 
Amsterdam Treaty. As it was already suggested, the European integration process, 
which takes place within the umbrella of the European Union, is constituted by 
many sub-processes of integration ranging from economic, social, monetary to 
foreign security and defense policy domains. As mentioned in certain issues, 
specifically within the framework of the first pillar of the EU, the member states 
have given up their sovereign rights to the supranational institutions. Yet, in
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certain other issues, mainly relating to political unification domain, the decisions 
are made by the intergovernmental procedures. However, some member states, 
mainly the core-six, accomplish the processes of integration faster than the other 
members. This means that they are much closely integrated than the other 
members. As an illustration, not all the member states are integrated into the EMU 
framework, and the same applies for CFSP. This is either because of their 
reluctance to give to the Union sovereign rights over their territories relating to 
certain areas of integration or because they can not meet the prerequisites for 
further integration. Therefore, the essence of ‘closer cooperation’ is the idea of 
‘flexibility in the European Union’ (Philppart and Edwards, 1999: 87). This 
principle involves the “authorization for Member States seeking closer co­
operation to make use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms’ laid down 
by the TEU and the TEC” (Philppart and Edwards, 1999: 90). This is strongly 
backed by “founder members of the union such as Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, and to a lesser extent by Germany and France” {Financial Times, 14 
June 2000). The major purpose is to prevent the economic and political unification 
movements to slow down as the resulting from individual national interests 
considerations or the forthcoming enlargement process.
To summarize this exploration of the institutional framework of the EU and the 
current ‘institutional debates’ in hand, there are two basic conclusions, which can 
be drawn relating to the subject matter of this thesis. First, the current institutional 
state of the EU and considerations about the ideas of ‘Federal Europe’ and ‘closer 
co-operation’ demonstrates the extent to which the traditional Westphalian system 
of states on the European Continent is experiencing a transformation. The
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traditional conceptions on the nation-state is seriously challenged. The sovereign 
rights of the member states are shared with the EU. In most of the issues, 
specifically relating to the economy, the EC exercises authority over the territories 
of the member states. The member states can no longer make autonomous 
decisions in many policy areas since they are bind to consider the EU level 
negotiations, and specifically after the completion of the common market. 
Consequently, the process of integration has largely undermined the member 
states’ capacity to meet the material and moral expectations of their population 
because in most of the cases they can no longer adopt individual macroeconomic 
or social welfare policies without agreement at the Union level. Moreover, they 
are sharing most of their resources such as those relating to the development of 
foreign trade. Therefore the member states are dependent on the EU. Second, the 
integration process has also fragmentary effect. In other words, the consideration 
of the ‘closer cooperation’ involves a flexible model of integration. This could 
bring about “an increasingly diverse EU, with different numbers of members 
pursuing different sets of policies, within one broad institutional framework” 
{Financial Times, 14 June 2000).
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CHAPTER 4
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC, MONETARY AND POLITICAL 
UNIFICATION: ‘“THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE’ OR THE ART OF 
CREATING  THE POSSIBLE”*^*?
In the previous chapter the attempt was to picture the current institutional 
dynamics of the EU to develop an understanding about the shape of the emerging 
European polity. The institutional restructuring brought about by Maasticht Treaty 
was a most important step in ‘deepening’ the European integration movement, the 
increase in the nature of the policies handled at the supranational level and the 
strengthened scope of the institutions were its symptoms. Yet, another important 
aspect of the Maastricht Treaty was that its underlying aim overtly consisted of a 
progressive move toward the achievement of a European Economic, Monetary 
and Political Union. As set in the opening page of the TEU (1993),
RESOLVED to mark a new stage in the process of European integration 
undertaken with the establishment of the European Communities, 
DESIRING to deepen the solidarity between their people while respecting 
their history, their culture and their traditions, RESOLVED to enhance 
further the democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions so as to 
enable them better to carry out, within a single institutional framework, the 
tasks entrusted to them, RESOLVED to achieve the strengthening and the 
convergence of their economies and to establish an economic and 
monetary union including, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, 
a single stable currency,...RESOLVED to establish a citizenship common 
to the nationals of their country, RESOLVED to implement a common 
foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common
The title is quoted from Chryssochoou, Dimitris N. 1998. Democracy in the European Union, 
pp. 158.
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defense policy, which might lead to a common defense, thereby reinforcing 
the European identity and its independence to promote peace , security and 
progress in Europe and in the world, REAFFIRMING their objective to 
facilitate the free movement of persons while ensuring the safety and 
security of their peoples, by including provisions on justice and home 
affairs in this Treaty, RESOLVED to continue the process of creating an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe in which the decisions are 
taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle 
of subsidiarity, IN VIEW of further step to be taken to advance European 
integration... (Corbett, 1993: 382-492)
This meant a move from integration in Tow politics’ to integration in ‘high 
politics’. In this chapter the focus of the study will basically be on the principles 
set in the Treaty for the achievement of the economic, monetary and political 
unification. And, certainly because the idea of political unification, which implies 
the convergence of the political domains of the member states has serious 
implications with respect to the modern nation-states that are part and parcel of 
the European unification movement. The recent debates with regard to the 
prospects of the EU to become a ‘Federal European State’ are the major 
consequences of the transformations that the modern state experiences.^^ 
Additionally, conceptualizations such as “Constitutional Europe”, “post- 
Westphalian state”, or the “international state” are all addressing in one way or 
another to the EU and the future of the European state (Weiler, 1997; Linklater, 
1996; Wendt, 1994).
In such a context, where the destiny of the modern nation-state in Europe is 
widely discussed, one of the main concerns is about the ‘sovereignty’, and the 
shifting powers between local (regional, sub-national), national and supranational
®’The idea of ‘Federal Europe’ is intensively discussed in Chryssochoou, Dimitris N. 1998. 
Democracy in the European Union, pp. 134-158.
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centers. On the one hand, the effects of the supranational forces integrating the 
European economic, social, political systems are visible by the completion of a 
Europe sans frontières. The prospects for EMU, the undertakings relating to 
the assertion of a common European defense and security identity, cooperation in 
police and judicial affairs are all revealing the nature and scope of the 
supranational forces of the EU. On the other hand, even though not as evident as 
the supranational forces, integration has also its side effect, the increase in the 
political strength of the localities (or sub-national actors) that bring about 
fragmentation. The process of fragmentation is not as obvious as the process of 
integration, and the thesis recognizes the difficulty of depicting it. Yet, integration 
and fragmentation are in some respects complementary to each other and not 
necessarily opposed (Rosenau, 1999). The principle o f ‘subsidiarity’, for example, 
and with it the emergence of a ‘multi-level’ governance understanding, though 
widely debated on its impact on the EU, it can be used “as an instrument to 
challenge the national center” (Van Kersbergen and Verbeek, 1994; 227). Though 
the reverse may also be possible depending on the institutional choices of the 
peoples. Then, the regional socioeconomic dynamics and the political interactions 
of these local (sub-national) actors with the supranational center can also be a 
source of challenge to the exclusiveness of the state as the arena to perform 
‘domestic’ politics (Jeffrey, 2000; Marks, 1997). Fragmentation can also be the 
result of ethnic (or “ethnoterritorial”) nationalism, caused by factors ranging from 
economic disparities to the lack of institutional frames to resolve various center-
70 'Sans frontières’ implies 'without border’, the term is used to refer to the elimination of internal 
barriers and to the four freedom of movements within EU.
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periphery cleavages (Zariski, 1989).^' Yet, this is further a very multi-causal issue 
that is quite impossible to explore in all its dimensions within the scope of this 
thesis. For the recent purpose it suffices to say that the states in Europe are both 
effected by the supranational forces and the various fragmentary forces of 
integration. However, the resulting process of transformation and restructuration 
is a function of their own peculiar internal structures. In other words, as it will be 
explored in the subsequent sections, the member states are all effected by these 
processes of European integration, yet the transformations that are observed in 
these states are different and related to the internal dynamics of these states. The 
overall consequence is a double pressure on the modern nation-state arising from 
the very nature and scope of the European integration movement. And, the most 
immediate effect being the supranational forces of the European integration.
4.1. Citizenship of the European Union: from National Democracy to 
Supranational Democracy?
As it was already explored in the previous chapters, by the completion of the
Single European Market, the sovereignty and the independent policy making
capacities of the member state were largely undermined. A related discussion was
the public concern about the ‘loss of sovereignty’. This was combined with two
interrelated issues. First, as Held (1999; 48) mentions,
...the theory of democracy took for granted, particularly as it developed in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the link between the demos, 
citizenship, electoral mechanisms, the nature of consent, and the 
boundaries of the nation-state. The fates of different political communities 
may be contested and intertwined but the appropriate place for determining
” For an extensive study relating to theories of ‘fragmentation’ see also Guney, Aylin. 1998. 
Regionalism as a Failure of National Integration: A Case Study o f Italy. Unpublished Ph.D 
Dissertation
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the foundation of the ‘national fate’ was the territorially based political 
community itself ..democratic theory assumes a congruence between the 
citizen-voters and national decision-makers.
In this respect, second, the amount of sovereignty transferred from the member
states to the supranational institutional framework of the EC implied to rethink
about the national borders of democracy. In this context, relatively significant
efforts have been made to increase democracy in the institutions and specifically
to render the European Parliament and the Commission as closer as possible to the
citizens of the Union in their legislative capacities (SEA, 1987; Maastricht, 1993,
Agenda 2000, 1997; Feira Summit meeting of the European Council, 2000).
Another factor stimulating the conceptualization of the ‘citizenship of the Union’,
the ‘four freedoms’ or the ‘free movements’. According to Gormley (1998: 585),
“the freedom principle may be a pure and simple application of the principle of
non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality of origin of destination”, the
Article 6 of the EC assumes “the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of
nationality...in situations covered by the Community Law ”. Finally, in the Treaty
on European Union (1993), which established the basic grounds upon which the
citizenship of the Union be built, recommends,
(Article 8) Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be 
a citizen of the Union...Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights 
conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed 
thereby...(8a) Every citizens shall have to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States...(8b) Every citizen of the Union 
residing in a Member of which he is not a national shall have the right to 
vote to stand as candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in 
which he resides, under the same conditions as national of that State...these 
arrangements may provide for derogations where warranted by problems 
specific to a Member State...every citizens of the Union residing in a 
Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and 
to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the 
Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as the
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nationals of that State...(Article 138e) The European Parliament shall 
appoint an Ombudsman empowered to receive complaints from any citizen 
of the Union or any natural or legal person residing its or having registered 
its office in a Member State concerning instances of maladministration in 
the activities of the Community institutions or bodies, with the exception 
of the Court of Justice or Court of First Instance acting in their judicial 
role... (Corbett, 1994; 389)
As it was demonstrated in the second chapter, the process of European integration 
covers a wide ranges of issue directly effecting the daily life of the citizens from 
the economic, social to the political and cultural aspects. Accordingly, within the 
institutional framework of the EU, the citizens of the Union are simultaneously 
entitled with equal ‘rights and obligations’ with respect to the ‘Community’. As 
the case for the right to political participation into the peculiar legislative 
processes of the EU, these to be the complements of the civil (fundamental) rights, 
and the social rights of the as set forth and developed through the ‘Social 
Charter’(1989).^^ As for the last set of rights they range from the “free movement 
for citizens”, employment conditions, “adequate social protection” and “social 
benefits”, “equal treatment of males and females” to “the freedom of association 
and collective bargaining” and other issues, which fall under the domain of the 
social policy (Weiner, 1998: 177). However, it should be specified that despite the 
enforcement of the provisions in the post-Maastricht era the adoption of common 
policies relating to these area are largely debated within the Community 
(Newman, 1996; Barnard, 1999). Yet, still to provide an illustrative example, in a 
recent case the ECJ concluded for a German woman to be allowed in the German 
army. This had two major implications. On the one hand, Germany as well as the 
UK had to reconsider their “basic military policy” with respect to the employment
72 See also the ‘Green Paper’ and the ‘White Paper’.
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of its military staff. On the other hand, this increased the awareness of the EU 
citizenship rights and supranational identity for those who brought this and similar 
cases to the ECJ. The women now entitled to bear arms in the German army 
declared “I used to think of myself as German. Now I feel European too”.^  ^ This 
case alone certainly does not demonstrates that the EU nationals are identifying 
themselves with the European supranational identity, yet it does reveal that this 
identity is on its way of construction and that even if at varying level, a gate is 
open for the future prospects of the EU citizenship. In addition to all these rights 
conferred to the citizens, the notion of a ‘European passport’, to be provided to 
EU nationals, is also important in its implications. It is symbolic of a European 
identity out of the EU frontiers, and a basis for outside-EU identification. 
Consequently, it also relates to the common foreign and security framework of the 
EU. Additionally, another issue is the cooperation in police and judicial affairs, 
because the elimination of the internal frontiers requires the adoption of certain 
common policies relating to the protection and enforcement of the rights and 
obligations of the EU citizens, this will be addressed in the following section. 
Finally, as it was explored in the third chapter, the political groups in the EP are 
generally transnational in nature and according to TEU they are intended to 
provide a platform for the international socialization of the representatives of the 
EU citizens.
In the post-Maastricht era, to use the description of Meehan (1993), these were the 
“language of the European Communities”. In respect to the practical side of these
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provisions, which are again part of the ‘stage by stage’ or ‘spillover’ 
understandings of the European integration movement, a space is open for the 
emergence of an alternative notion of citizenship. This citizenship is neither 
cosmopolitan for it is reserved to the “members only” nor it is ‘national’ for it 
constitutes a social space where “an increasingly complex configuration of 
common Community institutions, states, national and transnational voluntary 
associations, regions and alliances of regions” communicate their interests, and 
identities, their demands and expectations (Meehan, 1993). This is an important 
challenge to the modern nation-state traditionally accepted as the only rightilil 
domain of the ‘political’. In order words, the post-Ancien Regime the origins of 
which dates back to the French Revolution is in a process of reformulation. It is 
useful to remind here an implication of the French Revolution, “the principles of 
political legitimacy which shapes the state identities are linked to domestic social 
structures, and help determine the resources states mobilize in international 
competition” (Bukanovsky, 1999: 197). If referred to Anderson’s “nation as an 
imagined community”, it is insightful to develop an understanding of “how the 
nation became a political-identity as people began to imagine a horizontal 
relationship to their countrymen beginning in the eighteen century...” (Cerwona, 
1999: 335). However, the point in this overall discussion is not to argue that the 
notion of national citizenship is gone, but to emphasize an alternative notion of
See Roger Cohen. 14 January 2000, “A European Identity: Nation-State Loosing Ground”, New 
York Times [News Analysis].
See also Lipschutz, Ronnie D. 1999. “Members Only ? Citizenship and civic virtue in a time of 
globalization”. International Politics.
”  The ‘political’ is reffered to as follows; “Within the historical epoch known as the ‘modernity’, 
tire political came to be defined as a distinct realm located exclusively in the institution of the state 
mid concerned primarily with the maintenance of the social order...” See Martin, James. 1999. 
“The Social and The Political”. In James Martin and et. al, Contemporary Social and Political 
Theory, pp. 156
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citizenship, be it complementary to or challenging with respect to the principle of 
‘allegiance’ to the nation-state. Indeed, it opens a gate for the nationals of the EU 
to reconsider “the understanding of the self and its identity” and the locus of their 
loyalty (Weiler, 1998: 2; Wendt, 1994: 386).
To conclude this section, through the channels of participation to the political and 
social life opened up to the citizens of the Union, an alternative ‘political’ space is 
on the way of construction. Obviously, the implication of the ‘EU citizenship’ 
undermines seriously the basic principles of the modern nation-state as described 
in this thesis. However, the process in not uniform, multi-layered networks of 
interactions between the various component parts of the EU are shaping the 
common destiny of the ‘European People’.
For the recent purpose, shifting the focus to the participation procedures 
introduced by the TEU, reveals a double pressure on the modern nation-state. 
First, the overall concept of EU citizenship including right to direct participation 
into the EP elections, complemented by the right to form Union wide civil society 
organizations -such as the freedom of collective bargaining and association or the 
existence of the Economic and Social Committee. These constitute the 
supranational forces of integration, and this time pushing toward a political 
unification. Second, the right of the EU citizens to participate in equal conditions 
the municipal (local) elections or in immediate day-to-day politics in any member 
state in which they reside implies that the “image of the of non-national union 
citizens as ‘foreigners’ was to vanish and the opportunity for democratic
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participation would be created” (Weiner, 1998: 284). The only platform of 
participation closed to the EU citizens is then to directly participate in the national 
level elections of the member states to the nationality of which they do not belong. 
However, the nation-state is in between the bottom-up pressure from the local (or 
sub-national) level politics and the top-down pressure from the supranational level 
politics. Although the institutionalization of these networks are not as obvious as 
the consequences of the completion of the Single European market, the traditional
76relations between the citizens and their nation-state are in reformulation. As 
mentioned by Wiener, 1998 (299),
It is a multi-level polity couched in competing systems of governance. 
Citizenship practice related to this polity/community generated a 
fragmented type of citizenship. Union citizens direct demands towards the 
member states and to the union as well; they may belong to a local 
community (in terms of their social, cultural, economic and political 
activities) and at the same time to a national community of another 
member state (legal/national ties and political activity).
4.2, Stretching Back to the Local
The interactions among the multiple networks and actors shaping the European 
integration were so far expressed within the overall framework of this study. The 
capacity of a wide range of actors to participate to the EU in its legislative 
capacity, in its ‘constitutional’ element of the integration, give some local or sub­
national forces some spaces of action outside the domain of the ‘national’. Yet, 
the point here is not to argue that there is fragmentation through the channels 
linking the various actors to the supranational. On the contrary, they are aimed at
See also McClure, Kristie. 1992. “On the Subject o f Rights: PluraUsm, Plurality and Political 
Identity”. See also Van Kersbergen, Kees and Bertan Verbeek. 1994. “The Politics of Subsidiarity 
in the European Union. They provide significant insights in understanding the smooth 
transformations of the ‘political’.
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reinforcing the process of unification. However, they are insightful because, 
though ‘indirectly’, they also reveal another source of challenge to the nation­
state, the fragmentary forces. Indeed, it is to underline a more general fact that 
“state executives no longer monopolize the representation of domestic interests in 
international relations” (Marks, 1997: 90). On these grounds, the present 
discussion, though narrowly, aims at exploring the networks that relate the local 
(or sub-national) actors to the process of European integration, and an attempt to 
more directly focus on the increased political strength of the localities which bring 
about fragmentation.
As it is the case for the globalization process, in the process of European 
integration, and perhaps in a unique fashion, the different localities of the EU 
became increasingly interdependent from one another (Newmann, 1996: 110-). 
The socioeconomic, political and cultural activities and decisions performed at 
one locale came to impact the same types of activities and decisions in another 
locale (Held, 1998). As Guney (1998: 28) observes, “The emergence of a supra­
national administration, more distant from immediate experience than any 
previous public authority has put an understandable premium on sub-national 
administration, as a compensating mechanism”. Both for purposes of generating 
equal levels of development and providing for democratic accountability, the 
Community adopted a ‘Europe of the Regions’ vision, considering the requisite 
for the participation of the regional and local representative into the decision­
making processes. The Commission and the European Parliament were the
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supporters of this vision because of its federal tenets and for the sake of 
democratic legitimacy (Dinan, 1994: 315).
As already touched upon in the previous chapter, the EC had acquired budgetary 
competence relating to the control and effective use (redistribution) of the 
Communities’ resources. In this respect, the Commission and the EP powers are 
increasing. Yet, the member states are not at all too enthusiastic in conferring so 
much budgetary powers to the EC or in increasing their contributions to the funds, 
a double-edged pressure from both the local and the supranational is affording too 
much for the nation-state. Among the developmental resources of the EC, for 
instance the (European Regional) Structural Funds have a significant place, for its 
financial (resource) contributions to the different regions of the Union. 
Additionally, the European Investment Bank is also a resource for giving credits 
to the Union-wide credible projects brought under its consideration. These and 
similar funds are of great importance to support the regions in their economic 
developments. Consequently, the sub-national (regional) actors focus on the 
means for “attraction” of these resources into their localities (Nugent, 1999: 285). 
Thus, they constitute an object of competition between the interests of various 
localities. In 1988 reformation of the Structural Funds, with the introduction of a 
‘partnership program’, the sub-national level actors came to play an increasingly 
important role in the management of European Regional and Structural Funds, 
this was also an extension of the ‘Assembly of the Regions’ which was a 
transnational platform to bring together sub-national interests (Dinan, 1994: 315; 
Nugent, 1999: 286) By the introduction of the TEU it was reasserted that the
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Union was giving importance to democratic accountability and to overcome the 
regional disparities and the probable ‘negative effects’ brought about by the 
process of integration.^^ Thereafter, the Committee of the Regions (COR) was 
established as a formal consultative institution of the EC pillar of the EU. As set 
in the Treaty on European Union, it was composed of the “representatives of 
regional and local bodies”. The activities of the COR extends from regional and 
economic development and finance to agriculture, fisheries, tourism, transport, 
social policy, education, culture, telecommunication, environment, and many 
other areas.
In this context, then the sub-national governments are in direct interactions with 
the supranational actors, and on a platform of negotiations for the process of 
legislation and the process of redistribution of resources that fall within the 
capacities of the supranational institutions. Additionally, the choice of 
participation to the supranational politics imply a tendency to act autonomously 
with regard to the national governments, which is certainly curtailing the authority 
of the central government over the local ones. As already mentioned at the 
opening of this chapter, different member states are being impacted at varying 
degrees and depending on their (pre-)existing internal structures and dynamics. As 
illustrations, within the EU, “Belgium has been transformed from a unitary into a 
federal polity”, in Italy and in Spain there is remarkable increase in regional based
”  Regional here implies localities within the territorial borders of the nation-state. However, it is 
also widely used to refer to the specific regions of the EU, such as the Mediterranean Region or the 
Northern Regions. Note also that local and sub-national are used interchangeably. This is because 
they are all in practice interrelated to one another. For an observation of the flexibility of the term 
region within the EU; see, Newman, Michael. 1996. Democracy, Sovereignty and die European 
Union, page 127-129.
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politics, and even in France which traditionally is known as a highly centralized 
state there are trends in the opposite direction (Marks, 1997: 88,90; Newman 
1996: 136). Kurzer (1993) in her case study on Belgium and Ladrech (1994) in his 
case study on France identify the impact that the process of integration have on 
the member states as “Europeanization” leading on one set of networks to 
unification and on another set of networks into fragmentation. In the case of 
Belgium, Kurzer argues that the uneven pace of integration has sharpened the 
“disparities between the language communities and gave rise to a new generation 
of political leaders who took advantage of the European integration to promote 
decentralization of state function and to restrict government executive autonomy”. 
Moreover, she also refers to the clashes of interests among the Wallon, Flemish 
and Brussels regional councils and among the French, Dutch and German 
linguistic communities. Another example is the Italian case where the European 
integration process has sharpened the political divisions between the North and 
the South regions (Newman, 1996; Güney, 1998). Additionally, there is also 
another dimension through which the political strength of the localities increases, 
as mentioned in Ladrech (1994: 84), “beginning in 1986, the Rhone-Alpes region 
entered in accords on scientific, technical and cultural cooperation with Baden 
Wurttemburg, Catalonia, and Lombardy”.’* He emphasis the consequences as in 
some way meaning “less tutelage from Paris”. Yet, another consequence that these 
inter-regional or transnational regional cooperation can bring about is uneven pace 
of development among the EU regions. In general terms the intensification of the
See also Newman, Michael. 1996. Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union., pp. 133- 
134 for both the ‘inter-regional’ cooperation and disparities.
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political tensions can paved the way to more extreme cases of horizontal 
identification of oneself with the local or regional communities. This is yet a 
problem and challenge which not only the state but also the EU have to 
accommodate (Newman, 1996: 136). Indeed, in its origins, the efforts devoted to 
the visions of ‘Europe of the Regions’ are bring about to overcome the ‘negative 
effects’ or failures of integration. The prospects of future regional integration in 
Europe are open to further and elaborate discussion; however, for the current 
study, in relation to the case studies reviews and discussions in this section, it can 
be suggested that even if at varying degrees and in varying forms, the nation­
states are all challenged by the increasing political forces of the localities that 
brings about fragmentation. Then, through the forces of ‘Europeanization’, the 
territorial sovereignty and the independent policy-making capacities of the states 
are undermined directly through the sub-national actors, indirectly through the 
supranational institutions which from time to time reflects on the state certain 
claims or decisions of these localities. Yet, again this is not to argue that the states 
have entirely lost control over their territories, this is only to put the emphasis on
7Qthe transformations which the Westphalian state exhibits.
4.3 Stretching Forth to the Supranational
4.3.1 European Economic and Monetary Uniflcation (EMU)
The European Economic and Monetary Unification is the latest stage of the 
European economic integration processes. The processes of economic integration
’’ For an alternative yet complementary analysis of ‘Euroepan Regional Development Policy’, see 
Ansel, K.Christopher, Craig A. Parsons and Keith A.Dardea “Dual Networks in Regional 
Development Policy”, Journal o f Common Market Studies, pp. 347-375, they provide a 
“structuralist logic of sociological network theory” .
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and their spillover effects into the other domains of policy were discussed in detail 
in the second chapter, in this section the focus will be on EMU and its political 
consequence that is the convergence of the national economies of the member 
states. In other words, the transfer of sovereignty in all the aspects relating to the 
national economies of the member states to the single institutional framework of 
the EU, specifically to the first pillar (EC). The purpose will be to explore the 
extent to which the convergence of the national economies of the member states 
was realized.
The TEU (1993) set the objectives to be achieved, for the realization of EMU not 
later than January 1999. First, the establishment of an independent European 
Central Bank (ECB)*° to govern and to regulate the macroeconomic policies of 
the EU; the maintenance of the price stability, the regulation of the foreign 
exchange operations, the management of the foreign reserves of the member 
states, to regulate the operation of the payment policies (foreign debts). Second, 
the introduction into the financial markets of the EURO as the ‘single currency’ of 
the common market, this implied the ‘irrevocable fixing of the exchange rates’ of 
the member states. Therefore, the general underlying purpose is the convergence 
of the macroeconomic policies of the member states.
The achievement of the EMU is essential for the proper functioning of the Single 
European Market. This is a requirement for the complete elimination of the
The ECB was intended to operate ‘within the framework of a Euroepan Sytenm of Central 
Banks’, the ‘main objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability, and to support the general 
aims and policies of the EC’. See Nugent Neil. 1999. The Government and Politics o f  the 
European Union", page 73 for the underlying objectives of EMU.
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barriers to trade within the Single Market. In other words, analogous to the 
domestic markets, it is intended to provide “greater stability of the common 
market economy” and to “exclude exchange-rate risks in investment and trade, 
and help to prevent macroeconomic disturbances of the balance within the entire 
territory of the common market” (Gormley, 1998: 125).In consideration of the 
economic disparities between the members, as early as the 1978 the European 
Monetary System was established in order to achieve these goals. Additionally, 
ECU was established as a means of transaction, and the weight of the economy of 
the member states would be reflected in it. In this respect, the member states 
should have to harmonize their macroeconomic policies on a ‘stage by stage 
basis’. This was a first instance where the member states’ autonomous policy 
formulation capacities was significantly undermined. The member states were 
supposed to approximate their inflation rates, exchange rates, budget deficits and 
many other components of their national economic policies. In addition, by the 
TEU the common policies were more demanding on the member states in terms of 
cutting considerable amounts of their public expenditures for the reduction of their 
budget deficit, and the unemployment rates were still relatively high and reduction 
in social security measures would be a source of pressure for the governments 
(Risse, 1999:148) In this respect, already bound by common trade policies, the 
member states were also restricted in their extractive and redistributive capacities, 
since the overall national economic system is highly dependent on these activities 
of the state. Additionally, it is mainly by its extractive (i.e. tax collection) and 
redistributive (i.e. social welfare systems) policies that the state is supposed to 
meet the demands and the expectations of its citizens, and the social support of its
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citizens is highly dependent on these capacities of the state, as well as its 
legitimacy (Migdal, 1987; Nordlinger, 1987). Consequently, by the introduction 
of EMU the policy-making capacities of the member states would be undermined, 
and considerable loss of sovereignty in domestic economy would be the result. 
However, in January 1999, as prescribed by the TEU, with the exception of 
Denmark, Greece*^ Sweden and the UK accomplished the European Monetary 
and Economic Union. EMU falls under the supranational pillar of the EU, and the 
decisions are binding over all the members. Although, some issues such as the 
approximation of taxation policies, harmonization of social policy are still on their 
processes of accomplishment, the EMU is realized. Indeed, for instance in the 
Helsinki Summit, it was decided that a project should be developed for the 
taxation of the EU citizens, meanwhile paralleled with the reinforcement of the 
common social policies.
Therefore, the implications of EMU for the sovereignty and strength of the 
modern nation-state are very fundamental. First, in almost all the general 
economic issues it is the supranational center that decide. Consequently, the 
sovereignty of the states over their economic activities is to a considerable extent 
undermined. Second, the autonomy and capacities of the state for policy 
formulating or making in the national economy is undermined. Indeed, in almost 
all the economic issues, it is bound to conform to the supranational directions and 
regulations. Finally, the question of ‘collective identity’ again comes to the forth. 
The Euro is intended to replace the national currencies of the member states.
In June 2000 Greece joined the EMU.
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which also in this term enters into the domain o f ‘identity-interest’ politics (Risse,
1999). The national currency is a symbol of the national economic sovereignty. In 
this respect, both symbolic and material values are attached to the national 
currency. Consequently, EMU is, as Oatley (2000: 163) mentions, “the deepest 
instance of institutionalized international cooperation ...those governments that 
have joined monetary union have surrender to the policy advantages attached to 
independent national currencies”. In other words, they have “lost autonomy over 
national monetary and exchange rate policies”, which are the main means for 
achieving national economic objectives (Oatly, 2000). However, on the one hand, 
the process is sensitively handled by the governments in order for the process to 
be credible. The governments are measuring both the public response and the 
level of trust among the member states. Yet, on the other hand, the EMU and the 
Euro are symbolic of a united European economic system in its external relations 
(Calleo, 1999).
4.3.2 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
The TEU introduce this third intergovernmental pillar of the EU basically because 
of the consequences of the elimination of custom controls between the member 
states, and with respect to the free movements of persons. This was basically to 
strengthen “the bases for the establishment of an area in which there could be free 
movement of persons ‘behind’ common entry rules”, and the development of a 
framework for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters” (Nugent, 1999: 
83). This was also intended to support and safeguard the fundamental principles 
upon which the Union rested; liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
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fundamental freedom, and the rule of law. The member states were expected to 
conform to these fundamental principles, and in cases of infringements, their 
membership rights would be suspended (Nugent, 1999: 83-84). In the TEU 
(1993), with respect to the common interests of the member states; approximation 
of asylum policies, visas regulations, immigration policies and policies 
concerning the non-member states nationals, cooperation in police and judicial 
matters and cooperation in customs were outlined as the basic areas of 
competence of JHA. In the post-Maastricht period, the adoption of common 
policies relating to the ‘free movement of persons’, such as visas, immigration and 
asylum, were brought under the EC pillar of the EU, this was intended to 
accelerate the “free movement of persons behind a common external border” 
(Nugent, 1999). Additionally, it was decided that Schengeri’^ ,^ which is an 
agreement intended to eliminate internal custom controls and to adopt common 
external measures for the entrance of the citizens from third countries, be 
incorporated into the EU. With respect to this second pillar of the EU, the main 
activities to be held under the intergovernmental framework is the ‘police and 
judicial cooperation’ (Nugent, 1999). However, with respect to the developments 
in the overall framework of this second pillar it can be observed that the 
approximation of the policies of the member states are relatively slow. The 
immigration and asylum policy positions of the member states vary greatly from 
the Northern European countries to the Southern ones, and their security concerns 
varies greatly. Yet, still, the Schengen agreement is significant for the accession of 
citizens of a third country are subjected to single external border control, as if they
82 All the member states of the EU, with the exception of UK and Ireland, are also Schengen 
members
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were accessing one single state. Although the negotiations between the member 
states are complicated with respect to the approximation and adoption of common 
policies falling under this third pillar, the study of which exceeds the scope of this 
thesis, the JHA domain is another significant instance for the reformulation of the 
traditional geographical borders of the modern nation-state.
4.3.3 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European 
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)
The Maastricht Treaty was an aggregation of all the activities, which the member 
states performed throughout the process of European integration, under the 
umbrella of the European Union (Best, 1994). A major pillar introduced was the 
CFSP to be undertaken under the European Council.*^ In retrospect, the progress 
relating to the issues of political integration were hardly negotiated between the 
member states. Certainly because they were undermining directly the ‘territorial 
sovereignty’ of the state. In other words, the locus of power safeguarding the 
national identity, interests and security and the gatekeepers of the distinction 
between the ‘self and the ‘other’. Indeed, as a reminder to the first chapter, it 
was “at the intersection of the ‘international’ and the ‘national’ conditions and 
processes” that the territorial sovereignty of the state had “crystallized” (Held, 
1999). And, the “boundaries and identities of the modem national states” are in
In retrospect, in the second chapter the developments relating to the establishment of a closer 
political cooperation were briefly touched upon , these were EPC.EDC, and provisions contained 
in various Reports submitted to the member states and the EC institutions. Additionally, the scope 
and nature of the European Council was underlined in chapter 3.
In retrospect, the competition between the national interets conducted trough power politics in 
Europe was explored in chapter 2 and in chapter 1. The Westphalian settlement was to set the 
territorial borders to stop war in Europe, the European integration movement was laimched to stop 
tlie war brought about by the ‘sovereign nation-states’ co-existing in the European system.
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most part constructed by their within and beyond territorial interactions (Evans, 
Rueschmeyer, Skcopol, 1987: 169-). Consequently, the capabilities of the nation­
state to reassert their internal and external social, economic, cultural and political 
relations and standpoints is also an attribute of their foreign, security, and defense 
policy considerations. In terms of common foreign and security policies the 
national interests of the member states of the Community\Union showed 
considerable difference up until the post-Maastricht era. As illustrations, the UK’s 
traditional attachment to ‘'Atlanticism”, the French strong commitment for the 
preservation of its role in shaping global politics, the tendency of other members 
such as Denmark or Austria wishing to preserve their relatively neutral positions 
(Carlsness and Smith, 1995). Not to mention the different security concerns 
among the member states locating in the Mediterranean Region, the Nordic 
Region, those having geographical boundaries with the Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans. It can not be argued that actually the member states are 
fully reconciled in terms of their foreign policy and security concerns, but the 
recent developments in this second pillar of the EU demonstrate a relatively 
remarkable convergence of foreign, security and defense identities of the member 
states.
As it was demonstrated within the overall framework of this thesis, everything 
which falls under the European integration movement are simultaneously 
interrelated. The adoption of common foreign policies are an extension of the 
completion of the Single European Market and the adoption of common foreign 
trade policies as well as the notion of EU citizens or the EMU and other issues
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having implications for the formation of a common foreign policies. Yet, the TEU 
was projecting a step further by additionally introducing the notions of ‘common 
security’ and ‘common defense’. In historical perspective, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were the major 
platforms where the European cooperation on security and defense were held. 
They are all international organization and the members are both members and 
non-members to the EC/EU. Additionally, within the scope of the European 
integration movement, the intergovernmental conferences were also providing 
platforms of negotiation between the member states to open new avenues for the 
adoption of a stronger and more independent foreign security and defense 
architecture. Davignon Report (1970) was such an attempt to forsee and set the 
foundations of a European CFSP structure (Salmon and Nicoll, 1997; 107-110). 
By the 1970s, the Foreign Ministers of the member states had discussed in the 
report the problems relating to ‘political unification’ and had brought to the forth 
the need to realize a Europe that “can speak with one voice” in its out-of- 
Community relations. Thereafter, the process of European political unification 
was revitalized. Moreover, beginning from this period the global visions of the 
United States and Western Europe were becoming divergent from one another, 
and the Europeans were negotiating strategies to acquire further independent 
action capabilities. By the early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought 
about a fundamental change in the global system. The reunification of Germany, 
the motivation to bring the Central and Eastern European States within the 
integration framework, the turbulence in the Balkans and other systemic
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challenges brought about by the globalization processes urged Europe to adopt a 
single European position in its external relations. The EU had to increase its 
bargaining powers in global politics and be able to control its destiny in an ever 
globalizing world, by continuing to take its part in shaping the global politics.*^ 
Additionally, the new (global) security challenges were more or less clear, “world 
wide diffusion of military technologies” and the corresponding increase in 
weapons of mass destruction; “economic crisis”; environmental pollution; “ethno- 
nationalism”; “refugee-crises”; “militant and politicized religious movements”; 
“terrorism” and many other potential sources of territorial conflicts. While the 
potential challenges were the same, and the identity fighting against these forces 
was aiming at ‘promoting peace, security and democracy in the world’, the 
strategies used to combat them varied within and without Western Europe.**’ In 
this light, the post-Maastricht era was intended to promote a stronger convergence 
of the national political interests and identities in the conduct of the external 
relations of the EU. As set in the TEU (1993), the institutionalization of the CFSP 
under a first pillar had the overt goal of “framing a common defense policy” that 
was expected to lead to the emergence of a ‘common defense’ to result in 
reinforcing the “European identity and its independence to promote peace, 
security and progress in Europe and in the world”. Therefore, the CFSP was 
intended to reinforce the ‘European identity’ and to form a platform of collective 
identity and action among the member state. In other words, a common position in
See Guehenno, Jean-Marie 1999, "Americanisation du monde ou mondialisation de l ’Amérique” 
[Americanization of the globe or the globalization of America], the article in insightful with 
respect to the underlying motivations of the European Economic and Political Unification
See, The New Transatlantic Agenda (US/EU), Public Affairs Office, United States Mission to 
the European Union (1995) for a detailed information on the fields of transatlantic cooperation.
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perceiving, in attaching meanings and in interacting with respect to the global 
politics and systemic changes. And, the implications of the adoption o f ‘common 
policies’ for the ‘national sovereignty’ were discussed in relation to the 
supranational pillar of the EU, the European Communities. The key word of the 
CFSP pillar was “joint action”, which is an overt objective of ‘common policy’ 
(Dinnage and Murphy, 1996: 43).
In the post-Maatricht era, the intergovernmental pillar speeded up its activities 
relating to CFSP. The respective aims were to strengthen the European pillar of 
the NATO, and integrate the WEU as the defense common pillar under the EU. In 
June 1992, the Petersberg Declaration has been overtly reasserted these goals. The 
Treaty set the objective as “The Union requests the WEU which is an integral part 
of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and 
actions which have defense implications” (Eliassen, 1998: 6). In 1996, Berlin 
Summit of NATO, the ‘European Defense and Security Identity’ was created as 
the European pillar of NATO. This was aimed at the adoption of a common 
defense position within the NATO, to strengthen the European initiative. This was 
followed by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), considerable competence was given to 
the CFSP pillar of the Union. First, qualified majority principle was brought as the 
“norm for adopting and implementing joint actions and common positions, thus 
making these policy instruments essentially supranational”, but “for important and 
stated reasons of national policy” a member state might not given its vote 
(Nugent, 1999: 85). However, the introduction of qmv opened up a relatively 
important space for the decisions of the CFSP acquire a supranational nature.
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Moreover, though highly debated, the financing of the second pillar, with the 
exception of military or defense expenditures, were brought under supranational 
control. Additionally, the process of incorporation of the WEU under the EU was 
furthered. The ‘Petersberg tasks’ of the WEU involved in ‘humanitarian and 
rescue tasks and task of combat management, including peace keeping’ were 
brought under the EU by the TEU, Article 17 (Gordon, 1997: 89). Consequently, 
common security tasks were undertaken by the EU. Another competence 
introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty was the authority of the CFSP to enter into 
agreements with third countries in the issues falling under its competence. This 
meant again the possibility for the CFSP to act as the representative of the 
member states in external relations. Finally, the selection of a High Representative 
for the CFSP to participate into the Council was decided upon. In the years to 
follow, the Franco-German and UK cooperation to further the CFSP capabilities 
of the EU were considerable (Ham, 1999; Vershbow, 1999). In 1998 St Malo 
Summit, the French and British axis negotiate to give further competence to the 
CFSP in order for the EU to have more control over common defense and security 
matters. The St Malo Joint Declaration on European Defense (1998) has set the 
objective as
The EU needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international 
stage. This means making reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will 
provide the essential basis for action by the Union...To this end, the Union 
must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to 
respond to international crises. In pursuing our objective, the collective 
defense commitments to which the member states subscribe must be 
maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between member states of the 
European Union, in order that Europe can make its yoice heard in world 
affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective
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obligations in NATO... European will operate within the institutional 
framework of the European Union...European solidarity must take into 
account the various positions of European states...
To follow St Malo, in 1999 in the Cologne Summit of the European Council (199,
the decision was made to merge the EU and the WEU. This was very important
because the common defense capabilities of the EU would decisively be brought
under the competence of EU. Additionally, Secretary General of the WEU, Javier
Solana, became the first High Representative for the CFSP responsible for all the
activities to be held under this EU pillar. Although decision would be made on
intergovernmental basis, the common defense policies of these states would be
closely tied to each other in their decision making capabilities. This was one of the
reasons for why some EU members opted out or were reserved concerning the
CFSP, Denmark is one of such states who opted out already in 1993 at Maastricht
negotiations. Additionally, not all the member states belong to WEU Ireland,
Austria, Finland, Sweden opted to become Observer States (Leonard, 1998: 241).
Indeed, the member states were hardly negotiating on issues undermining their
national sovereignty on the high political domains. However, the commitment to
create common defense capabilities were not void since a CFSP without a
common defense policy would not at all be credible with respect to the conduct of
the EU’ s external relations (Mathiopoulos and Gyamati, 1999: 73). In the
Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki Summit of the European Union held in
10-11 December 1999 it was stated that.
The European Council underlines its determination to develop an 
autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not 
engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to 
international crises...cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, the 
member states must be able by 2003, to deploy within 60 days an sustain 
for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of
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the foil range of Petersberg tasks; new political and military bodies and 
structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to 
ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such 
operations, while respecting the single institutional structure...
The conclusions reached at Helsinki were of great significance for the project of 
the creation of a common European army. This army is not yet formed but a 
cooperation network between the EU, WEU and NATO is activated so as to 
provide the EU with the defense capabilities of both of the institutions. The 
decision was based on the assumption that the “construction and deepening of the 
EU integration” was necessary for the adoption of common positions relating to 
foreign, security and defense, and specifically in cases of crises escalation 
(Varshbow, 1999). This was also an extension of the US/EU argument concerning 
the European military forces in NATO as ‘separable but not separate forces’. A 
coherent NATO and within or without it a coherent Europe were latent objectives. 
More precisely, Europe aimed at creating common defense capabilities under the 
control of EU, and the ESDI pillar which would be under NATO was yet another 
avenue opened for joint action in the voting procedures of the Organization as 
well as in the operation to be held in cases of crises requiring to perform defense 
capabilities. As the recent declaration of the UK prime minister Blair “We 
Europeans, should not expect the United States to play role in every disorder in 
our backyard” and added that the military capabilities of NATO “need to be more 
available to European led-operations” (Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati). Finally, in 
the recent Feira Summit of the European Council held on 19 and 20 June 2000, 
the commitment of the EU in ‘building the Common European Sedurity and 
Defense Policy capable of reinforcing the Union’s external action trough the
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development of a military crisis capability as well as a civilian one’ was asserted. 
The Nice Summit to be held on December 2000 is expected to be decisive in the 
establishment of permanent political and military structures within the EU for the 
further advance of the Common European Security and Defense Identity.
The Westphalian settlement in 1648 and the subsequent era of Absolutism to 
result in the French Revolution and the chain of events combined together to 
shape the modern nation-state were all explored. In historical perspective, one of 
the symbols of the ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘territorial unity’ of the nation-state 
is the ‘national army’. And, at this final destination of the study, which attempted 
to picture the basic transformations that the Westphalian state had experienced, it 
can be concluded that the process of European Economic and Political Unification 
is quite resolved in ‘the art of creating the possible’. It is certain that the 
strengthening of the second and the third pillars of the EU will further undermine 
the sovereignty of the nation-states and their capabilities of autonomous action. 
Although the intergovernmental initiative is much more stronger than the 
supranational one in CFSP pillar of the EU. It was already demonstrated so far in 
this thesis that the intergovernmental decisions have led to strengthening the 
weight of the supranational in the decision making procedures of the EU. It is 
certain that the emergence of the European Union as a single institutional 
structure and the extent to which it is supranational in nature and scope points out 
to a very significant transformation in the Westphalian order which has been 
experienced before. In the context of the international relations (system) it is also 
a relatively singular platform for ‘collective identity formation’ among the states.
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CONCLUSION
The main focus of this study has been the integration process that is taking place 
in Western Europe for about half century that can be considered as an integral part 
of the evolution of the modern nation-state in Western Europe. As this thesis has 
suggested, the process is pushing for a reformulation of the modern nation-state 
by undermining its sovereignty and by putting into question its strength. There are 
two rather controversial but integrated dimensions to this process. On the one 
hand, the supranational forces of the EU are pushing for more unification of 
national economics and politics. On the other hand, this tendency is counter 
balanced by a move towards fragmentation, particularly originating from the 
localities within the Western European states. These pressures are the results of 
the increasing political strength and the fragmentary forces of the localities. 
Taking together, these two counter tendencies are the consequences of both the 
globalization processes that is taken place at the systemic level, and more 
specifically the outcome of the smooth process of integration in Europe itself As 
a result, the nation-state is under the double pressure of these two processes that 
are pushing for its reformulation.
As it was explored in this study, at the edge of the 2U‘ century, there are 
considerable transformations, in terms of both perceptions and realities, on the 
nature and scope of the modem nation-states in Western Europe. Consequently, 
the thesis has proposed that the modem nation-state in Western Europe, as
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symbolized and defined basically by the premises of the Westphalian model and 
the French Revolution, is in a process of reformulation. The focus has been on the 
concept of the modern nation-state of whose premise, i.e. its sovereignty is 
challenged. The thesis has chosen to concentrate on three major variables which 
are thought to be responsible for the reformulation of the modern nation-state in 
Western Europe. These three major challenges are; (1) the process of 
globalization, (2) the supranational forces as posed by the European Union and its 
policies, and the increased political strength of localities which brings about 
fragmentation, (3) these are not the only variables responsible for the 
reformulation of the state, but the study has aimed to focus only upon these 
variables for analytical purpose. Following this logical sequence, the thesis has 
attempted to demonstrate that these three challenges undermine the very 
foundation of the European state; the principle of sovereignty.*’ On the other 
hand, the thesis has proposed that these challenges mentioned above impact 
another basic pillar of the modern state; namely its strength as measured through, 
the interplay of two factors; its autonomy and its capacities. The strength of the
OO
state is traditionally defined through these two factors.
As it was introduced in the first chapter, the sovereignty principle implies that the 
nation-state, within its territorial boundaries, has the relative independence of 
action in its internal and external affairs. Additionally, sovereignty also involves
The principle of sovereignty is basically defined in the first chapter o f the thesis through 
underlining the ‘Westphalian model’ which emerged in the 1648 to evolve throughout the 
eighteen, nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
*** The strength of the state was defined in the first chapter by referring to the works of Migdal 
(1987), Nordlinger (1987) and Scocpol, Rueschmeyer and Evans (1987).
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the notion of ‘juridical equality’ in terms of freedom of action of each state 
existing in the international system. Then, for a state to have its claim to 
sovereignty and political equality to be legitimized, it has to be recognized as such 
by the international community. Second, the strength of the state first implies the 
extent to which it is relatively independent from internal and external actors to 
formulate its own preferences into policies, which is conceptualized as its 
autonomy. Another determinant is the extent to which the state can solve the 
internal and external problems it encounters, meet the moral and material 
expectations of its population and obtain their consent and support, which is 
conceptualized as its capacity. The first chapter has also outlined the 
contemporary challenges, i.e. the forces of the globalization process, the 
supranational forces of the European Union, and the increased political strength 
and the fragmentary forces of the localities by the encounter of which to the 
modern nation-state in Western Europe is undergoing a reformulation and \or 
restructuring process. The exploration of the forces of the globalization process 
has been integrated into the overall study, since the process of regional integration 
in Western Europe is interrelated with this wider process of globalization. 
However the main focus has been on the exploration of the supranational impact 
and the impact of the local forces within the EU, which have been explored in the 
second, third and fourth chapters of the thesis. To put it somewhat differently, the 
thesis has been an attempt to explore the extent to which these two forces, forces 
of integration and fragmentation, constitute a challenge to the member states of 
the EC\EU.
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In this light, the following chapters have carried the task of exploring the 
emergence and evolution of the EC\EU in its relations with the member states. In 
the first chapter, he period from the emergence of the visions of a united Europe 
to the ratification of the Treaty on the European Union has been covered. The 
underlying dynamics of the processes of integration, with a specific emphasis to 
the interplay of ‘negative integration’ and ‘positive integration’, and the 
subsequent completion of the Single European Market, were studied in their 
respective impacts on the member states. The processes whereby the member 
states have been sharing their territorial jurisdiction with the EC have been 
demonstrated. Additionally, empirical case studies have been used to provide a 
picture as to show how the sovereignty and the strength of the states have been 
undermined. It has been concluded that the cumulative processes of European 
integration, which revolves around the interactions between the intergovernmental 
and supranational axis, has led to a serious reformulation on the conception of the 
modern national state. To follow the second chapter, in the third chapter, the 
institutional structure of the ECVEU has been studied. The aim has been to 
demonstrate that the EC\EU is a new form of territorial governance the lubricant 
of which are the intergovernmental and the supranational institutional procedures. 
The institutionalized scope of the European integration process and its irrevocable 
nature has been pictured so as to deepen the understanding of the mechanisms 
whereby the ECVEU is reshaping the Westphalian order, and in that it is an 
emerging post-Westphalian actor.
Finally, in the last chapter, the focus was on the post- Maastricht (Treaty on 
European Union) period. This part consisted of an evaluation of the extent to
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which the process of European integration has been deepening. The prospects of 
the project of the European Economic, Monetary and Political Unification has 
been elaborated. It has been concluded that the processes whereby the European 
integration stretches back to the local and forth to the supranational are posing 
double-pressure on the modern nation-state. At the heart of the unification 
projects lies the convergence of the political spheres of the nation-states and this 
certainly stimulates to a significant extent the transformation of the modern 
conception of the nation- state.
Accordingly, the thesis focused upon the extent to which the conceptions of the 
sovereignty and the strength -  as it is measured by the autonomy and capacity 
variables-, as the main pillars of the modern nation state, are transformed by the 
integrative and fragmentary forces of the EC\EU within the general framework of 
the processes of globalization. However, a remaining vital remark to be made is 
that the study has taken as granted the inherent differences which exists in the 
internal structures of the Western European states, and assumed that even if at 
varying degrees the responses will be all the member states are impacted by the 
European integration processes.
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